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Abstract 
 
Optimizing radio resource within a network and across cooperating heterogeneous 
networks is the focus of this thesis. Cooperation in a multi-network environment is 
tackled by investigating network selection mechanisms. These play an important role in 
ensuring quality of service for users in a multi-network environment. Churning of mobile 
users from one service provider to another is already common when people change 
contracts and in a heterogeneous communication environment, where mobile users have 
freedom to choose the best wireless service-real time selection is expected to become 
common feature. This real time selection impacts both the technical and the economic 
aspects of wireless network operations. Next generation wireless networks will enable a 
dynamic environment whereby the nodes of the same or even different network operator 
can interact and cooperate to improve their performance. Cooperation has emerged as a 
novel communication paradigm that can yield tremendous performance gains from the 
physical layer all the way up to the application layer. Game theory and in particular 
coalitional game theory is a highly suited mathematical tool for modelling cooperation 
between wireless networks and is investigated in this thesis. 
In this thesis, the churning behaviour of wireless service users is modelled by using 
evolutionary game theory in the context of WLAN access points and WiMAX networks. 
This approach illustrates how to improve the user perceived QoS in heterogeneous 
networks using a two-layered optimization. The top layer views the problem of prediction 
of the network that would be chosen by a user where the criteria are offered bit rate, 
price, mobility support and reputation. At the second level, conditional on the strategies 
chosen by the users, the network provider hypothetically, reconfigures the network, 
subject to the network constraints of bandwidth and acceptable SNR and optimizes the 
network coverage to support users who would otherwise not be serviced adequately. This 
forms an iterative cycle until a solution that optimizes the user satisfaction subject to the 
adjustments that the network provider can make to mitigate the binding constraints, is 
found and applied to the real network. The evolutionary equilibrium, which is used to 
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compute the average number of users choosing each wireless service, is taken as the 
solution.  
This thesis also proposes a fair and practical cooperation framework in which the base 
stations belonging to the same network provider cooperate, to serve each other‘s 
customers. How this cooperation can potentially increase their aggregate payoffs through 
efficient utilization of resources is shown for the case of dynamic frequency allocation. 
This cooperation framework needs to intelligently determine the cooperating partner and 
provide a rational basis for sharing aggregate payoff between the cooperative partners for 
the stability of the coalition. The optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the 
allocations of the channels to mobile customers, can be obtained as solutions of linear 
programming optimizations. 
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1 Introduction 
The role of wireless networks resource management is to provide quality of service (QoS) 
guarantees to traffic according to their bandwidth requirements while maintaining the 
high utilization of network resource. The resource management in wireless networks can 
be implemented in two levels [LU07]: 
 Macro-level, which involves call admission control (CAC), resource allocation 
and resource reservation to control the connectivity and end user‘s perceived QoS 
of the applications. 
 Micro-level, which deals with power control, media access control (MAC) and 
packet scheduling to control the QoS parameters such as delay and jitter of the 
applications.  
This thesis works at the macro level. 
In heterogeneous wireless networks, different wireless access technologies are integrated 
to complement each other in terms of coverage area, mobility support, bandwidth, and 
price. In such heterogeneous wireless networks, a dynamic network selection scheme is 
required not only to achieve seamless mobility, but also to support quality of service 
(QoS) enhancement and load balancing.  
Network selection in heterogeneous wireless networks can be categorized into two 
concepts namely as network-driven and user-driven. In the network-driven concept, the 
selection decision is made from the network-side (i.e., service provider). It is typically 
managed in a tightly integrated environment in which a central controller distributes the 
traffic flows among different networks. In contrast, with a user-driven approach, users 
make decisions to select the network and their decisions are autonomous and distributed 
across the whole network.  
1.1 Problem 
Self organisation of a network and the option for mobile users to swap from one service 
provider to another in order to choose the best wireless service is expected to become a 
common feature.  The technical and the economical aspects of wireless network design 
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are being affected by these latest trends in wireless communication. This thesis looks at 
techniques, principally based on Game Theory to support decision-making and to manage 
the resources of the network depending on the choices a user makes. 
For reasons of self-interest, the wireless users may engage in cooperative behaviour, 
resulting in an improved overall network performance. Cooperation among devices can 
coexist with a centralized infrastructure, e.g., in a cellular network, but is also of interest 
in ad hoc autonomous networks. In fact, due to the advantage of cooperation, numerous 
aspects of cooperative communication are making their way into wireless standards such 
as 3GPP‘s long-term evolution advanced (LTE-Advanced) or the forthcoming IEEE 
802.16j WiMAX standard. The implementation of cooperation among wireless network 
needs to address the modelling the benefit and cost tradeoffs, providing fair rules for 
cooperation, the modelling of users and the design of distributed approaches for 
cooperation among others. Therefore, an analytical framework needs to be developed 
which can appropriately capture these challenges of cooperation and provide guidelines 
for deploying cooperative nodes in next generation networks.  
1.2 Contribution 
Two different notions of cooperation are explored within this thesis. The first approach of 
cooperation uses the idea of supporting the transfer of users from one wireless network to 
another based on an established evolutionary equilibrium. The evolutionary equilibrium 
is a notion of equilibrium in which no user can increase their payoff by moving from one 
network to another. The second approach uses the concept of coalitional game theory to 
cooperatively utilize the allocation of channels between the network providers to 
optimize their payoffs. The coalition formation process should enable the selection of 
individual players that based on their own resources and availability will constitute the 
best group to satisfy user‘s QoS requirements.  
The main issue in coalitional game theory is to apply heuristics on the search space to 
find an optimal solution as quickly as possible. The top and bottom level within the 
search space is searched to find current optimal solution. All the partitions within the 
search space having a monetary value less than the current optimal solution are pruned. 
The upper and lower bounds are computed for the partitions and the pruning process 
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considers these bounds. The notion of stability on partition is used to decide the 
efficiency of the selected partition. The notion of stability ensures that no user within a 
partition can leave or join another partition to better their gains.   
Game theory is a framework consisting of set of mathematical tools to study interactions 
among the rational players. Game theory can be used to model the competitive and 
cooperative behaviour of wireless entities capable of making autonomous decisions. The 
self-organization, configuration and optimization of wireless networks lead to the use of 
game theoretic concepts. 
Game theory can be classified into two areas namely as non-cooperative and cooperative 
game theory. The non-cooperative game theory is used to model the competitive 
behaviour among the players. The cooperative game theory is used to study the 
cooperation among the number of players.  The cooperative game theory can be further 
subdivided into two branches, viz Nash bargaining and coalitional game theory. In this 
thesis, only coalitional game theory is considered. 
Coalitional game theory is a potentially powerful tool to devise a fair, efficient and 
practical framework to model various aspects of cooperation (i.e. coalition formation 
model) among the players in next generation wireless networks to optimize their utilities. 
Hence, it is necessary to describe the basics of coalitional game theory and its application 
in the research area of the heterogeneous wireless communication diagnosed in a 
dynamically varying environment. Hence, in the next chapter, we provide an introduction 
to coalitional game theory, which is a suited framework for modelling cooperative 
behaviour to be defined fully in Chapter 7. It is impractical to assume that a grand 
coalition would form and it is imperative to study how cooperation among the nodes (eg. 
between two base stations or wireless networks) can affect the QoS perceived by the 
users.  
This thesis only considers the cooperation among the wireless networks to provide better 
QoS to the mobile users. The cooperation among the mobile users is outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
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1.3 Research Aims 
In recent research, dynamic radio resource management is seen as a cost effective and 
flexible way to optimized spectrum utilization and improve the system capacity. Dynamic 
radio resource management mitigates the problem by employing adaptive approaches in 
channel assignment, re-allocation and sharing aspects of wireless communication, and 
typically takes one of two approaches [ZAN97]: 
1) Capacity Adaptation: An overloaded cell can try to increase its own capacity by 
borrowing capacity from neighbouring cells. Examples are channel borrowing 
[DSJ97][YW93], channel sharing [SLSX01][LSC99], dynamic channel allocation 
[AJK99][PMPS97][RFG95][BCH99]. 
Coalitional game theory uses the term coalition to refer to the collections or combinations 
of players with the same interests. The possible coalitions of players are dependent on the 
maximum number of possible combinations of players. For example, if there are four 
players involved in the game, the number of possible coalitions would be 2
4
-1. An 
increase in number of players exponentially increases the number of possible coalitions. 
A partition is a collection of one or more coalitions containing all players. For example, if 
there are four players involved in the game, the coalitions could be {2, 4} or {1, 3} 
whereas a partition would be {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}. As will be seen later, each partition of a 
game constitutes the search space.  The search space can be grouped in various levels. At 
the top level is the partition with all players acting on their own i.e.                  . 
The second level constitutes the partitions with collection of two coalitions i.e. 
              and so on. The bottom level constitutes the partitions with all the players 
(also known as grand coalition) i.e.          .  
The basic coalition problem can be described as: given a set of base stations or wireless 
networks ‗N‘ and a resource allocation demand breq they each have to satisfy, if the 
resource demand cannot be satisfied by a single network or when a single network 
handles the request inefficiently, it is necessary for the wireless networks to cooperate 
with each other to fulfil the resource demand. With cooperation between networks (by 
forming coalitions among themselves), the allocation of resources (i.e. channels) required 
for that application can be split over the ‗N‘ base stations or perhaps networks. This is a 
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special case of Overlapping Coalition Formation. In real world, the resources (or 
channels) can be borrowed from the ‗N‘ BS or networks to fulfil the application 
requirements of the coalition. Let                 denote a coalition structure, 
where              . As a result of coalition formation, individual players now act 
for the benefit of the coalition. Therefore the objective of each member in the coalition 
becomes the optimization of the coalition objectives subjected to operating constraints.  
2) Load Adaptation: An overloaded cell can try to reduce its own load by forcing or 
directing some or all of its associated wireless devices to switch to alternative 
neighbouring cells. Examples are cell breathing and soft handover schemes. The load 
adaptation is implemented in this thesis by using a form of Evolutionary Game Theory in 
which the users are diverted from the congested network to the un-congested network 
depending on the received payoff. 
1.4 Novelty 
The main objective of this work is to introduce different cooperative mechanisms into 
wireless networks using different concepts of game theory and investigate their potential 
benefit as compared to non-cooperative mechanisms. The cooperative mechanisms are 
classified as coalitional and evolutionary. 
 This thesis analyzes the cooperation between the wireless networks as an 
optimisation problem and solves it using the coalitional game theory. The cooperation 
among base stations within the same provider to share the resources is analyzed using 
transferable payoff coalition game model. The aim of this thesis is motivated by the 
need to develop efficient algorithms for solving the coalition structure generation 
problem. It does it by applying game theory to several problems where cooperation is 
required. The coalition structure generation is the formation of coalitions by the players 
involved such that players within each coalition coordinate their activities, but players 
do not coordinate between coalitions. Precisely, this means partitioning the set of 
players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions. This partition is called a coalition 
structure (CS). The characteristic function to determine the coalitional value is modelled 
as convex optimization and it can be solved to find an optimal cooperation.  
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  This thesis describes the cooperation between the heterogeneous wireless networks 
using population evolution algorithm.  Multi-criteria mechanism such as AHP is applied 
to model user preferences for different criteria to get an initial partition of users (i.e. 
proportion of users within a network) within the heterogeneous wireless networks. Next, 
an evolutionary game theory is applied to re-calculate the partition by churning the 
users from one network to the other network depending on their received payoff. In 
population evolution, each user observes the payoff of other users in the same 
population in each period and in the next period adopts a network that offers it a higher 
payoff. The network is also re-configured by altering the transmission power of 
networks to hypothetically calculate the new partition. For example, if one network is 
overloaded in peak times, the neighbouring networks (might be in their off-peak time) 
can alter their transmission power to churn the users from the loaded network. This 
mechanism helps by churning the users from loaded network to the un-loaded network 
such that the proportion of users within the loaded network becomes within their 
capacity for the smooth running. The evolutionary equilibrium is considered a stable 
point (or partition) after which no user can move from one network to the other 
network. 
   This thesis also investigates the order in which these cooperative mechanisms should 
be applied. The coalitional game based cooperative mechanism analyzes the 
cooperation between the base stations of the same network whereas the evolutionary 
game based cooperative mechanism analyzes the cooperation between different 
networks. In case of cooperation whether the coalitional or evolutionary based 
cooperation should be applied first depending on the scenario (i.e. congestion or BS 
failure) need to be addressed in this thesis. 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into three main areas. Firstly, the mathematical modelling to 
express user preferences for the considered criteria and its potential benefit in network 
selection is discussed using multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) methods. In Chapter 
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2, different MCDM methods are discussed. In Chapter 3, the basics of Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) are discussed and explained with the help of simple WiMAX/Wi-Fi 
example. In Chapter 4, the proposed AHP network selection model to cater the user 
modelling is explained. This chapter also considers some realistic scenarios with 
realistically gathered data to explain the effectiveness of AHP. This chapter looks at 
network selection from user perspective. 
Secondly, the concept of evolving users from congested network to uncongested network 
using network re-configuration and evolutionary game theory model is illustrated with 
the help of simulation. In Chapter 5, cooperative load balancing with the help of 
evolutionary game theory along with Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) method is 
explained using network re-configuration. This chapter considers the network selection 
from the network perspective. 
In Chapter 6, the basic concepts of coalitional game theory, the payoff distribution 
methods, the coalition formation process and the stability of partitions are described in 
detail. Finally, the concept of cooperation in wireless communication networks is 
investigated in Chapter 7. Then, we introduce the analytical framework of coalitional 
game theory and discuss its potential application in wireless networks. Further, the basics 
and challenges of implementing cooperation in an integrated wireless network 
environment using different types of game theory (i.e. coalition based and evolutionary) 
are discussed. 
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2 Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) 
In general, there exist two distinctive types of MCDM problems and these arise from 
different problems settings: one type has a finite number of alternative solutions and the 
other an infinite number of solutions. Normally in problems associated with selection and 
assessment, the number of alternative solutions is limited. In problems related to design, a 
criterion may take any value in a range. Therefore the potential alternative solutions 
could be infinite. If this is the case, the problem is often referred to as a multiple objective 
optimisation problems instead of multiple criteria decision problems.  
2.1 Features 
The MCDM problems can vary in context but share the following common features 
[XY01] as follows: 
 Multiple attributes or criteria often form a hierarchy 
The number of alternatives is evaluated on the basis of predefined attributes. The 
attributes are also referred to as criteria. Some attributes may be further classified 
into lower level of attributes called sub-attributes.  
 Conflict among criteria 
Multiple criteria usually conflict with each other. For example, in manufacturing a 
TV, the criteria of high quality picture may increase the product cost.   
 Hybrid nature 
1. Different measurement units 
Each criterion might have different units of measurement. For example, in a 
TV selection problem the quality of picture is measured by resolution and the 
cost is measured in pound sterling. 
2. Mixture of qualitative and quantitative attributes 
Some attributes might be measured numerically and the other attributes can 
only be described subjectively. For instance, price is quantitative and 
customer experience is qualitative. 
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 Uncertainty 
o Uncertainty can arise through subjective judgement due to lack of experience 
o Uncertainty can also arise due to lack of data or incomplete information about 
the attributes 
 Large scale 
The real MCDM problem might consist of hundreds of attributes. The increase in the 
number of attributes also increases the number of comparisons between the attributes 
and the alternatives.  
However, in most MADM methods, the general assumption is that all the criteria are 
independent, which may not be true in our network selection problem. In 1996, Saaty first 
introduced a mathematical theory named analytic network process (ANP), which 
manages all kinds of dependence and feedback systematically, and it can be applied in 
MCDM problems [LIU07]. This thesis focuses on the problems with a finite number of 
alternatives. For a finite number of alternatives MCDM can also be termed as Multiple 
Attribute Decision Making (MADM).  
2.2 Representation of MADM problem 
An MADM problem can be expressed in a matrix form, where each row ‗i’ corresponds 
to the alternatives
1
 and each column ‘j’ corresponds to the attribute. Suppose there are m 
alternatives to be assessed based on n attributes, a decision matrix D (also known as 
evaluation or option matrix) is created. The size of decision matrix is m × n with each 
element aij being the value of attribute ‗j‘ with respect to the alternative ‗i‘ (i.e. action or 
decision). The structure of decision matrix is shown below in Table 2.1.  
2.3 Review of MADM methods 
Some classic methods developed in MADM are Simple Additive Weighting (SAW), 
Multiplicative Exponent Weighting (MEW), Grey Relational Analysis (GRA), Analytic 
Hierarchy Processing (AHP), Elimination and Choice Translating Priority (ELECTRE), a 
Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS).  
 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis, the term alternatives and candidate are interchangeably used for the available  networks 
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Table 2.1 Structure of a Decision matrix ‘D’ 
Alternatives Attributes 
c1 c2 c3 cn 
A1 a11 a12 a13 a1n 
A2 a21 a22 a23 a2n 
A3 a31 a32 a33 a3n 
Am am1 am2 am3 amn 
2.3.1 Simple Additive Weighting 
Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) [NW06] method is a simple and most often used 
MADM scoring method.  The score of each alternative Ai (typically network i in this 
thesis) is obtained by adding the normalized contributions from each metric     
multiplied by the weight    assigned to the attribute ‗j‘. The selected alternative      
  is: 
                 
                     
 
        (2.1) 
In Equation (2.1),     denotes the score of the alternative ‘i’ with respect to the attribute 
‘j’.    is the weight of the attribute ‗j‘ and must satisfy   
 
     . In (2.1), N is the 
number of attributes and M is the number of candidate networks. 
The attribute can be classified as positive, i.e. the larger the better or negative i.e. smaller 
the better and the calculation of     are dependent on the type of attribute as shown below 
in (2.2) and (2.3) respectively: 
Positive attribute:     
   
  
              (2.2) 
Negative attribute:     
  
 
  
             (2.3) 
In (2.2),   
 is the maximum value of a for attribute ‗j‘ (i.e.  
             ). In (2.3), 
  
  is the minimum value of a for attribute ‗j‘ (i.e.  
             ). 
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2.3.2 Multiplicative Exponent Weighting 
Multiplicative Exponent Weighting (MEW) [YH95] [NW06] is another MADM scoring 
method. The score of alternative ‗i‘ is determined by the weighted product of the 
attributes and is given as below:  
                                               
   
               (2.4) 
where     denotes the attribute ‘j’ of alternative ‘i’.    is the weight of the attribute ‗j‘ and 
must satisfy   
 
     . In the above equation,    is a positive power for positive 
attribute (    
   ) and    is a negative power for negative attribute (    
    ). 
The score of alternative obtained by MEW has no upper bound so it is convenient to 
compare the score of each network with the score of positive ideal alternative A
**
. The 
positive ideal alternative is defined as the alternative with best values for each attribute. 
The definition of the best value is different for a positive attribute (i.e. the largest value) 
and a negative attribute (i.e. the smallest value).  
The value ratio Ri between alternative i and the positive ideal is calculated by: 
                                 
  
  
   
   
    
  
   
   
           (2.5) 
   where        
The selected alternative     
  is: 
                             
                   (2.6) 
2.3.3 Grey Relational Analysis 
In Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) [SJA05] [NW06], grey relational co-efficient (GRC) 
is the score used to describe the similarity between each candidate alternative and an 
ideal alternative. The GRA compromises of three steps: normalization of the data, 
defining an ideal sequence and computing the GRC. 
The normalization of the data is performed according to the three situations (larger the 
better, smaller the better and nominal is the best) as follows: 
                                
      
     
      (2.7) 
                                   
      
     
      (2.8) 
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      (2.9) 
In (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9),               ,               and   is the largest value in 
the situation of nominal the best for j=1, 2, ------------,n. 
The ideal sequence a0 is defined to contain the upper bound, lower bound or moderate 
bound respectively in larger the better, smaller the better or nominal the better situations. 
The GRC can be calculated as follow: 
                          
 
 
 
         
       
 
        (2.10) 
Where                                      
                                                              
                                                             
The larger the GRC, the more preferable the alternative will be. The selected alternative 
    
  is: 
                      
                     (2.11) 
2.3.4 Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution 
In Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) [API10] 
[LFN11], two artificial alternatives are considered, i.e. an ideal alternative and a negative 
ideal alternative.  The ideal alternative is the one having the best values for each attribute 
and the negative ideal alternative is the one which has the worst attribute values. TOPSIS 
selects the alternative which is the closest to the ideal solution and the farthest from the 
negative ideal solution. TOPSIS defines an index called similarity to the positive ideal 
solution. Considering decision matrix D (m alternatives and n attributes) as shown in 
Table 2.1 with each element aij being the value of attribute ‗j‘ with respect to the 
alternative ‗i‘. TOPSIS consists of the following six steps: 
Step 1: Construct the normalized decision matrix 
This step transforms different attribute dimensions into non-dimensional attributes to 
allow comparisons across attribute. The normalized value nij is calculated as: 
                     
   
     
  
   
, i=1 to m, j=1 to n     (2.12) 
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This step transforms the decision matrix D into   with each element nij being the 
normalized value of attribute ‗j‘ with respect to the alternative ‗i‘.   
Step 2: Calculation of weighted normalized decision matrix 
In this step, the weight of each attribute ‗j‘ is calculated (i.e. wj). Each column of 
normalized decision matrix    is multiplied with its associated weight wj. The weighted 
normalized value vij is calculated as: 
                             , i=1 to m, j=1 to n     (2.13) 
Step 3: Identify ideal and negative ideal solutions 
The ideal solution can be identified as: 
                         
    
       
        (2.14) 
Where   
                                             
                      } 
The negative ideal solution can be identified as: 
                         
    
       
        (2.15) 
 
Where   
                                             
                     }  
Step 4: Calculation the separation measures of each alternative from ideal and 
negative ideal solution 
The separation of each alternative from the ideal solution is 
                
           
  
  
    i=1 to m     (2.16) 
The separation of each alternative from the negative ideal solution is 
               
           
  
  
    i=1 to m     (2.17) 
Step 5: Calculate relative closeness to ideal solution 
               
  
 
  
    
 , i=1 to m,   0<Si< 1    (2.18) 
Step 6: Ranking the preference order 
The closer the Sj is to ‗1‘implies the highest priority of alternative ‗i‘. 
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2.3.5  Elimination and Choice Translating Priority 
The ELECTRE method [HC05] consists of the following steps: 
Step 1: Construct the normalized decision matrix 
This step transforms different attribute dimensions into non-dimensional attributes to 
allow comparisons across attribute. The normalized value nij is calculated as: 
                     
   
     
  
   
, i=1 to m, j=1 to n     (2.19) 
This step transforms the decision matrix D into   with each element nij being the 
normalized value of attribute ‗j‘ with respect to the alternative ‗i‘.   
Step 2: Calculation of weighted normalized decision matrix 
In this step, the weight of each attribute ‗j‘ is calculated (i.e. wj). Each column of 
normalized decision matrix    is multiplied with its associated weight wj. The weighted 
normalized value vij is calculated as: 
                          , i=1 to m, j=1 to n     (2.20) 
Step 3: Determine concordance and discordance sets 
Let‘s assume there are ‗m‘ alternatives and ‗n‘ attributes with their respective weights as 
wj. With regard to two alternatives ‗p‘ and ‗q‘ such that (p≠q), the ‗n‘ attributes can be 
classified into two sets namely as concordance and discordance sets. The determination 
of these set is dependent on the type of attribute. In these sets, the weighted normalized 
value of attribute ‗j‘ with respect to alternative ‗p‘ (   ) and ‗q‘ (   ) are compared under 
all attributes (i.e. j=1 to n). The concordance set of alternatives ‗p‘ and ‗q‘ (Cpq) consist 
of all the attributes for which the alternative ‗p‘ is better than ‗q‘. The concordance set for 
positive and negative attributes can be computed as follow: 
                         (Positive attribute)    (2.21) 
                        (Negative attribute)    (2.22) 
The discordance set of alternatives ‗p‘ and ‗q‘ (Dpq) consist of all the attributes for which 
the alternative ‗p‘ is inferior to ‗q‘. The discordance set for positive and negative 
attributes can be computed as follow: 
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                      (Positive attribute)      (2.23) 
                     (Negative attribute)     (2.24) 
 
Step 4: Determination of the concordance and discordance matrix 
The size of concordance (Co) and discordance (Di) matrix are same as that of normalized 
decision matrix   . The weight of each concordance set is an element in concordance 
matrix ‗Co‘. The element coij in concordance matrix ‗Co‘ is the weight of all attributes in 
the concordance set Cij. All the diagonal entries in concordance matrix ‗Co‘ are kept 
blank because the alternatives cannot be compared with themselves. The concordance 
matrix Co can be created as follow: 
                     
      
   
      
       (2.25) 
In (2.25),               &              . 
Similarly, the weight of each discordance set is an element in discordance matrix ‗Di‘. 
The element diij in concordance matrix ‗Di‘ is the weight of all attributes in the 
discordance set Dij. All the diagonal entries in discordance matrix ‗Di‘ are kept blank 
because the alternatives cannot be compared with themselves. The discordance matrix Di 
can be created as follow: 
                    
      
   
      
       (2.26) 
Where  
     
                 
                
          
                 
                
 
                                         
Step 5: Determine the concordance and discordance dominance matrix 
The concordance and discordance dominance matrix are determined by their respective 
threshold values. The concordance dominance matrix    on the basis of threshold value 
  is determined as follow: 
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      (2.27) 
Where                          
     
 
   
 
   
      
      
   
              
   
              
The discordance dominance matrix    is determined similar to the concordance 
dominance matrix on the basis of threshold value    as follow: 
                       
    
    
 
   
   
   
      (2.28) 
Where                            
     
 
   
 
   
      
      
   
               
   
               
Step 6: Determine the aggregate dominance matrix 
The aggregate dominance matrix is determined by identifying the intersection of 
concordance dominance matrix C
+
 and discordance dominance matrix D
-
. The aggregate 
dominance matrix E is created as follow: 
                  
       
   
       
       (2.29) 
Where               
     
  
     
                                                             
                                    
   
The final step is to eliminate the less favourable alternative. If e12=1 it means that there is 
an edge from alternative ‗1‘ to ‗2‘ and the alternative with no incoming edges are 
eliminated. 
2.4  Summary 
In this chapter, some essential features of MCDM methods are briefly explained. This 
chapter also highlights the drawbacks (i.e. scalability and uncertainty issues) of MCDM 
methods. This is followed by a description of the representation of a MADM problem. 
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The mathematical concepts used in different MCDM methods such as SAW, MEW, 
GRA, TOPSIS and ELECTRE are explained in detail.  
  
32 
 
3 The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) has been applied to a number of areas such as 
predicting economic outcomes and resolving conflicts when there are many attributes 
associated with the outcomes. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [SJ05] [SAA80], is a 
Multi Criteria decision making method which requires pair-wise comparison. Thomas L. 
Saaty developed a system called AHP that transforms the pair-wise comparison scores 
into weights of different attributes and priorities of all alternatives on each attribute to 
obtain the overall ranking of alternatives.  The input can be obtained from actual 
measurements (price, measured quality of service attribute, etc) or from subjective 
opinion such as feelings of satisfaction and preference. The decision factors of the 
problem are identified and inserted into a hierarchy. The overall objective is placed at the 
topmost node of the hierarchy. The lower nodes represent the decision factors. The 
solution alternatives are located at the bottom nodes. The procedure of AHP can be 
summarized as follows: 
3.1 Formulate the Problem 
The first step in AHP is to formulate the problem to decide which attributes should be 
used to evaluate each alternative. The hierarchy for ―select an optimal job‖ is shown in 
Figure 3.1. Location, salary, content and duration is considered to be the criteria 
(attributes) used to describe a job and denote these by C1, C2, C3 and C4 respectively. 
Each of these of four criteria is evaluated for the three jobs that are being compared. 
3.2 Determine the Relative Weights of the Comparison 
Attributes 
The second step is to determine the relative weights of the attributes i.e. Location, Salary, 
Content and Duration. Every attribute is compared against all attributes within the same 
level to decide the relative importance of each attribute. The comparisons result in a 
square matrix. The size of the matrix depends on the number of pair wise comparisons 
within the same level (e.g. for ―Select an optimal job‖ a 4×4 square matrix is created as 
there are four attributes). 
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Figure 3.1 AHP model for selecting an optimal job 
A 1 to 9 scale [SAA80] is used to allow the decision maker to express the strength of 
preference. The numbers from 1 to 9 are used to respectively represent equally, weakly 
moderately, moderately, moderately plus, strongly, strongly plus, very strongly, very very 
strongly and extremely important to the criteria with respect to the goal. Comparing 
criteria C1 and C2 gives a preference value a12. If the value of a12=k then the value of 
a21=1/k. By definition all the diagonal values in the square matrix are set to ‗1‘. Similarly, 
the reciprocals of these numbers are used to show the inverted comparison results. The 
square matrix for the criteria comparison (for the four criteria in Figure 3.1) is shown 
below: 
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Figure 3.2 Criteria comparison matrix 
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3.2.1 Calculate the Eigen value and Eigen vector 
Suppose the criteria comparison matrix A for ‗n‘ criteria is shown as below  
             















nnnn
n
n
aaa
aaa
aaa
A
......
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
......
......
21
22221
11211
      (3.1) 
 
 
Let A be     matrix. The number λ is an eigenvalue of A if there exists a non-zero 
vector v such that 
                                                                   (3.2) 
In Equation (3.2), vector v is called an eigenvector of ‗A‘ corresponding to Eigen value 
‗λ‘. The Equation (3.2) can be rewritten as  
                                             (3.3) 
In Equation (3.3), I is      identity matrix. In order for a non-zero vector v to satisfy the 
above equation,      must not be invertible. The determinant of      must be equal 
to 0. The characteristic polynomial of A is                 . The eigenvalues of A 
are simply the roots of the characteristic polynomial of A. 
If      has an inverse, (3.3) can be rewritten as 
                           
                                                (3.4) 
The Eigen value or principal Eigen value of matrix A can be calculated using the 
following two methods that are named as the ―Eigen value calculation‖ method and the 
―normalized geometric mean‖ method.    
 
a. Eigen value calculation method 
The easiest method [SAA90] to calculate the Eigen value is by taking the value of each 
criterion (say a11) and dividing it by the sum of the column it appears in. In our example, 
the square matrix ‗A‘ is a 4×4 (i.e. four columns). Let us denote the column sums by S1, 
S2, S3, S4 respectively.  
       
 
   ,        
 
   ,        
 
   ,        
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In general terms, A is n*n matrix so the column sum Sn can be represented as 
                              
 
           (3.5) 
In Equation (3.5), ain are the entries in the matrix ‗A‘ and ‗n‘ are the number of 
considered criteria. After dividing every entry in the matrix by the sum of its column the 
matrix ‗A‘ is now transformed to 'A  as shown below: 
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All the entries in a row are averaged to get the weight (or Eigen value) of each of the 
comparison criteria as shown below. 
                       nA /1''
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The weight vector W1,W2,------,Wn represent the weight of the criteria 1 to n. 
b. Normalized geometric mean calculation method 
The relative importance of each criterion (aka attribute) can be computed as normalized 
geometric means of the rows [SAA90]. The geometric means for each criterion is 
computed as shown below, where ‗j‘ indicates the criterion number: 
                                            
        (3.8) 
In general, the geometric means can be computed for each other criterion by simply 
multiplying all the entries in the corresponding row and taking their n
th
 root. These 
groups of geometric means (m1, m2, m3, m4) divided by the sum of all geometric means 
are called the Relative weights for that criteria. The Relative weight for criterion j can be 
computed as follows: 
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xmW jj /     
   (3.9) 
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jmx
1
        (3.10) 
 
 
3.3 Perform the consistency index 
Saaty defined the consistency index (CI) [SAA08] as deviation or degree of consistency 
between the pair-wise comparisons using the following equation:   
        
)1/(max  nnCI        (3.11)  
 
Where λmax is the maximum Eigen value and n is the number of comparison criteria. 
The λmax can be calculated by summation of products of weight of each criteria and their 
respective column sum as shown below: 
                      
 
          (3.12)   
For an optimal job selection, the      will be sum of the multiplication of weight of 
Location (W1) with their respective column sum (S1) and respectively for all other 
criterion like Salary, Content and Duration. 
Accordingly Saaty defined the consistency ratio (CR) [SAA08] as a comparison between 
Consistency Index (CI) and Random Consistency Index (RI) using the following formula   
        RICICR /         (3.13)   
The RI is the random index representing the consistency of a randomly generated pair-
wise comparison matrix. It is derived as average random consistency index (Table 3.1) 
calculated from a sample of 500 randomly generated matrices based on the AHP scale (1 
to 9). 
Table 3.1 Random consistency indices for different number of criteria (n) 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
RI 0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 
3.4 Calculate the overall level hierarchy weight to select the 
candidate 
The next step is to evaluate all the alternatives on each criterion. In this step of AHP, the 
pair-wise comparison of the alternatives with respect to every criterion on scale 1 to 9 is 
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performed. The alternative comparison process is exactly the same as the criteria 
comparisons process i.e. the weights for the alternatives with respect to the criteria can be 
created using the same method as shown above in Section 3.2.1. For an optimal job 
selection, the alternatives like HSBC, Barclays and Halifax will be evaluated for the 
criterion Location using a pair-wise comparison. As there are three alternatives, a     
matrix will be created for the criterion Location. The entries within     matrix will be 
on 1 to 9 scales. The Eigen value calculation or normalized geometric mean method can 
be applied on this       matrix to get the weights   
    
    
  which is the weight of 
HSBC, Barclays and Halifax with respect to criterion Location. Similarly the weights of 
HSBC, Barclays and Halifax for the criteria Salary, Content and Duration can be 
calculated. 
Now the final evaluation metrics is produced by summation of the products of relative 
weights for the comparison criteria and the alternatives with respect to every criterion 
throughout the hierarchy. The final value of each alternative for problem goal is denoted 
by ‗r‘ and for specific alternative ‗i‘ will be of the following form: 
                     
       
          
       (3.14) 
 
 
Where W1 is the weight for criteria C1 and   
  is the weight for alternative candidate ‗i‘ 
(namely as HSBC, Barclays and Halifax) with respect to criteria C1. The alternative with 
highest value of ‗r‘ will be selected for the user.   
3.5  Worked Example 
The job seeker has four criteria i.e. location, salary, content and duration in mind for the 
selection of an optimal job. Initially all diagonal entries in a pair-wise comparison contain 
entries of ‗1‘ as each criterion is as important as itself.  
 Location Salary Content Duration 
Location 1    
Salary  1   
Content   1  
Duration    1 
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Let us suppose that the job seeker decides that Salary is slightly more important than 
Location. In the next step, entry in the cell Salary-Location contains 3 and entry in the 
Location-Salary cell is 1/3.  The job seeker also decide the Location is far important than 
the Content, giving 5 in the Location-Content cell and entry in the Content-Location is 
1/5. 
 
 Location Salary Content Duration 
Location 1 1/3 5  
Salary 3 1   
Content 1/5  1  
Duration    1 
 
The job seeker decides that Salary is much more important than the Content giving 5 in 
the Salary-Content cell and respectively 1/5 in Content-Salary cell. The job seeker 
decides that Duration is much more important than the Content giving 5 in the Duration-
Content cell and respectively 1/5 in Content-Duration cell. 
 
 Location Salary Content Duration 
Location 1 1/3 5 1 
Salary 3 1 5 1 
Content 1/5 1/5 1 1/5 
Duration 1 1 5 1 
 
Method 1: Eigen value calculation method  
       
 
 
       
   
 
 
   
 
 
         
              
       
 
 
       
 Location Salary Content Duration 
Location 1/5.2 =0.193 0.333/2.533=0.132 5/16=0.313 1/3.2=0.313 
Salary 3/5.2=0.577 1/2.533=0.395 5/16=0.313 1/3.2=0.313 
Content 0.2/5.2=0.038 0.2/2.533=0.079 1/16=0.063 0.2/3.2=0.065 
Duration 1/5.2=0.193 1/2.533=0.395 5/16=0.313 1/3.2=0.313 
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Method 2: Normalized geometric method 
 
      
 
 
    
 
  
 
 
 
       
 
           
 
    
 
       
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
       
           
 
   
 
       
                    
          
 
     
              
        
 
     
              
         
 
     
              
          
 
     
              
 
3.6  Heterogeneous wireless network model 
A competitive heterogeneous wireless access network model is considered in which 
multiple wireless networks operated by the same service provider coexist and offer their 
services to users. The integrated heterogeneous wireless access system model consists of 
cellular networks and Wi-Fi hotspots operated by the same or different providers. The 
cellular network has greater coverage area as compared to Wi-Fi, so it is imperative for a 
set of users to stay within Wi-Fi coverage for a sensible time frame to be considered for 
selection in order to avoid frequent vertical handoffs and because Wi-Fi is not suited to 
fast moving traffic. The user decision could be either maintain the actual connection as it 
has a favourable price or move to an alternative network which offers a better access 
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service. In this work, we assume the latter case. When the user selects a provider, a 
contract is established with the provider. It is also assumed that the network selection is 
reconsidered periodically after a predefined time interval.  
In the following section, the simple network selection between Wi-Fi and WiMAX 
network is explained with an example to evaluate the AHP simulator. In this network 
selection, it is assumed that all the users request the same application type and belong to 
the ―pay as you go‖ payment plan. In the next chapter, the concrete case of network 
selection with the download data rate offered by different networks measured using 
―Cnlab speed test‖ [CNST11] application. The ―Cnlab speed test‖ allows selecting a Test 
server and measures the download and upload data rate along with the response time. The 
response time is measured by using a SYN packet (port 80). In order to validate the 
results, it is better to complete at least 20 measurements over a period of several days and 
if possible at different times of day so that your results will not be distorted due to 
possible short-time malfunctions. The architecture for ―Cnlab speed test‖ is shown below 
in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Cnlab speed test Architecture [CNST11] 
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3.6.1  Wi-Fi-/WiMAX network selection case 
In this scenario, the heterogeneous wireless environment consisting of IEEE 802.16 
WiMAX network provider and two IEEE 802.11 based WLAN providers (‗A‘ and ‗B‘) 
are assumed. All BSs and AP‘s are in the centre of the considered cell. The network 
which satisfies the user requirements and the requested QoS is selected. Simulations are 
based on three AP‘s of each WLAN provider lie within one cellular WiMAX network.  
The coverage of each AP of WLAN provider ‗1‘ (A) and WLAN provider ‗2‘ (B) are 
assumed as 200m and 400m respectively. The coverage of WiMAX BS‘s is assumed as 
1000m respectively. In the simulation scenario, a mobile user is moving clockwise at a 
constant speed of 10 meters per second throughout the simulation scenario shown in 
Figure 3.4.  
The network selection decisions for this scenario can be divided into three cases: 
1) When there is only one network (WiMAX) that can be chosen. This case is 
considered because WLAN provider ‗1‘ (A) and WLAN provider ‗2‘ (B) has less 
coverage area as compared to WiMAX. The WLAN providers also lie within 
coverage area of WiMAX.  
2) Within the overlapping coverage area of WiMAX and WLAN provider ‗1‘ (A). 
3) Within the overlapping coverage area of WiMAX, WLAN provider ‗1‘ (A) and 
WLAN provider ‗2‘ (B). 
 
Figure 3.4  Heterogeneous wireless environment scenario 
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The network selection for the Wi-Fi and WiMAX model can be divided into different 
decision points as shown below in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Different Decision points in the scenario 
Decision Points Available Networks 
D1 WiMAX 
D2 WiMAX and WLAN ‗1‘ (A1) 
D3 WiMAX , WLAN ‗1‘ (A1) and WLAN ‗2‘ (B1) 
D4 WiMAX  and WLAN ‗2‘ (B1) 
D5 WiMAX 
D6 WiMAX and WLAN ‗2‘ (B2) 
D7 WiMAX , WLAN ‗1‘ (A2) and WLAN ‗2‘ (B2) 
D8 WiMAX  and WLAN ‗1‘ (A2) 
D9 WiMAX 
D10 WiMAX and WLAN ‗1‘ (A3) 
D11 WiMAX , WLAN ‗1‘ (A3) and WLAN ‗2‘ (B3) 
D12 WiMAX  and WLAN ‗2‘ (B3) 
D13 WiMAX 
 
Based on Table 3.2, the network selection decisions for this scenario can be divided into 
four cases: 
1) When there is only one network (WiMAX) that can be chosen. This case is 
considered because WLAN provider ‗1‘ (A) and WLAN provider ‗2‘ (B) has less 
coverage area as compared to WiMAX. The WLAN providers also lie within 
coverage area of WiMAX.  
2) Within the overlapping coverage area of WiMAX and WLAN provider ‗1‘ (A). 
3) Within the overlapping coverage area of WiMAX, WLAN provider ‗1‘ (A) and 
WLAN provider ‗2‘ (B). 
4) Within the overlapping coverage area of WiMAX and WLAN provider ‗2‘ (B). 
The pair-wise comparison values between the network attributes are assumed and the 
equation (3.8) is applied to the network attribute values mentioned in Table 3.3 to 
calculate the weight of network attributes. Similarly, the equation (3.8) can also be 
applied to the respective network attribute values offered by different networks 
mentioned in Table 3.5 to calculate the relative network scores for network attributes. 
The ranking of networks are determined through the sum of the products of weight of 
each network attribute with the relative network scores for that network attribute.     
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3.6.1.1  Network Selection 
User‘s preferences on network attribute are defined in Table 3.3. The pair wise 
comparison of available networks for each attribute i.e. Reputation (R), Cost (C), Bit rate 
(B) and Mobility support (M) are done based on original network parameters shown in 
Table 3.4 which decide the preferred network and intensity of importance. In Table 3.4, 
the cellular WiMAX network, WLAN provider ‗1‘, WLAN provider ‗2‘ are represented 
as ‗NW1‘, ‗NW2‘ and ‗NW3‘ respectively. 
Table 3.3 Attribute Comparison 
  
R 
 
C 
 
B 
 
M 
wi
 
R 1 1/3 5 1 0.232 
C 3 1 5 1 0.402 
N 1/5 1/5 1 1/5 0.061 
M 1 1 5 1 0.305 
Table 3.4 Network Parameters 
 NW1 NW2 NW3 
R 0.3 0.4 0.5 
B 2 3 5 
C $1.2 $0.8 $0.9 
M 0.6 0.35 0.25 
For every pair wise comparison between alternative networks, the respective cost being 
charged is considered. When both the cost being offered is well above (or well below) the 
user expected value, they are equally preferred. When both costs being offered are less 
than the user expected value, a $1 difference in cost does not matter, but a $2 difference 
is considered strongly important, and a $4 difference is extreme. Whenever a network 
with a cost that is less than user expected value is compared with another network having 
cost well above user expected value, the former is extremely preferred. The network costs 
being offered above or below the user expected value determine the preferred network 
whereas their difference decides the relative importance. The network‘s parameters for 
each attribute can vary for different users. 
The relative importance of each network for every attribute (Bit rate, Cost, Reputation 
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and Mobility Support) is defined in Table 3.5 (a),(b),(c) and (d) respectively. The Relative 
value vector of alternative networks for each attribute is shown below in Table 3.6.  
Table 3.5 Network comparisons with respect to attributes  
(Network preferences for attribute derived from Table 3.4) 
 
Table 3.6 Ranking vector for alternatives with respect to each attribute 
 R B C M ri 
NW1 0.077 0.480 0.066 0.751 0.392 
NW2 0.231 0.406 0.615 0.178 0.406 
NW3 0.692 0.114 0.319 0.071 0.204 
 
The graphical representation of Table 3.6 is shown below in Figure 3.5. The network 
selection results based on reward index for each competing networks are shown below in 
Figure 3.6. The results show that network 3 never gets selected because its reward index 
is less than the other two competing networks. The network selection results with user 
preference based on attribute Reputation is shown below in Figure 3.7. In Figure 3.8, the 
network selection is shown with user preference on cost while Figure 3.9 and 3.10 show 
network selection with user preferences on Bit rate and Mobility Support respectively.   
It is also noted that mobile user selects high reliable WLAN ‗B‘ (NW3), when WiMAX 
(NW1), WLAN ‗A‘ (NW2) and WLAN ‗B‘ (NW3) are simultaneously available. 
Similarly the mobile user selects low price WLAN ‗A‘, when WiMAX (NW1), WLAN 
‗A‘ (NW2) and WLAN ‗B‘ (NW3) are simultaneously available.  
 
B NW1 NW2 NW3 
NW1 1 1 5 
NW2 1 1 3 
NW3 1/5 1/3 1 
(a) Bit rate 
R NW1 NW2 NW3 
NW1 1 1/3 1/9 
NW2 3 1 1/3 
NW3 9 3 1 
(c) Reputation 
M NW1 NW2 NW3 
NW1 1 5 9 
NW2 1/5 1 3 
NW3 1/9 1/3 1 
(d) Mobility Support 
C NW1 NW2 NW3 
NW1 1 1/9 1/5 
NW2 9 1 2 
NW3 5 1/2 1 
(b) Cost 
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Figure 3.5 Ranking vector for alternatives with respect to each 
attribute 
WiMAX
WLAN ‘A’
WLAN ‘B’
Decision points
 
Figure 3.6 Network Selection based on Reward Index as user rotates clockwise 
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WiMAX
WLAN ‘A’
WLAN ‘B’
Decision points
 
Figure 3.7 Network Selection with user preference on Reputation as user rotates 
clockwise 
WiMAX
WLAN ‘A’
WLAN ‘B’
Decision points
 
Figure 3.8 Network Selection with user preference on Cost as user rotates clockwise 
 
WiMAX
WLAN ‘A’
WLAN ‘B’
Decision points
 
Figure 3.9 Network Selection with user preference on Bit rate as user rotates 
clockwise 
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WiMAX
WLAN ‘A’
WLAN ‘B’
Decision points
 
Figure 3.10 Network Selection with user preference on Mobility Support as user 
rotates clockwise 
3.7 Disadvantages of AHP 
The drawbacks of AHP are explained as follow:  
 The first problem is that the hierarchy used to build additive value function for 
calculation actually requires independence among all those criteria that are in the 
same hierarchy level. In many cases, the AHP [DYE90] is misused by not 
maintaining the independence among elements of a hierarchy.  
 The second disadvantage is the scalability issue of AHP in the real world as the 
number of pair-wise comparisons increases exponentially with the number of 
considered attributes. 
 The third disadvantage of AHP is called rank reversal. The meaning of rank 
reversal can be explained in two cases:  
1) Assume after calculated by AHP, the order of preference is, for example, A, B, 
C then D, but if C is eliminated for other reasons, the order of A and B could be 
reversed so that the resulting priority is B, A, then D [SV06].  
 2) A, B, C and D are ranked according to the criteria, say, W, X, Y, adding 
another criterion about which A, B, C, and D are equal, should have no bearing on 
the ranks. Yet, Perez et al proved in [DYE90] that ranking change is possible in 
this case by using AHP.  
Rank reversal [HY81] is a typical problem of many MADM methods like AHP, ANP, 
Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) and ELECTRE. 
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The rank reversal issue can be resolved using Analytic Network Process (ANP) for the 
calculation of weights of criteria [LK00]. ANP allows the interaction and dependence of 
higher-level elements on lower-level elements as well as elements in the same level.  
3.8 Summary 
In this chapter, the key features of the Analytic Hierarchy Process model used in this 
thesis are given. The complete AHP procedure is illustrated using two different methods 
(the Eigen-value calculation and normalized geometric mean) to compute the weights 
from the comparison matrix. A simple example to ―select a job‖ considering different 
attributes is demonstrated to give an insight into the AHP.  This chapter also describes 
network selection in a WiMAX and Wi-Fi simulation model considering four attributes 
namely as reputation, offered bit rate, cost and mobility support. The last section explains 
the disadvantages of AHP.  
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4 Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) 
for network selection    
This chapter looks at Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) techniques like Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) methods for selection 
between networks, possibly of different types and analyzes how they can be incorporated 
to improve the quality of the network selection by incorporating the different factors 
affecting the choice. AHP is used as it allows the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different technologies to be accommodated into the user preferences, thus supporting 
rational decision making. The trust in the relationship between the user and network also 
plays an important part in network selection. If the network is committed to provide users 
the specified Quality of Service (QoS) but fails to deliver, then the service will be 
penalised for a certain amount of time depending on the strategies being applied at the 
network and user level. The approach discussed in this section considers the suitability of 
a network offering a particular Radio Access Network (RAN) for a particular service 
(like voice, video-streaming, video-interactive and data) from a user perspective.  It is to 
be noted that this approach does not focus on applying a service dependent Call 
Admission Control (CAC) later on as part of network selection scheme. This section 
presents a generic framework for network selection that can easily be extended in future 
for a range of wireless technologies.  
4.1 Assumptions 
In this chapter, the following assumptions are considered:  
i. All considered attributes are assumed independent of each other (i.e. no rank 
reversal problem). 
ii. The scalability issues of AHP are not considered. 
iii. The users give their preferences for mobility support but no mobility model is 
considered. 
iv. A vertical handover scheme from one network to another network is assumed. 
v. The reputation for each network is assumed identical. 
vi. Each network charges a constant price. 
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vii. All users requesting the same service type with identical payment plan give 
similar preferences for the considered attributes. 
viii. The weights of each attribute could be estimated. To do this a survey was carried 
out that asked users belonging to different payment plans to give pair-wise 
comparison between the considered attributes on a 1 to 9 scale and these user 
inputs were used to compute the weights of each considered attribute for different 
service types per payment plan. 
4.2 Related work 
Several multi-criteria decision making based algorithms have been proposed, e.g. 
[BL07][BLC07][AGAPL05][PGALPA03]. These conventional multi-criteria based 
algorithms do not take into account the complexities and uncertainties that arise from the 
different characteristics and natures of the different Radio Access Technologies (RATs). 
For example, these algorithms do not have a proper method to address the importance of 
the different criteria to the access network selection. Several multi-criteria based 
algorithms that employ tools such as fuzzy logic, neural networks, and genetic algorithms 
[GAPS05][WLM05] suffer from scalability and modularity problems. These algorithms, 
for example, take all inputs from the different RATs at once into one fuzzy logic block, 
so suffer from scalability and complexity problems when more RATs or membership 
functions are added due to the exponential increase on the number of inference rules. 
In [ZSWD98] different types of models are used for multiple criteria decision making 
such as Simple Additive Weighting (SAW), Multiplicative Exponential Weighting 
(MEW), Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) and 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP).  
In [ZM06], Zhu and McNair proposed a cost function based on Multiservice Vertical 
Handoff Decision Algorithm (MUSE-VDA). The cost function is evaluated for each 
network ‗n‘ covering the service area of a user and the network with the lowest cost is 
selected for handover. The cost function for ‗n‘ network (i.e. Cn) is computed as follow 
[ZM06]: 
                                
 
        (4.1) 
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In Equation (4.1), s is the user requested service and   
  is the QoS experienced by 
choosing network ‗n‘ for service type s. The   
  can be calculated as follow [ZM06]: 
                         
       
 
      
       (4.2) 
In Equation (4.2),     
  is the normalized QoS provided by network ‗n‘ for parameter ‗j‘ 
and service‗s‘.    
   is the weight of QoS parameter on the user or network. The objective 
of this work is to divert the users towards the less congested network. By combining 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2), the general form of cost function is as follow: 
                
        
 
      
 
           
                         (4.3) 
In Equation (4.3),     
  is the network elimination factor indicating whether QoS parameter 
‗j‘ can be satisfied by network ‗n‘. The      
  can be computed as follow: 
                  
   
                                             
                                                  
      
       (4.4) 
Zhu and McNair considered a cost function example with three networks (UMTS, 
WLAN or satellite network), the services (voice, video and images) and QoS parameters 
(battery power consumption, bandwidth and delay). The two different vertical handoff 
policies namely as collective session handoff and prioritized session handoff are 
illustrated. The       ,       and            for collective session handoff policy using 
Equation (4.3) can be computed and one with the lowest cost is selected. For prioritized 
session handoff policy with video having the highest priority i.e.       
    ,       
     and 
      
         can be computed using Equation (4.3) and one with lowest cost is selected. 
In [NW06], the performance of different MCDM methods like SAW, TOPSIS, GRA and 
MEW are discussed for vertical handoffs decisions. It also explains the basics of each 
MCDM method and their procedures. This study assumes to have four collocated 
networks namely as UMTS, GPRS and two WLANs. The conversational, streaming, 
interactive and background traffic classes are considered.  The available bandwidth, end-
to-end delay, jitters and bit error rate are the considered attributes for the network 
selection. The eigenvector method using AHP is used to determine the weights of 
attributes for each traffic class. The Markov chain with state transition matrix is used to 
vary the value of metrics. The paper also studied the allocation of bandwidth to different 
traffic classes by four MCDM based handoff decision algorithms. The simulation 
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demonstrates that the same amount of bandwidth is allocated to both the conversational 
and streaming traffic classes by four MCDM based handoff decision algorithms. The 
interactive and background traffic classes are allocated slightly more bandwidth when 
GRA based handoff decision algorithm is used. Similarly for average delay, the four 
MCDM performs similarly for both conversational and streaming traffic classes. The 
GRA have a slightly smaller delay for both interactive and background classes. The 
sensitivity analysis of attribute ‗jitter‘ shows that by increasing its weight, all four 
algorithms select the network with the lowest jitter. The sensitivity analysis of attribute 
‗bit error rate‘ shows that by increasing its weight, all four algorithms select the network 
with the lowest bit error rate. This paper also studies the percentage of time all four 
algorithms select the same network.  
In [MRN10], the performance of MCDM methods like SAW, MEW, TOPSIS, 
ELECTRE, VIKOR, GRA and WMC is illustrated for voice and data applications with 
the help of numerical example. In this work, the six attributes (available bandwidth, total 
bandwidth, packet delay, packet jitter, packet loss and cost per byte) are evaluated for 
vertical handoff in an integrated 4G environment with three network types namely as 
WLAN, UMTS and  WiMAX. This study also considered three different cases of 
assigning weights to the considered attributes: case 1, all the attributes are assigned same 
weight; case 2: packet delay and jitter are assigned 70% of importance and the rest is 
equally distributed among the remaining attributes; and case 3: available and total 
bandwidth are assigned 70% of importance and the rest is equally distributed among the 
remaining attributes. The simulations study shows that SAW, VIKOR and TOPSIS 
methods perform better by providing lower values of delay and jitter for case 2 (voice 
connections) whereas GRA and MEW algorithms perform better by providing highest 
available bandwidth for case 3 (data connections). 
In [AKL06], an AHP based context aware decision algorithm is proposed. This algorithm 
considered six primary objectives namely as interface priority, minimum cost, maximum 
mean throughput, minimum delay, minimum jitter and minimum Bit Error Rate (BER) 
based on the QoS parameters defined in 3GPP. This algorithm constitutes of five stages.  
In stage 1, the user gives their preferences for the primary objectives, available interface 
preferences and application type preferences. Based on user preferences and number of 
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possibilities, the scores are assigned equally spaced integers on 1 to 9 scale (the most 
preferred choice is assigned a score of ‗1‘ and the least preferred choice is assigned a 
score of ‗9‘) using the space gap [TAKL06] as defined below: 
                               
     
  
        (4.5) 
In Equation (4.5),    is the number of attributes,          are the highest and the lowest 
possible scores (i.e. 9 and 1) respectively. I is the numeric space gap between two 
subsequent scores which is rounded to the next integer.  
In stage 2, the network QoS parameters such as maximize mean throughput, minimize 
delay, minimize jitter and minimize Bit Error Rate (BER) are assigned upper and lower 
limit values for three different types of applications [AKL06]. These network QoS 
parameters can be classified as positive parameters (larger the better) or negative 
parameters (smaller the better). The mean throughput is classified as positive parameter 
whereas the remaining three parameters are classified as negative parameters. The lower 
limit values of positive parameters for each application types are fixed (i.e. mean 
throughput is 4 kbps for conversational class) and the upper limit varies according to the 
score assigned to the parameters. If the positive parameter such as mean throughput for 
conversational class is assigned a score ‗1‘, the upper limit is set to 25 kbps whereas for a 
score of ‗7‘, the upper limit is set to 8 kbps. In case of negative parameters, the upper 
limit value is fixed and the lower limit value varies according to the scores assigned to 
the parameters.   
In stage 3, the scores are assigned based on the six primary objectives to each available 
network. Static primary objectives (e.g. interface priority and cost) are assigned score in a 
straight forward way by using Equation (4.5) as mentioned in step 1. For interface 
priority, the scores already defined by users in stage ‗1‘ are assigned to the available 
networks depending on their type. For cost, the network with cheapest cost is assigned a 
score of ‗1‘ and the most expensive network is assigned a score of ‗9‘ using Equation 
(4.5). For dynamic primary objectives (delay, jitter, mean throughput and BER), all 
available networks are compared with the individual upper and lower limit values of a 
primary objective defined in stage ‗2‘. The network score Si [AKL06] for a particular 
dynamic parameter depending on whether larger the better (mean throughput) or smaller 
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the better (delay, jitter and BER) are calculated using Equations (4.6) and (4.7) 
respectively. 
      
     
     
                  
                                                                            (4.6) 
                                                     
    
     
     
                          
                                                                                   (4.7) 
                                                   
Where ui and li denotes the upper and lower limits of a particular parameter and ni 
denotes the value offered by a network for particular parameter. 
In stage 4, the relative scores between two particular scores assigned to primary 
objectives in stage ‗1‘ and the network scores assigned in stage ‗3‘ are calculated as 
shown below in [AKL06]:  
                           
  
  
                 (4.8) 
                    
 
   
    
  
  
                 (4.9) 
                                                     (4.10) 
In Equations (4.8), (4.9) and (4.10), cab is relative score between primary objectives ‗a‘ 
and ‗b‘, and sa and sb are their respective scores. The pair-wise comparison method 
[SAA90] is applied to the relative scores of primary objectives to calculate their 
respective priorities. Similarly, the network weights of each available network for the 
considered primary objectives are calculated. The overall ranking of each available 
network is computed by multiplying the sum of products of network weights for each 
individual primary objective with their respective objective priorities as shown below 
[AKL06]: 
                          
  
             (4.11) 
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In Equation (4.11), Ri is an overall ranking and is always in the range of 0 to 1, cij is the 
network weight of network ‗i‘ for primary objective ‗j‘ and pj is the priority for primary 
objective ‗j‘.  
In [MAPP09], the authors explain a new architecture Y-Comm proposed jointly by 
researchers at the Networking Research Group at Middlesex University, Computer 
Laboratory at Cambridge University, Samsung Research and Deutsche Telekom to 
support heterogeneous networking by addressing the new challenges faced at the 
network, device and application level. It adopts a layered approach and acts as a reference 
model similar to OSI reference model. Y-Comm consists of two frameworks namely as 
Peripheral Framework (deals with operations and functions on the mobile node) and Core 
framework (functionality required in the core network to support the Peripheral 
Framework). The key requirement of Y-Comm infrastructure is to support efficient 
vertical handover. More detail about the architecture and functionalities of Y-Comm 
architecture can be found in [MAPP06][MAPP07]. The author investigates the design of 
imperative handover mechanisms using the Y-Comm Framework and also claims that Y-
Comm Framework can be easily mapped onto the GSM/GPRS architecture. Y-Comm 
architecture supports both reactive and proactive handovers. The main contributions of 
Y-Comm architecture are at Policy Management Layer and QoS Plane. The Policy 
Management Layer resides the circumstances under which vertical handovers occur and 
determining the time before vertical handovers using the proposed Time Before Vertical 
Handover (TBVH) models. The TBVH is derived to pass it to other layers such as the 
QoS Plane and Vertical Handover layer to start preparing for the vertical handover by 
proactively negotiating for resources with the core network. The proposed Stream Bundle 
Management layer for handling downward QoS resides in the QoS Plane of the MN. This 
layer collects context information from the network, client and application domains to 
make intelligent choices in network selection and QoS management. This is one layer 
that actively applies information on Time before Vertical Handover (TBVH) to choose a 
stable network interface for a requesting application by avoiding unnecessary vertical 
handovers. 
In [SHAIKH08], the authors present the proactive modelling-based approach for policy 
management which allows the Mobile Node (MN) to calculate Time before Vertical 
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Handover (TBVH) for open and closed environments. The network boundaries can be 
determined by proposing additional specifications to the boundary BS (BBS) to inform 
imminent network boundaries to the mobile node in outdoor scenarios and the 
dimensions of enclosed environment and the position of various exits for indoor 
environment. The parameters used to calculate TBVH are location co-ordinates of MN 
and BBS (using GPS or network based positioning techniques). The location coordinates 
of MN and BBS can be used to calculate the MN-BBS distance, angle of direction and 
MN velocity [SHAIKH07]. The TBVH for outdoor environment with outward movement 
of MN in BBS towards boundary can be estimated as follow [SHAIKH08]: 
     
                   
 
 
Similarly, the TBVH for outdoor environment with MN in normal BS moving towards 
the boundary BS (BBS) can be estimated as follow [SHAIKH07]: 
     
                   
 
 
The TBVH in indoor scenarios needs to cater the false handover triggers caused by MN 
moving closer to the threshold circle but in the direction of wall as compared to the exit. 
In order to cater this false handover triggers, the cosine of the direction of MN (W1) is 
calculated with respect to a particular exit point as shown below and is assigned to TBVH 
[SHAIKH10].  
        
                                               
                               
 
Where 
 mid_distance is the distance between the previous MN position and current MN 
position 
 old_distance is the previous distance between the MN position and the point of exit     
 new_distance is the current distance between the MN position and the point of exit     
This mechanism will accommodate for indoor environments with multiple exits but the 
TBVH and W1 will be calculated separately with respect to each point of exit. 
Stream Bundle Management (SBM) layer (above Transport layer in OSI reference model) 
residing in the multi-interfaced heterogeneous network client is presented to tackle the 
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issues of traffic management in heterogeneous environment [SHAIKH06]. These 
decision making mechanisms rely on the feedback received from lower layers about 
prevailing network conditions. The SBM layer updates these values based on the periodic 
updates it receives normally. It also maintains a prioritized list of compatible networks 
for each traffic type. In the event of sudden dramatic changes in the parameter values, the 
layer receives triggers which prompt it to take immediate notice of the changed values. 
The network context information for available network is stored in two dimensional 
matrix called Network Descriptor Matrix (NDM). The NDM consist of network id, 
network status, available network bandwidth, received signal strength (RSS), TBVH and 
round trip time (RTT). In [SHAIKH06], four types of traffic namely as audio, video-
interactive, one way video streaming and data are considered. The application's parameter 
values (AP) are sent down to the decision making mechanism through the stream priority 
mechanism where they are assigned a priority, or are sent directly if the priorities are 
predefined. The Traffic Management sub-layer first checks the resources available in the 
available networks to the application‘s parameter values. If the application‘s parameter 
values are satisfied, the mechanism maps the traffic stream onto the most appropriate 
channel. If the application‘s parameter values are not satisfied, it is then added to a 
waiting queue (urgency value is incremented) and will be activated when required 
resources become available. The amount of bandwidth allocated to each stream is decided 
with the help of Weighted Resource Allocation (WRA) [SHAIKH06] as follow: 
                         
Where UV is the urgency value of a stream, V is the velocity of MN and        
     . In [SHAIKH10], main functions of six modules within the SBM layer are 
summarized as follow: 
i. Application QoS specification module 
Stores QoS requirements and the priorities of the application streams  
ii. Priority score repository  
Stores the scores for application, interface and objective priority sets 
iii. TBVH filtration module 
Stores the TBVH values 
iv.  Network descriptor module 
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Stores the latest values of network parameters obtained from lower layers 
v. Call admission control module 
It is responsible for negotiating resources based on application requirements and 
TBVH values 
vi. Network selection module 
Analytic Hierarchy Process based network selection algorithm to select an 
optimal network. 
In [SHAIKH10], the proposed Stream Bundle Management (SBM) based network 
selection module is compared with the T-NS mechanism presented in [AKL06]. The 
deficiencies of T-NS are highlighted such as allocation of scores to the primary objectives 
by users, same relative score allocation to the primary objectives for all profiles, lack of 
network coverage prediction mechanism (TBVH) and lack of resource negotiation 
mechanism to avoid vertical handoffs. The deficiencies of T-NS are catered in the SBM 
based network selection mechanism.  
The SBM based network selection is similar to the T-NS approach mentioned in 
[AKL06] except that it has an extra primary objective i.e. TBVH.  The effectiveness of 
SBM based network selection in comparison with T-NS for two different types of traffic 
namely as voice and data of student profile are evaluated.  The calculations of TBVH 
values for WLAN are considered and the calculation of TBVH values for WiMAX and 
UMTS is out of scope. The TBVH score changes dynamically as MN moves towards or 
away from the boundary and its performance to avoid unnecessary vertical handovers are 
highlighted.  It also evaluates the efficient handling of FTP request by SBM based 
network selection utilizing the TBVH concept to find an optimal network considering the 
following constraints: 1) available bandwidth sufficient to complete the FTP request 
within the TBVH values; 2) available bandwidth is not sufficient to complete the FTP 
request within the TBVH values; 3) AP grants request for additional bandwidth; 4) AP 
rejects request for additional bandwidth and 5) AP rejects bandwidth request and TBVH 
is very low. 
In this thesis, the proposed network selection is based on the concepts mentioned in the 
literature [SHAIKH10][AKL06] mainly on their concrete contribution to model the user 
preferences and selecting an  optimal network. In this thesis, the primary objective is to 
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model the user preferences considering the application type on per payment plan basis 
and the avoidance of vertical handovers are out of scope. The TBVH concept is quite 
useful in predicting the future network availability to avoid unnecessary vertical 
handovers. In the future, this concept can be extended in the proposed user modelling. 
4.3 Network Selection Modelling using MCDM method 
In this section, the selection of an optimal network for the users is modelled as a Multi-
Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) problem. The MCDM problem consists of three 
types of elements namely the Goal, the Criteria
2
 (or attributes) and the Alternatives. In 
the network selection context, these three elements are defined as below: 
Goal: select an optimal network 
     Attributes: Reputation, Bit rate, Cost and Mobility Support 
Alternatives: WiMAX and Wi-Fi 
The complete proposed network selection mechanism using MCDM method can be 
classified into the following steps: 
i. Establish the decision context, the decision goals and identify the decision maker. 
ii. Identify the candidate (or alternative) networks 
iii. Identify the attributes that are relevant to the decision problem 
iv. Identify the user preferences for considered attributes to generate a user decision 
matrix 
v. Calculate the weight of each attribute in order to calculate their importance to the 
overall goal 
vi. For each attribute, assign scores to measure the performance of alternatives with 
respect to these attributes and construct an evaluation table. The number of 
columns and rows in an evaluation table are ‗n‘ and ‗m‘ respectively. 
vii. Calculate the priority score of each alternative for every considered attribute. 
viii. The relative score of each alternative is determined by multiplying their priority 
score for each attribute (in step vii) with their respective assigned weight (in step 
v). 
                                                 
2
 The term attribute will be used from now onwards instead of criterion 
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ix. Perform a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the preference ranking to 
changes in the attribute scores and/or the assigned weights. 
Based on the above steps, the process of selection between available networks can be 
divided into three main stages namely as formulation of network selection, user model 
and network model.  
In the formulation of network selection, the problem of network selection is represented 
as a hierarchical structure. In the hierarchical structure, the goal is the top most node 
followed by the considered attributes as the second node and the set of alternatives as the 
bottom node. This stage defines the attributes considered by users and the number of 
available networks for the user request. This compromises of the above mentioned steps 
i-iii.  
In the user model, each user expresses their preferences for the considered attributes. In 
the approach, there are four types of application and three types of user payment types so 
in total there are 12 categories of user. These categories of user need to be created only 
once. All the users belonging to the same category have similar preferences for the 
considered attributes. For each user or category of user, the square matrix (also known as 
user decision matrix) of size n×n is created where ‗n‘ is the number of considered 
attributes. There are different types of methods mentioned in the literature namely the 
ranking method, rating method and pair-wise comparison for comparing attribute to 
create a user decision matrix. The rating method can be further classified into point 
allocation and ratio estimation. Each element in the user decision matrix is a comparison 
between two attributes. The attributes cannot be compared against themselves so all the 
diagonal elements in the user decision matrix are set to ‗1‘. A square matrix can be 
created that assign weights to each attribute for each category of user. This stage 
constitutes mentioned steps iv-v above.  
In the network model (different from the user group model), all the candidate or 
alternative networks are compared among themselves for each attribute and each network 
is assigned a priority score for the corresponding attribute. The relative score of each 
alternative network is the summation of priority score of each alternative (computed in 
step vii) multiplied with their respective assigned weights (computed in step iv) to rank 
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the alternatives in descending order. This stage constitutes of the above mentioned steps 
vi-vii.  
The top most ranked candidate or alternative network is selected. The block diagram of 
selecting the most suitable candidate network using MCDM method is shown below in 
Figure 4.1. The procedures involved in the network selection mechanism using MCDM 
are represented by a step number within a circle.  
 
Figure 4.1 Block diagram of Network selection using the MCDM method 
4.4 Formulation of Network selection 
The hierarchy corresponding to ―choosing a network‖ is shown in Figure. 4.2. 
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 Figure 4.2 Network Selection Hierarchy 
In this model multiple wireless networks operated by the same service provider offering 
its services to users. Pair-wise comparisons and the determination of the weights to be 
assigned to each attribute are performed following the AHP. For simplicity here, all users 
are assumed to be of same importance. We assume the providers offer their prices for the 
different networks simultaneously. The provider makes the first move by deciding to 
accept or reject the new connection request. After that the user decides whether to 
activate the subscription or not. 
4.4.1  Goal 
Each network controller is aware of the competitive nature but is not aware of other 
controllers‘ actions, and bases its actions on its own network‘s condition. Each time a 
user wishes to receive a service, they can express their preferences for different attributes 
according to their requirements e.g. by type of call. When the user selects a network, a 
contract is established with the network. The pilot signal strength, (modelled as a function 
of distance in the simulations, though in general this is observable) is used as a measure 
of power consumed to serve a user. The distance is a guide to how much it costs the 
provider to provide the service as the achieved bit rate for a unit of resource decreases. 
The network would prefer its users to be near the BS as then it can meet the bit-rate 
requirements, e.g. using different coding, without allocation lots of channels. It can then 
provide more bit rate in a single channel (a channel is not a constant bit rate). The QoS 
depends on how many channels the network is prepared to allocate given the rate it can 
transmit data (or receive data) to the user. The objective is to select an optimal network in 
accordance to the preferences of users for the considered attributes.   
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4.4.2 Alternative or Candidate networks 
In the proposed model, there are two alternative networks considered namely the Wi-Fi 
hotspots within the coverage area of a WiMAX network. 
4.4.3  Considered attributes  
The following are the attributes used in our proposed network selection model: 
Reputation: A measure of the user perceived satisfaction for a particular access network 
based on their delay and jitter parameters. In this chapter, reputation is assumed same as 
interface priority defined in [SHAIKH10]. The users prefer a network which provides the 
lowest delay and jitter according to the QoS limits defined for the requested application 
type. In Chapter 5, the reputation is the same for all the networks. 
Cost: The price being offered by the access network for the service request. In the 
simulation, the price can be modelled as linear pricing or constant pricing. In the linear 
pricing, the networks charged price increases with the number of served users. For 
example, the loaded network will charge high price as compared to the un-loaded 
network for the same user. In this chapter constant pricing is assumed.  
Offered Bit rate: The bit rate is the rate at which the user can transmit or receive their 
data. A user closer to the base station can transmit at a faster rate compared to a user 
farther away from the base station. The bit rate is dependent on the Signal to Noise Ratio 
(SNR). Depending on the SNR the network can provide different modulation schemes 
and based on this the bit rate can be calculated. In the simulation, the bit rate is computed 
depending on the user location and the modulation coding being applied by the base 
station. 
Mobility support: The user can be of static, pedestrian or vehicle based and so requires 
different degrees of mobility support. User mobility support requirement plays an 
important role in the selection of the appropriate network. The mobility support offered 
by WiMAX to a user is greater as compared to the WLAN because the WiMAX has 
greater coverage area as compared to WLAN and the protocol has been designed to 
support mobility chosen attribute.  
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4.5  User Model 
In the proposed network selection approach, the procedure can be divided into four steps 
as shown below: 
4.5.1  User Payment Plan 
Different users can have different priorities even though they may use the same 
application type. The user model contains a set of pre-defined payment plans to meet the 
specific needs of different types of users. 
Table 4.1 User Payment Plan Goals 
User Profile Defining Objective 
Pay as You Go Low cost, acceptable QoS 
Pay Monthly Good QoS, fixed cost  
Business Excellent QoS, cost within budget 
4.5.2 Assigning attribute preferences 
The four network attributes namely as Cost, Bit rate, Mobility support and Reputation are 
considered in the network selection mechanism. The attribute preferences are assigned 
scores separately for each application type on a per user payment plan basis. For 
example, the video application has three sets of attribute priorities, one for each user 
profile.  
Each attribute is ordered based on its relative importance for the goals of each user 
payment plan. For example, the order of the network attributes for voice application for 
pay as you go plan is shown below: 
Pay as You Go                                             
The order of attributes for a voice application for the pay monthly plan is shown below: 
Pay Monthly                                             
The order of network attributes for voice application for the business plan is shown 
below: 
Business                                             
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The users for their payment plan and chosen application types give its preferences for the 
network selection attributes are mapped into the scores 1 to 9. The next step is to assign a 
set of scores in between 1-9 scale to network attribute in the descending priority order. 
The scores are equally spaced integers with a space gap dependent on the number of 
attribute [25] defined by Equation (4.5). Therefore, applying Equation (4.5) for the 
situation where                    give   
   
 
  . Since the value of I is 2, 
the next important attribute for each user payment plan of a specific application type is 
assigned a score of ‗3‘. Similarly, the remaining attributes are assigned scores of ‗5‘ and 
‗7‘ respectively. The scores of attribute of each user payment plan for voice application 
are shown below in Table 4.2. The scores of attribute of each user payment plan for other 
application types are mentioned in Appendix B.1.     
Table 4.2 Attribute scores per payment plan for voice application 
 Score Pay as you go Pay Monthly Business 
1 Cost Reputation Bit rate 
3 Reputation Bit rate Cost 
5 Bit rate Mobility support Reputation 
7 Mobility support Cost Mobility support 
4.5.3 Assigning application preferences 
In this MCDM based network selection framework, four different types of application are 
considered namely as voice, video streaming, video interactive and data transfer. 
Therefore, applying (4.5) for the situation where                    give   
   
 
  . The application preference scores are shown below in Table 4.3. Table 4.3 
shows that independent of payment plan the model prefers the voice, video interactive, 
video streaming and data transfer in descending order. In [ZCKN11], the large amount of 
collected data is statistically analyzed to make the following observations: 
i. HTTP is the most popular application type. Its usage  is more during the business 
hours and also a peak at 8 pm. Its usage starts to decrease after midnight. 
ii. SIP based VOIP and push to talk services are more used in the business hours. 
Based on the above observations, different preference scores can be defined for 
application types dependent on the time of day (i.e. business hours, off peak and night).  
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Table 4.3 Application preference scores 
Score Application 
1 Voice 
3 Video interactive 
5 Video streaming 
7 Data transfer 
4.5.4 Assigning network preferences 
Let WiMAX and WLAN be the two candidate networks available for selection. Network 
preference scores are assigned on a per application basis in a similar manner by applying 
Equation (4.5). With I=4 in this case, the network preference scores for each four type of 
application are shown below in Table 4.4. Table 4.4 shows the importance of WiMAX 
and WLAN networks for different application types independent of payment plan. This 
order can be varied based on the payment plan but it is not considered here. 
Table 4.4 Network preference scores 
Scores Voice Video 
interactive 
Video 
streaming 
Data transfer 
1 WiMAX WLAN WLAN WLAN 
5 WLAN WiMAX WiMAX WiMAX 
4.5.5  Calculating the weight of each attribute  
Every new user connection request has some parameters associated with it. Some users 
prefer the quality of service whereas some prefer low cost. The network should be able to 
provide the services requested by users. There are two comparison groups: a group of 
‗n=4‘ attributes and a group of ‗m=2‘ alternatives.  
In the first step we use AHP to calculate the weights of the chosen attributes based on the 
pair-wise comparisons. The pair-wise comparison describes the relative importance of 
one attribute over another attribute. Every attribute is compared against all other 
attributes to decide the relative importance of each attribute. Each user performs pair wise 
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comparisons between attributes using a 1 to 9 scale. The relative importance of network 
attribute ‗a‘ as compared to the network attribute ‗b‘ is computed using Equations (4.6), 
(4.7) and (4.8). 
The pair-wise comparisons between the attributes result in a square matrix namely as C. 
The matrix C is created on per plan basis for each application type. This imply that user 
with similar payment plan with same application type would have similar matrix ‗C‘. In 
this proposed MCDM based network selection model, the total number of matrix ‗C‘ 
need to be created are given below: 
                                                          (4.12) 
Where nc is the number of matrices ‗C‘, napplication is the number of application types 
considered and nplan is the number of user payment plans. In this situation,        
    (i.e.                                                                                  
                                                                                         
                                                                        .The size of matrix 
‗C‘ is dependent on the number of considered network attributes and for the problem of 
choosing a network a matrix ‗C‘ (square matrix of size ‗4‘  is created) is shown below in 
Equation (4.13).  
                               
               
               
               
               
              (4.13) 
Let‘s consider the example of creating a comparison matrix ‗C‘ for pay as you go 
payment plan with the voice application namely as ‖                    ‖ with the scores 
for the attributes defined as below: 
Scost=1, Sreputation=3, Sbit rate=5 and SMobility support=7 
The attributes cannot be compared against themselves so all the diagonal elements of 
matrix ‗C voice, pay as you go‘ i.e. c11=1, c22=1, c33=1 and c44=1. The attribute ‗cost‘ can be 
compared with the attribute ‗reputation‘ using Equation (4.6) as shown below: 
       
 
 
     
  
 
   
Similarly, 
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The attribute ‗cost‘ can be compared with the attribute ‗bit rate‘ using Equation (4.6) as 
shown below: 
       
 
 
       
Similarly, 
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
The attribute ‗cost‘ can be compared with the attribute ‗mobility support‘ using Equation 
(4.6) as shown below: 
       
 
 
     
  
 
   
Similarly, 
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
The attribute ‗reputation‘ can be compared with the attribute ‗bit rate‘ using Equation 
(4.6) as shown below: 
       
 
 
       
Similarly, 
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
The attribute ‗reputation‘ can be compared with the attribute ‗mobility support‘ using 
Equation (4.6) as shown below: 
       
 
 
     
  
 
   
Similarly, 
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
The attribute ‗bit rate‘ can be compared with the attribute ‗mobility support‘ using 
Equation (4.6) as shown below: 
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Similarly, 
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
The comparison matrix ‗C‘ for pay as you go payment plan with the voice application 
namely as ―                    ‖ is shown below: 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
 
 
                     
 
 
       
 
 
              
 
 
       
 
 
     
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, the comparison matrixes ‗C‘ for voice application with pay monthly and 
business payment plans are shown below: 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
      
 
 
     
 
 
                       
      
 
 
              
     
 
 
      
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
      
 
 
              
 
 
       
                         
 
 
     
 
 
       
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, the comparison matrixes ‗C‘ for video interactive application with pay as you 
go, pay monthly and business payment plans are shown below: 
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Similarly, the comparison matrixes ‗C‘ for video streaming application with pay as you 
go, pay monthly and business payment plans are shown below: 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
     
 
 
       
 
 
              
 
 
        
                      
        
 
 
     
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
        
 
 
 
            
 
 
        
                      
 
 
       
 
 
     
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
        
 
 
 
            
 
 
       
 
 
                        
 
 
             
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, the comparison matrixes ‗C‘ for data application with pay as you go, pay 
monthly and business payment plans are shown below: 
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For each comparison matrix C, the ―eigenvector‖ for the network attributes [HY81] can 
be calculated using geometric mean method. Specifically the element    is derived as 
shown below in Equation (4.14).  
                               
 
                      (4.14) 
These                             for each of the network attributes are normalized 
to get their respective weight  .  The weight value    is determined using Equation 
(4.15)       
               
  
   
 
   
                                            (4.15) 
Hence each payment plan and application type combination will have a weight for each 
network attribute. The four weights              corresponds to the Reputation 
(R), Cost (C), Bit rate (B) and Mobility support (M) respectively. The weight of attribute 
for different application types per payment plan calculations are mentioned in Appendix 
B.2.  In total, there will be twelve sets of ‗W‘ as there are three types of payment plan and 
four types of application.  
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Table 4.5 Weight of attribute for different application types per payment plan 
Application Type 
/Payment plan 
Pay as you go Pay Monthly Business 
Voice      683 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Video-streaming          
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Video-interactive          
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Data          
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
4.6 Network Model 
A network model consisting of a two-dimensional matrix called an evaluation matrix is 
created. In the evaluation matrix, each column corresponds to a value for the considered 
network attribute and each row corresponds to the candidate networks. In user model, the 
users are categorised on payment plan and application type combination whereas in 
network model each user request is a separate entity irrespective of payment plan and 
application type combination. The users with same payment plan and application type 
combination can be closer or further away from the base station thus can be offered 
different bit rates and modulation scheme by the base station. In order to cater this 
concept, an evaluation matrix is generated for each user request irrespective of payment 
plan and application type. This implies that users having identical payment plan and 
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application type combination can have different evaluation matrix. An evaluation matrix 
representing 1-n networks is given below in Table 4.6: 
Table 4.6 Evaluation matrix 
Candidate 
Network/Attribute 
Reputation Bit rate Mobility 
support 
Cost 
Network 1 R1 B1 M1 C1 
Network 2 R2 B2 M2 C2 
Network n Rn Bn Mn Cn 
The Bit rate column stores the value of the current bit rate offered by a certain network. 
Reputation, Mobility support and Cost indicate the historical interaction of a particular 
user (irrespective of payment plan and application type combination) with a certain 
network, mobility support offered by a certain network and the cost charged for 
transmission by certain network respectively.  
Assigning scores to static attributes such as reputation, mobility support and cost is 
simple. For cost, the available networks are compared with each other and assigned 
scores between 1 to 9 based on Equation (4.5) where the cheapest network has a score 
‗1‘.  The network with unknown cost is assigned a score ‗9‘. Dynamically changing 
attributes such as offered bit rate for available networks are compared with the individual 
network attribute limit values. The network score Si is calculated using Equations (4.6) 
and (4.7). The Equation (4.6) is applied for the positive attributes (i.e. larger the better) 
whereas Equation (4.7) is applied for negative attributes (i.e. smaller the better). 
For every user request, the available network         offers different values for each 
network attribute          . These values of each attribute offered by each available 
network represent how well each available network performs in terms of each network 
attribute. A pair-wise comparison is carried out on the basis of offered quality levels by 
available networks for each attribute.  
In this step the network scores (calculated using Equations 4.6 or 4.7) among available 
networks for certain network attribute are compared using Equations (4.8), (4.9) and 
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(4.10) to constitute a comparison matrix of available networks for each network attribute. 
For example, lets us consider a user with pay as you go payment plan requesting a voice 
application with the respective evaluation matrix as shown below in Table 4.7: 
Table 4.7 Evaluation matrix example 
 Reputation Bit rate Mobility 
support 
Cost 
Wi-Fi 2 36kbps Low 25p/min 
WiMAX 3 42kbps High 22p/min 
 
Using Equation (4.6) to calculate the score of network attribute ‗reputation‘ for Wi-Fi and 
WiMAX network with the following condition           where         = 5 
and                   . 
         
   
   
          
          
   
   
       
By applying Equation (4.9) to get a comparison matrix where subscript ‗1‘ is used for 
Wi-Fi and subscript ‗2‘ is used for WiMAX 
 
   
    
      
     
           
    
 
   
       
    
 
   
     
                    
          
  
               
                 
  
The size of comparison matrix of available networks for each network attribute would 
be    . There are four network attributes so we would have four     available 
network comparison matrixes i.e. one for each network attribute. The Equations (4.14) 
and (4.15) mentioned in step 4.4.5 can be applied to the comparison matrix to find the 
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relative network scores of available networks for each of the network attributes Cost, 
Reputation, Bit rate and Mobility support.  
The final overall ranking of each network is determined through the sum of the products 
of weight of each attribute (obtained from section 4.4.5) with the relative network scores 
for that attribute.  For ‗i‘ number of attributes and ‗j‘ number of networks, the network 
ranking is given as 
                                                          
          (4.16) 
In Equation (4.16),    is the weight of attribute ‗i‘ and   
  is the network score of network 
‗j‘ for attribute ‗i‘. In our model, there are four attributes and two available networks so 
the network ranking for available networks WiMAX and Wi-Fi is given as below: 
                
           
           
           
     (4.17) 
                
           
           
           
       (4.18) 
The network with the highest ranking is chosen. 
4.7  Worked Example 
The comparison matrix ‗C‘ for pay as you go payment plan with the voice application 
namely as ―                    ‖ based on Table 4.2 (containing network attributes scores 
for pay as you go payment plan) is shown below: 
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An evaluation matrix as mentioned before in Table 4.7 is reconsidered, 
i. Reputation 
                    
   
                 
                 
  
       
          
 
       
      
          
 
 = 0.548 
      
  
     
     
=0.769 
     
  
     
     
=0.231 
ii. Bit rate 
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=0.667 
iii. Cost 
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=0.555 
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iv. Mobility support 
        
         
 
   
    
 
 
       
    
 
   
   
    
 
   
 
 
 
       
                    
   
                 
                   
  
      
          
 
       
       
      
 
 = 2.828 
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Decision: WiMAX is selected  
4.8 Realistic Scenarios 
The scenarios consider two types of Radio Access Networks (RANs), a UTRAN based 
macro-cell and an IEEE 802.11b based WLAN. All the users are covered by both the 
UTRAN cell and the WLAN with acceptable radio channel conditions. The simulations 
implement the four types of applications namely as voice, video interactive, video 
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streaming and data. For the UDP based real time applications, the data rate values are 
fixed. For TCP based non-real time applications, the data rate values are the minimum 
requirements for each service.  
The number of users already being served by UMTS macro-cell and WLAN hotspot at 
any location on the shown path is unknown. In order to cater this situation, it is assumed 
that the data rates are measured multiple times (i.e. 20 times for Home scenario in this 
thesis) for both UMTS macro-cell and WLAN hotpots at each location. The mean and 
variance of measured data rate for both UMTS macro-cell and WLAN hotspots are 
calculated at each location.  
The users start the services gradually and each user can start one service at a time. When 
a service request is received, the MCDM based network selection algorithm assigns the 
service request to an appropriate network. The measurements can be taken at multiple 
times during different times of day (as peak, off-peak and night).  
4.8.1 Home scenario 
To evaluate the behaviour of our proposed network selection algorithm, a scenario is 
assumed with two users at Locations ‗A‘ and ‗I‘ (as shown in Figure 4.3) belonging to 
same or different payment plans making request for same or different type of 
applications. In this scenario, the measurements are taken during the peak times for Wi-Fi 
and UMTS as shown below in Table 4.8 and 4.9 respectively. All the users at a particular 
location in Home are assumed to have mean bit rate. All the users are equipped with 
multi-mode terminal and uses same type of handset. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Home scenario 
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Table 4.8 Wi-Fi related data at different locations of Home scenario 
Wi-Fi Location ‗A‘ Location ‗E‘ Location ‗I‘ Location ‗J‘ 
Min 252.75 489.125 40.875 603.75 
Max 634.625 578.375 607.5 679.875 
Mean 595.68125 564.45625 383.0125 665.3375 
Std Deviation 113.516193 26.2449373 172.27895 25.24096 
 
Table 4.9 UMTS related data at different locations of Home scenario 
UMTS Location ‗A‘ Location ‗E‘ Location ‗I‘ Location ‗J‘ 
Min 17.25 15.25 24.375 24.25 
Max 73.25 45 40.875 79.375 
Mean 43.2875 27.50625 30.68125 48.9 
Standard 
Deviation 
17.7167244 9.10928067 5.132097524 17.5852846 
 
In this scenario, the network selection is evaluated for the following cases: 
Case 1: The users at locations ‗A‘ and ‗I‘ within the Home requesting same type of 
application with same payment plan or different payment plans are shown below in 
Figure 4.4. 
Case 2: The users at locations ‗A‘ and ‗I‘ within the Home requesting different type of 
applications with same or different payment plans are shown below in Figure 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.4 Payoffs of user requesting video-interactive application  
at locations ‘A’ and ‘I’ 
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Figure 4.5 Payoffs of user at location ‘I’ requesting different applications  
whereas the user at location ‘A’ request video-interactive application 
 
Figure 4.6 Payoffs of user at location ‘A’ requesting different applications  
whereas the user at location ‘I’ request video-interactive application 
In case 1 (as shown in Figure 4.4), the user at location ‗A‘ requesting video-interactive 
application always select Wi-Fi network irrespective of the payment plan whereas the 
user at location ‗I‘ requesting video-interactive application always select Wi-Fi network 
except in case of  business payment plan (UMTS is selected). At location ‗I‘ (as shown in  
Figure 4.5),  the UMTS network is selected for voice applications request irrespective of 
payment plan and data application request for pay monthly plan. Similarly for all other 
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application request at location ‗A‘ and ‗I‘, the Wi-Fi network is selected. In Figure 4.6, 
the UMTS network is selected for voice applications request irrespective of payment plan 
and data application request for pay monthly plan at location ‗A‘. At location ‗I‘, the 
UMTS network is selected only for video-interactive application request. The Wi-Fi 
network is selected for all other application requests at location ‗A‘ and ‗I‘.   
4.8.2 Walking from home to the Supermarket scenario 
To evaluate the behaviour of our proposed network selection algorithm, a scenario with 
four users belonging to  pay as you go payment plan is assumed moving from Region ‗A‘ 
to ‗B‘ through the same path (marked by blue line on the map shown in Figure 4.7) at 
pedestrian speed.  
In the scenario, user ‗1‘ started File transfer service from start of the journey (location 
‗1‘) to the location ‗8‘ (i.e. 0 to 480 seconds) followed by voice service from location ‗8‘ 
to ‗15‘ (i.e. 480 to 900 seconds). The user ‗2‘ uses video streaming application 
throughout the considered scenario. The user ‗3‘ only uses voice services throughout the 
considered scenario whereas user ‗4‘ only initiates video-interactive. All the users are 
equipped with multi-mode terminal and uses same type of handset. In this scenario, the 
measurements are taken during the peak times for the shown path. The weights of 
attributes of different application types for pay as you go payment plan are mentioned in 
Table 4.5. The considered networks are UMTS and WLAN. The users while walking 
through the locations ‗1‘ to ‗15‘ have an access to different WLAN hotspots operated by 
different network providers.  
In this scenario, the data rates offered by UTRAN based macro-cell operated by ―Three 
network‖ are measured using ―cnlab speed test‖ application installed on ―Iphone 4‖ at 
every minute interval as shown below in Figure 4.8.  Similarly, the data rates offered by 
BT Open-zone hotspots and BTFON hotspots at different locations of the considered 
scenario are assumed as shown below in Figure 4.9.  
The data rate is measured at each location using Iphone ‗4‘ handsets and can be allocated 
to each individual user. For example, at location ‗A‘ in the above mentioned scenario, the 
data rates are measured four times at each location for both UMTS macro-cell (e.g. u1, u2, 
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u3, u4) and WLAN hotspot (e.g. wl1, wl2, wl3, wl4). There are four users so each user is 
assigned a (u, wl) pair at each location. 
 
Figure 4.7 Walking from home to the shopping centre scenario  
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Figure 4.8  User perceived data rate for UMTS macro-cell [Kbps] 
 
Figure 4.9 User perceived data rate of WLAN [Kbps] 
4.8.2.1 Performance Evaluation 
The performance are evaluated and compared in terms of the data rates perceived by the 
users and the selection of an optimal network. The results are presented in Figure 4.10, 
4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 respectively. Figure 4.10 compares the data rate perceived by all 
users in UMTS macro-cell and the WLAN hotspot. Figure 4.11 shows the data rate 
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perceived by the users served by UMTS macro-cell and Figure 4.12 shows the data rate 
perceived by the users served by WLAN hotspot. Figure 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 shows 
the selection of an optimal network for all users at the different locations of the path.  
 
Figure 4.10 Data rates perceived by all users in UMTS macro-cell and 
WLAN 
 
Figure 4.11 Data rates perceived by users served by UMTS macro-cell 
 
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
800 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
O
ff
e
re
d
  d
at
a 
ra
te
s 
b
y 
U
M
TS
 
m
ac
ro
-c
e
ll 
am
d
 W
LA
N
 
Locations 
UMTS-User 1 
UMTS-User 2 
UMTS-User 3 
UMTS-User 4 
WiFi-User 1 
WiFi-User 2 
WiFi-User 3  
WiFi-User 4  
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 d
at
a 
ra
te
s 
p
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 b
y 
u
se
rs
 s
e
rv
e
d
 b
y 
U
M
TS
 
Locations 
pay as you go user '1' 
pay monthly user '1' 
business user '1' 
pay as you go user '2' 
pay monthly user '2' 
business user '2' 
Pay as you go user '3' 
pay monthly user '3' 
business user '3' 
pay as u go user '4' 
pay monthly user '4' 
business user '4' 
86 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Data rates perceived by users served by WLAN 
 
Figure 4.13 Network selection for User ‘1’  
  
Figure 4.14 Network selection for User ‘2’  
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Figure 4.15 Network selection for User ‘3’ 
 
 
Figure 4.16 Network selection for User ‘4’ 
4.9 Computing the payoff for each user 
The previous sections consider the selection from the user perspective whereas in this 
section network perspective is considered. The payoff for each network compromises two 
parts namely the network reward index and the utility ‗Ui‘ to be gained by network ‗i‘ if 
the user selects the network ‗i‘. The pilot signal strength, (modelled as a function of 
distance in the simulations) is used as a measure of power consumed to serve a user. The 
distance is a guide to how much it costs the provider to provide the service. The provider 
would prefer its users to be near the BS as then it can meet the bit–rate requirements e.g. 
using different coding, without allocation lots of channels. It can provide more bit rate in 
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a single channel. The QoS depends on how many channels the provider is prepared to 
allocate given the rate it can transmit data (or receive data) to the user. 
In this case, the utility of providing the bit rate ‗Ui‘ in fact depends on the location of the 
mobile unit as the resources required depend on the location. U is defined as a number 
between 0 and 1 such that it is ‗1‘ when the user is close to the base station (or AP) and 
‗0‘ when the user is far from the base station (or AP). From the network perspective, the 
less transmitting power will be needed to serve a user at a minimum distance to the 
network as compared to user at the border of coverage area. The payoff for each network 
in a particular cell is shown below in Equation (4.19): 
                                             (4.19) 
In (4.19), ri is the utility value from the user perspective and Ui is the utility value from 
the network perspective. In the simulation the modified utility value decreases with the 
perceived distance from the particular base station (or AP) as shown below in Equation 
(4.20).  
                                                                  (4.20) 
The value of α, dmin and dmax is chosen so that U ranges from ‗1‘ to ‗0‘ according to the 
wireless network being used. However there are situations where it is possible to 
configure the antenna so that the network provider can change the value of U. The details 
of how this can be done are not described here, but are described in [JBW08]. The 
Equation (4.19) can be rewritten as shown below in Equation (4.21). 
                                                                                 (4.21) 
The payoff of all candidate networks is determined in accordance with the user‘s attribute 
and the network with highest payoff is selected as the candidate solution. The AHP is 
used to calculate the reward index for each candidate network considering the user‘s 
preferences whereas the concept of wireless environment (i.e. every network can cover a 
mobile user within a particular coverage area) is employed in the form of utility function 
for the calculation of payoff. 
4.10 Sensitivity Analysis 
There are issues relating to the determination of the preferences and the sensitivity of the 
decisions to the values. The network selection would change if the user changes his 
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preference on cost (the weight of cost wc is varied from 0.1 to 0.7 for the example 
mentioned in Chapter 3) as shown in Figure 4.12. Initially at wc=0.1, the network ‗3‘ is 
the most preferred network whereas at wc=0.5 the network ‗2‘ becomes the most 
preferred network. Increase in the weight of cost enhances the selection of network ‗2‘. 
The network ‗3‘ is the least preferred network throughout the variations of weight of cost.  
Similarly increase in the weight of Mobility support and Bit rate enhances the selection of 
Network ‗1‘. Network selection mechanism is a process of balancing user preferences 
and network condition. 
 
Figure 4.17 Ranking Index for Available networks with respect to 
Weight for Cost 
4.11 Summary 
This chapter describes the MCDM techniques that can be applied to find an appropriate 
network dependent on the user requirements. The proposed MCDM scheme considers 
multiple decision factors and multiple optimization objectives. The modelling approach 
for network selection in heterogeneous wireless environment considering four user 
preferences in the form of reputation, cost, offered bit rate and mobility support is 
modelled and evaluated for the three payment plans. The plans were Pay as you Go, Pay 
Monthly and Business. A wireless environment where user commitment to a particular 
network depends on attributes each of which contributes to the provider‘s utility is 
considered. The proposed network selection mechanism shows the variations in policy as 
a user changes preferences. 
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The network selection based on user preferences along with real-time collected data using 
the NetSpeed application) of UMTS macro-cell and WLAN for two realistic scenarios are 
modelled and illustrated using an AHP.  
However, there are still some issues related to the mobility model that needs further 
consideration. This proposed work can be further enhanced, e.g. by using a 
mathematically derived mobility model [MAPP09] capable of depicting Time before 
Vertical Handoff (TBVH) and the approximate time the user would be in a particular 
network. An improvement on the approach in this chapter would be to define a threshold 
value for each considered attribute requiring that the selected network needs to satisfy 
these threshold values.  
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5 Cooperating Heterogeneous Networks 
In this chapter the focus moves from mere network selection by the user to the use of 
game theory to manage the cooperation between networks so as to satisfy more users. It 
is assumed that the networks are either managed by the same provider or there is an 
appropriate collaboration agreement. However, as the network providers need to have a 
model of how the users‘ will select the offered networks, the work of the previous chapter 
will be used to model the users.  
5.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made in this chapter 
i. Each user has no influence on the decision of other users. 
ii. The users give their preference for mobility support but no mobility model is used 
to predict future trajectories. 
iii. Linear and constant pricing scheme is used. 
iv. The initial partition is computed using either random allocation or based on the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
v. The rational behaviour of a user is to choose the wireless network with the highest 
payoff. 
vi. Irrational behaviour of a user is to choose a wireless network with lower payoff. 
vii. Churning of users from Wi-Fi to WiMAX is only considered in this chapter. 
viii. The optimal partition is considered to be the proportion of users selecting Wi-Fi 
and WiMAX at the end of simulation. 
ix. The heterogeneous payoff of each user is the utility value based on the four 
attributes whereas the homogeneous payoff is the population payoff where all 
users are treated identical. 
x. Two methods labelled as average and minimum are assumed to compute the 
population payoff (i.e. homogeneous payoff).  
xi. An evolutionary equilibrium is considered as a solution.  
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5.2 Related Work 
The network selection problem has been mainly addressed in WLAN/cellular integrated 
environments [SJ04], [SJ05], [SJA05]. In [SJ04],[SJA05] the proposed methodology 
combines two methods, called AHP (Analytical Hierarchy Process) and GRA (Grey 
Relational Analysis) so as to compare networks based on the level of end-to-end QoS 
provided. In [BL07], compensatory and non-compensatory multi-attribute decision 
making algorithms were proposed to assist mobile users in selecting the most suitable 
network. A cost function based network selection strategy from the system perspective 
was proposed in [SZ08]. A similar approach, which also constitutes a fine example of 
how these methods can be applied and combined, can be found in the work of Ourania 
Markaki at [MCN07]. In [KKGGM05], a hierarchical radio resource management 
framework supporting seamless handoff between WLAN and a cellular network is 
proposed. In [SJZ07], a performance analysis model for an integrated cellular network 
and a WLAN is proposed. However, this does not consider the competition among users 
to access different wireless networks so the dynamics of network selection is not 
considered.  
Some algorithms already exist to carry out cooperative network control for user QoS in 
traditional cellular network. In [BD03], agent based cooperative negotiation 
implementing geography load balance is discussed. In [DBC04], the bubble oscillation 
algorithm is introduced. The analogy is that cells are bubbles and demand is related to the 
pressure. The bubbles oscillate to cell shape leading to reasonable cellular radio coverage 
for user QoS. In [DBC03], particular utility function is introduced for utility-based 
network entity control to realize networks optimization. In [MJB10] and [JBW08] 
cooperative pilot power control algorithm for user QoS, network capacity throughput 
improving is provided.  
An evolutionary game is used to model the network routing problem in [FV]. The users 
were modeled as a population and the route of data flow to the destination was the 
choices available to the user in a single wireless network.   
In [NH08], the churning behaviour of wireless service users using the theory of 
evolutionary game was modelled. A system model consisting of WLAN hotspots where a 
wireless user can choose among different WLAN access points based on the 
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performances or price. A continuous-time Markov chain model was established to capture 
the connection arrival and departure processes, as well as the rational and irrational 
churning behaviours of wireless service users. The evolutionary equilibrium, which is 
used to compute the average number of users choosing each wireless service, is 
considered as the solution. Based on this evolutionary game framework, two different 
possible pricing schemes, namely, non-cooperative and cooperative pricing schemes, for 
the wireless service providers were investigated. These schemes maximize individual 
revenue and total revenue, respectively, of the service providers. Performance analysis 
results are presented for the proposed modelling framework. 
In [ZNW10] the network selection problem in heterogeneous wireless networks with 
incomplete information is formulated as a Bayesian game. In general, the preference (i.e., 
utility) of a mobile user is private information. Therefore, each user has to make the 
decision of network selection optimally given only partial information of the preferences 
of other users. The dynamics of network selection are applied using the Bayesian best 
response dynamics and aggregate best response dynamics. The Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium is considered to be the solution of this game, and there is a one-to-one 
mapping between the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium distribution of the 
aggregate dynamics. The numerical results show the convergence of the aggregate best 
response dynamics for this Bayesian network selection game. This result ensures that 
even with incomplete information, the equilibrium of network selection decisions of 
mobile users can be reached. In [MFS05], an evolutionary game was used to model and 
solve the problem of congestion control in wired networks. A Markov chain was used to 
model the evolution of users. However, in the efforts, the network dynamics due to the 
arrival and the departure processes of the connections were ignored. Also, the pricing 
issues were not considered. 
5.2.1 Overview of Dusit Niyato Approach 
In Dusit Niyato approach [NH09], the authors use evolutionary game theory to model a 
heterogeneous wireless access environment consisting of IEEE 802.16 based WMAN, 
CDMA cellular network and IEEE 802.11based WLAN as shown in Figure 5.1. The 
considered geographic area is entirely covered by a WMAN base station (area ‗1‘) and 
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partly covered by the CDMA cellular base station (area ‗2‘) and WLAN access point 
(area ‗3‘). The users in different areas have an access to different type of wireless 
networks and users are assumed to be static.  
 
Figure 5.1 Heterogeneous wireless access environment [NH09] 
 
In Figure 5.1, the users in area ‗1‘ is served only by a WMAN base station (i.e. the 
proportion of users selecting WMAN is represented by    
   
  and is equal to ‗1‘). The 
users in area ‗2‘ have the option to either select CDMA cellular network or IEEE 802.11 
based WLAN (i.e. the proportion of users selecting CDMA or WLAN is represented by 
   
   
 and    
   
 respectively and their sum     
   
     
   
  should be equal to ‗1‘). Similarly, 
the users in area ‗3‘ have the option to select WMAN, CDMA cellular network or IEEE 
802.11 based WLAN (i.e. the sum of users selecting WMAN, CDMA or WLAN     
   
 
   
   
     
   
  should be equal to ‗1‘).  
The service providers use linear pricing function depending on the total number of users 
(or connections) within the corresponding area. The service provider in the congested 
area would charge higher price to gain revenue. The amount of bandwidth allocated to 
each user is used to compute the user payoff for each network in the service area. The 
network with more users will allocate less bandwidth and the user payoff for that network 
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will be less as compared to other networks. 
The evolutionary game for the network selection problem in heterogeneous wireless 
network can be described as follows: 
 The user in each area who can choose among multiple wireless networks is a 
player of the game. In Figure 5.1, the users in area ‗2‘ and ‗3‘ who compete for 
resources from WMAN, cellular network and WLAN are the players. The users in 
area ‗1‘ are not considered in the game as WMAN is the only wireless access 
network available to the user.  
 The population in this evolutionary game refers to the set of users in a particular 
area and is assumed to be finite. In Figure 5.1, users in area ‗2‘ form a population 
and users in area ‗3‘ forms another population. 
 The strategy of each user corresponds to the selection of a wireless access 
network. In Figure 5.1, the set of strategies for the players in area ‗2‘ is {WMAN, 
Cellular} while that for the players in area ‗3‘ is {WMAN, Cellular, WLAN}. 
 The payoff of a player is determined by its utility.   
The dynamic evolutionary game theory is used to model the network selection because it 
can capture the dynamics of network selection (i.e. strategy adaptation) based on the 
available information and bounded rationality of the users. The user slowly evolves the 
network if its observed payoff is less than the average payoff of all users in the same 
population.  The evolutionary equilibrium is considered a solution where all the users in 
the same group receive identical payoff (i.e. the payoff of the user is equal to the average 
payoff of the population). 
A concave utility function is used to compute the payoff of the users. The utility of a user 
in area ‗a‘ choosing network ‗i‘ can be expressed as follow: 
                       
   
                    (5.1) 
The ‗n‘ is the total number of users in area ‗a‘ choosing network ‗i‘, Pi(n)is the pricing 
function, Ti(n) is the throughput of the user and U denote the utility function similar to 
the one mentioned in [NH09].  All the users selecting network ‗i‘ are allocated equal 
amounts of bandwidth and this assumption does not hold true in real wireless 
environment. According to the definition of population, all users requesting same type of 
service or within the same service area should be allocated equal amount of bandwidth 
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(or generally same payoff). In order to cater this constraint, two different types of 
methods are assumed in the simulations namely as Average and Minimum method later in 
the chapter. The net utility of user selecting network ‗i‘ can be rewritten as follow: 
               
   
   
  
   
  
 
   
      
        
   
         (5.2) 
The                                                                
   
        
   
. 
    denote the total number of users in area ‘a‘ and   
   
denote the proportion of users 
choosing network ‗i‘. The   
   
 is the network capacity in area ‗a‘ (total capacity of 
WMAN and/or cellular base station and/or WLAN access point in area ‗a‘),    is the 
cooefficient of linear pricing function used by network ‗i‘ to charge a user and      is the 
set of subareas in area ‗a‘. Considering Figure 5.1, for the WMAN area (i.e. area ‗1‘) this 
set can be defined as             .  
For three wireless access networks scenario consisting of areas ‗1‘, ‘2‘ and ‗3‘(in Figure 
5.1), the net utility of the users in the coverage area of WMAN can be computed as 
follows: 
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The number of users choosing WMAN network in the scenario given in Figure 5.1 can be 
computed as follows: 
)1()1()1(
wmwm xNn   
)2()2()2(
wmwm xNn   
)3()3()3(
wmwm xNn   
               
   
    
   
    
   
         
   
         
   
         
   
   (5.4) 
As    
   
  , the (5.4) can be rewritten as  
                        
            
   
         
   
   (5.5) 
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Similarly, the net utility of users in the coverage area of cellular network can be 
computed as follow: 
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 (5.8) 
Similarly, the net utility of users in the coverage area of wireless LAN can be computed 
as follow: 
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  (5.12) 
In the next iteration, a user observes the net utility of other users in the same area. The 
iteration users adopts a strategy (i.e. select a network) that gives a higher payoff. The 
parameter σ controls the speed of user in observing and adapting the network selection 
and it should be greater than zero. The replicator dynamics equation [KUY03] is used as 
a condition to see whether it is profitable for a user to move from one network to another 
network, and is defined as follows: 
         
   
     
   
   
                          (5.13) 
The average payoff of the users in area ‗a‘ is computed as follow: 
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           (5.14) 
Based on the replicator dynamics of the users in area ‗a‘, the number of users choosing 
network ‗i‘ increases if their payoff is above the average payoff. The evolutionary 
equilibrium is considered as the solution to this network selection game. The evolutionary 
equilibrium is a fixed point of replicator dynamics, at which all users of the same 
population have identical payoff. It is important to note that in this formulation every user 
in a particular area is treated the same way, but in reality they will receive different bit 
rates depending on which part of the area they are in. 
5.2.2 Advantages of the proposed approach 
In this thesis, wireless context related parameters in payoff calculation (like bit rate and 
mobility support) are introduced. The initial partition is calculated using AHP which is 
more realistic than the random selected partition used in [NH09]. The AHP can be used to 
approximately predict the load within the candidate networks and then hypothetical 
calculations of network re-configuration can be applied to distribute the extra load from 
the overloaded network to the least loaded network.  This approach can be used as a 
network planning tool which caters for the load on the networks during different times of 
a day and find a respective solution to re-configure the networks. The hypothetical 
iterative calculations consider different distributions of users within the candidate 
networks and can be utilized to balance the load between the networks. In [NH09] the 
random function is used to select the user which is a selfish approach with the first user 
satisfying the considered condition is moved. The inverse cumulative ranking is used to 
find the lowest ranked user in overloaded network and if the user payoff for that user is 
greater in another network then the user will be moved from loaded network to the  
another network. In our work, we select the user with probability proportional to their 
inverse ranking to move because all users in same population in wireless environment are 
not same. The probability of selection is proportional to how bad they are in a population 
(i.e. more chances of less rewarded user being moved). 
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5.3 Internetworking Architecture  
An internetworking architecture [LB07] (as shown in Figure 5.2) including an IP 
backbone network integrating different RANs like Wi-Fi and WiMAX is assumed in this 
work and this section describes briefly one such approach. The infrastructures of the Wi-
Fi and WiMAX networks are maintained without modifications. The Wi-Fi and the 
WiMAX networks are directly connected to the IP backbone. In some situations, a 
gateway may be introduced between the Wi-Fi/WiMAX networks and the IP backbone. 
The RAN selection should be based on the context information of the user/terminal and 
the network. The user/terminal context information includes the requested service, quality 
preference, terminal type, and user/terminal status. The network context information 
consists of available RANs, network capacity, resource availability, coverage area, and 
service costs. 
As shown in Figure 5.2, a Decision Maker (DM) resides in the IP backbone network. The 
DM is context aware; it receives and updates user/terminal and network context 
information, and accepts user service requests. Based on the context information, the DM 
needs to implement a dynamic evolutionary algorithm to generate an optimized selection 
and then transfers it back to the user. In order to exchange the service requests and 
transmit the context information, a specific signalling mechanism should be implemented 
in a heterogeneous communication environment. For the signalling we presume the SIP 
protocol, because it is simple, extensible and it can be integrated with the IP technology. 
In addition to SIP, a signalling network is required to enable the communications 
between the DM and the user terminals. 
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Figure 5.2 Interworking Architecture [LB07]. 
5.4 System Model 
An illustration of our approach as shown in Figure 5.3, where a heterogeneous wireless 
access environment consisting of IEEE 802.11 based WLAN lying within the geographic 
region of IEEE 802.16 based WiMAX network is shown. Area 1 is covered by the 
WiMAX and WLAN network and area 2 covered by WiMAX network only. Area 1 is the 
main concern of focus. The options available to each user in area 1 are to select either the 
WiMAX network or WLAN. WiMAX and WLAN exhibit different service capabilities, 
e.g. they differ in bandwidth capacity, coverage, mobility support, and bit rate offered to 
users.  
Each user within each service area who can choose among multiple wireless networks is 
a player of the game. For example, in Figure 5.3, the users within the service area ‗1‘ are 
players of the game. The users in area ‗2‘ are not considered in the game as there is only 
one wireless network available i.e. WiMAX. The set of users in a service area is referred 
as population. The population in the service area is finite. In Figure 5.3, the users within 
service area ‗1‘ form a population and users within service area ‗2‘ form another 
population. The strategy of each user corresponds to the selection of a wireless access 
network. In Figure 5.3, the set of strategies for the players in area ‗1‘ is {WiMAX, 
WLAN}. The payoff of the player is determined by his or her net utility. 
101 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Heterogeneous Wireless Environment 
5.5 Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Re-configuration using 
Coverage Adjustment 
 
The network selection problem is modelled using a dynamic evolutionary game. The 
evolutionary game is used to capture the dynamics of network selection based on the 
available information and bounded rationality of the users [NH09]. 
The prediction of the network that would be chosen by a user considering the criterion in 
the top layer is solved using AHP. The AHP is used to capture the user preferences for 
the attribute and then using a utility function the preferred network for each user can be 
computed.  
The evolutionary game theory is used to decide the users within the population which 
will be more likely to move from one network to another network depending on the 
offered QoS. At the second layer, the payoffs offered to users are related to network 
configuration so wireless network re-configuration can change user network preference 
by creating QoS changes to users as compared to other networks providers within the 
same service area. For example, in the initial configuration of WLAN and WiMAX, if 
WiMAX provides low radio resource like transmitting power, its bit rate and mobility 
support may be less than WLAN to users. Under this situation, lots of users may prefer 
WLAN and hence acquire limited radio resource and lead to low QoS. When WiMAX is 
re-configured to increase its offering transmitting power, more and more users will prefer 
WiMAX and release WLAN from load un-balancing. This is an evolutionary approach 
within heterogeneous wireless networks.  
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The user slowly evolves the network if its observed payoff is less than the average (or 
min) payoff of all users in the same population depending on the average (or minimum) 
method being applied. For this evolutionary game, the evolutionary equilibrium is 
considered as a solution which makes sure that all users in the same group receive 
identical payoff. 
5.5.1 Formulation of Network Selection Game 
In our model we assume a population modelled by four different categories of user, 
which are represented by four categories, A, B, C, and D of user preferences.  All users in 
each category are given equal importance. A coarse description of user categories is 
shown below in Table 5.1. The entries in Table 5.1 show whether which attribute the 
users are most sensitive to. For example, the users in category A are sensitive to 
reputation and price over the other criterions, so ‗yes‘ is shown in the entries of 
reputation and price in category ‗A‘ in Table 5.1. Table 5.1 gives a broad picture of the 
categories of users used in our experiments but the specification of the user preferences is 
in fact more detailed.  
Table 5.1 Four categories of user and their preferences 
Attributes\Categories A B C D 
Reputation Yes No No Yes 
Price Yes Yes No No 
Bit rate No No Yes Yes 
Mobility No Yes Yes No 
We model the WiMAX and WLAN network selection problem by using AHP as 
described in Chapter 4 and Evolutionary Game Theory [WEI97]. AHP is used to 
calculate the payoff offered to a user when choosing WiMAX or WLAN. The payoff 
calculation considers user sensitivity to each of these attributes (reputation, price, bit rate 
and mobility). The value of each criterion depends on the network configuration, user 
location and the intention of the user.  User sensitivity to each criterion is the property of 
the user. For example, a user downloading a file using a laptop in a moving car prefers a 
network that offers the desired bit rate and supports mobility. After the payoff of each 
candidate network is calculated, evolutionary game theory is applied to decide the 
proportions of the users that will choose WiMAX or WLAN.  
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For this problem, as shown in Figure 5.4, AHP is structured into a hierarchy of 
dependencies. The goal of the problem is represented by the top most node, i.e. select the 
most suitable network, and the attribute considered in this problem are represented in the 
second level and the bottom most nodes represent the network technologies being 
offered, i.e. WiMAX and WLAN.  
 
Figure 5.4  Network selection hierarchy of dependencies 
Each user performs pair wise comparisons between attributes according to on a 1 to 9 
scale. The pair wise comparisons between the attribute result in a square matrix for each 
user. Each user creates a square matrix C depending on the number of attributes ‗n‘, 
whose size is n*n (4*4 in our proposed model). Hence each user will have a weight value 
for each of the four attribute. The weight value wi for each attribute is calculated by 
applying Equation (4.7) and (4.8) on the square matrix C. Since there are four categories 
of users there will be four sets of  .  
5.5.2 Calculating each criterion value offered by candidate network 
For every user, the candidate network           offers different quality levels 
(between 0 and 1) for each criterion           .These quality levels represent how 
well each candidate network performs in terms of each criterion. A criterion may be 
labelled in such a way that the larger the value better or the smaller the value the better. 
For the criterion cost then smaller is better whereas for the reputation, bit rate and 
mobility, larger is better. 
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The quality level offered by network ‗j‘, for criterion ‗i‘ is denoted by ‗aij‘. It is computed 
according to the following relationship: 
          
    (Larger the Better)                    (5.15) 
      
        (Smaller the Better)                   (5.16) 
Where     is the quality level value of criterion   
  offered by candidate network   .   
    is 
the maximum quality level value of criterion     offered among all the candidate networks.  
  
    is the minimum quality level value of criterion     offered among all the candidate 
networks. So in our case with two networks e.g. for 
mobility          
                               .  Table 5.2 is an example of the quality 
level values for both networks and the four attribute. The     is a normalization onto [0-1] 
scale. The quality level value is computed in an attribute dependent manner. For example 
for cost it is simply the price charged. For bit rate it requires a mechanism to compute the 
bit rate that the user will experience and this depends on the location of the mobile, SNR 
of the channel and network type. More detail of the modelling used is described in detail 
in [DBC04].   
In order to show quality level values offered by the two networks to a single user, an 
example is provided in Table 5.2. The ―bit rate‖ value offered by each network will be 
variable depending on each user location and SNR. Similarly for the attribute ‗Mobility 
Support‘ the value can be variable if the user is not static (pedestrian or vehicle) 
otherwise the mobility value is constant and same. The ―Cost‖ offered by the two 
networks is different in this example. Finally the reputation is assumed constant and the 
same between the two networks 
Table 5.2 An example of criterion quality level value offered by network 
Network/Attribute Reputation Cost Bit rate Mobility 
Support 
WLAN 0.5 0.2 11.6 Mbps 0 
WiMAX 0.5 0.3 5.5 Mbps 0.6 
Let‘s assume the example shown in Table 5.2, the quality level offered by network ‗1‘, 
for criterion reputation, cost, bit rate and mobility is denoted by a11, a21, a31 and a41 
respectively. The quality levels offered by each network are computed according to the 
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Equations (5.15) and (5.16) depending on the type of attribute (larger the better or smaller 
the better) as shown below: 
                                                            
                                                           
  
               
               
                  
        
                                                    
                                                
The user criterion weight value according to different category in this simulation is 
described in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3 User criterion weight value in each category in the simulation 
Attribute/Category A B C D 
Reputation 0.4227 0.1384 0.1485    0.4151 
Cost 0.3575 0.4573 0.0682    0.0903 
Bit rate 0.1224    0.364 0.3783   0.042 
Mobility 0.0974    0.0403   0.405   0.4526 
5.5.3 User received payoff calculation 
In a particular service area, a user competes to share resources from different wireless 
networks depending on the payoff they will receive as a result of their choice. 
Considering service area ‗1‘, let N (1) is the total number of users within the service area 
‗1‘ constitutes a population. In this example, there are two candidate networks. The 
strategy available to each user is to either select the WiMAX or WLAN network. The 
payoff of a user choosing a candidate network in area ‗1‘ (the only area considered in this 
example) is indicated by the following relationship: 
                        
   
         
 
                      (5.17) 
In all the following equations the superscript refers area (1). The    is the criterion     
weight value of the user calculated using Equation (4.7).  For a user, the network ‗j‘ with 
the maximum payoff πj value is chosen as the preferred network for a user connection 
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request. Going through all the users N
(1)
     in service area ‗1‘ we get the partition       
   
   
   
   
  where x1
(1)
 is the set of users within service area ‗1‘ that prefers network ‗1‘ 
and x2
(1)
 is the set of users within service area ‗1‘ that prefers network ‗2‘. 
5.5.4  Evolutionary Network Selection using Inverse Rank 
In evolutionary game theory, population evolution is used to evolve the proportion of 
users selecting the available wireless networks. Each user in a particular population is 
awarded the same payoff. In a real wireless network a set of users , even from the same 
category, will not receive the same payoff, as the received bit rate (and hence user 
satisfaction) will depend on the location and other factors determining the signal to noise 
ratio. A criterion like price can however be same. So according to payoff calculation 
defined in Equation (5.17), each user can have different payoff we call this the 
heterogeneous payoff. In order to implement population evolution, the payoff of all users 
within the same population should be the same. To obtain a homogeneous payoff of a 
user for each population we define a specific utility function where they are treated the 
same. 
In population evolution, each period the user observes the payoff of other user in the 
same population and in next step adopts a network that offers it a higher payoff. This 
phenomenon can be represented with the help of replicator dynamics and the following 
relationship where ‗σ‘ is the gain for the rate of strategy adaptation and       is defined 
according to the condition (4) of the algorithm: 
              
   
    
   
   
   
                   (5.18) 
For the areas shown in Figure 5.3, the replicator dynamics can be expressed as follows: 
                   
   
      
   
    
                
           
   
 
   
       
For area 1 there are only WiMAX and WLAN network so 
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For area ‗2‘ there is only WiMAX network so 
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As    
   
   so     
   
   
There is only one network available to the user that is why all users would select WMAN 
and the rate of change is zero. 
The adjustment during the process of reaching equilibrium is hypothetical. The 
accumulated hypothetical adjustments can be applied to manage the available networks 
efficiently when the optimisation process has finished. If the networks are congested in 
the service area during the peak and off-peak times of the day, these adjustments can be 
applied to divert the traffic load from the congested network to the uncongested network. 
The actual selection is performed at the end.  
In this approach, an interworking architecture consisting of Wi-Fi and WiMAX networks 
are proposed. There exists a central selection controller (similar to Decision Maker in 
[LB07]) which calculates and maintains the payoff information of all users within the 
same service area. The network selection is based on the current homogeneous payoff 
and the average payoff of all users within the same area.  
For simplicity the user with the lowest rank associated with previous network is 
transferred to a new network if condition (6) and (7) of the algorithm is satisfied 
otherwise the user remains within the previous network. 
Algorithm: 
1) For all users, network j is chosen according to heterogeneous payoff calculated 
through Eq.(5.17) (i.e. j ϵ {WLAN, WiMAX} 
2) loop 
3) A user computes homogeneous payoff   
   
by using Eq. (5.20) in case of minimum 
method and Eq. (5.21) in case of average method. This homogeneous payoff 
information is sent to the selection controller. 
4) The selection controller computes average payoff  
            
   
     
     For the users and broadcasts it back to the users. {N (1) 
is the total number of users in area 1} 
   Rank each user through Inverse Cumulative Ranking;  
6) If    
   
        then 
    7) If (                     ) then 
             8) If (    
   
   
   
 ) {Where   
   
      
   
 is the  
                 Heterogeneous payoffs offered by network i and j to  
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                     User k, calculated by using Eq. (5.17)} 
                       9) User k chooses network ‗i’;  
             10) End if 
11) End if 
     12) End if 
13) End loop for all users in all groups 
5.5.5  Selecting a user 
The switching of a user ‗k‘ from the current network to another network is dependent on 
the probability proportional to Tk. The rank is decided by the heterogeneous payoff of 
users through computing the Inverse Cumulative Rank.  
Considering Figure 5.3, the switch process of a user from WLAN to WiMAX network or 
vice versa depends on their relative rank from all the users within the service area ‗1‘.  
The inverse Cumulative Ranking method is demonstrated with the help of a simple 
example. Suppose the WiMAX heterogeneous payoff for users within service area ‗1‘ is 
referred as Un and the total number of users within service area ‗1‘ is denoted by k ϵ {1, 
2, ----, 100}.  The inverse rank Tk is a relationship which determines the relative 
importance of a user within a network and is computed by the following relationship: 
                                        
 
    
                                                              
The lower the heterogeneous payoff of a user; the more is their inverse rank i.e. more 
chance the user has of being shifted from current network to another network. The 
complete procedure of rank calculation using Inverse Cumulative Raking is shown below 
in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Inverse Cumulative Ranking 
Index Cumulative Distribution of Tk 
1 T1/   
 
    
2 (T1+T2) /   
 
    
3 (T1+T2+T3) /   
 
    
    
N (100 in the example) (T1+T2+T3+   +Tk) /   
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Example 5.1: The procedure of Inverse Cumulative Ranking with the help of a simple 
example in which five users with their heterogeneous payoffs ‗Uk‘ and their respective 
‗Tk‘ are shown below in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 respectively.  
 
Figure 5.5 The heterogeneous payoffs of five users 
 
Figure 5.6 The inverse rank of the five users 
The rank of user using the procedure mentioned in Table 5.4 is shown below in Figure 
5.7.  
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Figure 5.7 Rank of five users 
5.6 Performance Evaluation of Inverse Rank Approach 
In the simulations to illustrate the approach it is assumed that network offered reputation 
remains constant throughout the simulation. The bit rate offered to users is decided 
through the Adaptive Modulation and Coding (AMC) scheme for the WiMAX and Wi-Fi 
networks. AMC makes use of Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) to decide the user bite rate. 
Normally, the further the user is away from the Base Station (BS) or Access Point (AP), 
the lower bit rate will be offered. The WiMAX and Wi-Fi networks offer different prices 
to the users and the simulation is carried out for the three cases:  
 Same price offered by both networks  
 Price offered by WiMAX network is greater than the price offered by Wi-Fi 
network and  
 Price offered by WiMAX network is less than the price offered by Wi-Fi network.  
The price does not change within the simulation. The mobility in WiMAX and Wi-Fi is 
related to the position of user in the coverage area of WiMAX or Wi-Fi.  The calculation 
of reputation, bit rate, mobility and price mentioned above provides the quality level 
values defined in Equation (5.17).  
The WiMAX network re-configuration is implemented through increasing the base 
station antenna transmit power in the sector covered by the WiMAX, whereas no re-
configuration is applied to the WLAN. So the homogeneous and heterogeneous payoffs 
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offered by WiMAX always increase as physical adjustments are made for this to be so, 
while WLAN offered payoffs always remain constant. In this way more and more users 
gradually choose WiMAX.  The base station antenna transmit power increase enhances 
the modulation scheme offered by WiMAX to the user and which in turn enhances the bit 
rate.  The quality level values offered by WiMAX for the bit rate and mobility criterion 
changes, which in effect change the respective heterogeneous payoff.  
5.6.1  Parameter Settings 
The heterogeneous wireless environment consider of two networks (i.e. WiMAX and Wi-
Fi) and group of users (i.e. population). The heterogeneous wireless environment is 
divided into two areas namely as ‗1‘ and ‗2‘. The Wi-Fi is one typical example of WLAN 
and makes use of CSMA/CA access technology, and is supported by IEEE 802.11g 
standard. The total bandwidth available to Wi-Fi network is 7MHz bandwidth. The 
WiMAX is supported by IEEE 802.16 standard and makes use of 512 FFT size OFDMA 
access technologies. The total bandwidth available to WiMAX network is 5MHz. The 
Wi-Fi has 300 meters radius coverage area covering the whole area ‗1‘ and lying within 
the coverage area of the WiMAX. The WiMAX coverage has minimum 1000 meters 
radius and maximum 2000 meters radius covering both area ‗1‘ and ‗2‘. The whole 
environment is 15000 meters in width and 15000 meters height.  
The total number of users in the heterogeneous wireless environment is 200 and 
uniformly distributed within service area ‗1‘ and ‗2‘. For analysis purpose, we assume 
that (N
 (1) 
= 100) is the number of users lying within the overlapping coverage area of 
WiMAX and Wi-Fi (i.e. service area ‗1‘) requesting the same service type with same 
demand.  In this simulation, the partition is defined as the proportion of users selecting 
Wi-Fi (i.e.            
                                                 
    
 ). 
5.6.2  Numerical Results  
5.6.2.1 Minimum method 
In this method, the homogeneous payoff for each user is computed using Equation (5.20) 
and the simulation is run for three different cases of price being offered.  
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Let   
    
be the set of the payoffs associated with all the users choosing network ‗j‘ in 
service area ‗1‘.The homogeneous payoff for each user in a population can be expressed 
as follows: 
                      
   
        
   
                   (5.20) 
In case 1, the price offered by both networks is same. In case 2, the price offered by 
WLAN is more as compared to the price offered by WiMAX. In case 3, the price offered 
by WiMAX network is more as compared to the price offered by WLAN. The 
homogeneous payoffs of Wi-Fi and WiMAX and the minimum payoff in different 
WiMAX re-configuration simulation time in case 1, 2 and 3 are shown below in Figures 
5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 respectively.  
 
Figure 5.8 Payoffs of Inverse rank approach for case 1 (Minimum method) 
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Figure 5.9  Payoffs of Inverse rank approach for case 2 (Minimum method) 
 
Figure 5.10 Payoffs of Inverse rank approach for case 3 (Minimum method) 
The impact of change in price being charged by network providers on partition for three 
different cases within service area ‗1‘ is shown in Figure 5.11. The partition is the ratio of 
users preferring one network to the total number of users within service area ‗1‘. 
Basically the partition shows the proportions of users that prefer Wi-Fi as compared to 
WiMAX. If more users prefer WiMAX than Wi-Fi, the proportion of users in partition 
for WiMAX will be more and vice versa.  
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As the WiMAX re-configuration simulation time increases, the transmitting power of 
WiMAX base station antenna becomes higher whereas the transmitting power of Wi-Fi 
remains constant. Under this situation, the user received homogeneous payoff of choosing 
WiMAX increases while homogeneous payoff of choosing Wi-Fi decreases. Based on 
evolutionary network selection algorithm, more and more users will prefer WiMAX, so 
the proportions of users for WiMAX in partition increases and the system blocking rate 
will keep on decreasing due to less number of users need to be served by Wi-Fi. 
The impact of change in partition on system blocking rate is shown in Figure 5.12. The 
system blocking rate demonstrates the QoS provided by wireless networks to the users 
and is closely related to the proportions of users for each network in the partition. In this 
simulation, if the proportion of users for Wi-Fi in partition is high leading to more call 
requests being blocked by Wi-Fi due to low capacity. As a result, if proportion of users 
for Wi-Fi in partition decreases, the system blocking rate decreases as well and vice 
versa. 
 
Figure 5.11 User preference partition of Inverse rank approach in different price 
cases (Minimum method) 
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Figure 5.12 System blocking rate of Inverse rank approach in different price cases 
(Minimum method) 
5.6.2.2 Average method 
In this method, the homogeneous payoff for each user is computed using (5.21) 
mentioned below:  
                             
   
      
   
     
         (5.21) 
The simulation is run for three different cases of price being offered by both networks. In 
case 1, the price offered by both networks is same. In case 2, the price offered by WLAN 
is more as compared to the price offered by WiMAX. In case 3, the price offered by 
WiMAX network is more as compared to the price offered by WLAN. The homogeneous 
payoffs of Wi-Fi and WiMAX and the minimum payoff in different WiMAX re-
configuration simulation time in case 1, 2 and 3 are shown in Figures 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 
respectively. The impact of change in price being charged by network providers on 
partition for three different cases within service area ‗1‘ is shown in Figure 5.16. The 
impact of change in partition on system blocking rate is shown in Figure 5.17. 
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Figure 5.13 Payoffs of Inverse rank approach for case1 (Average method) 
 
Figure 5.14 Payoffs of Inverse rank approach for case 2 (Average method) 
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Figure 5.15 Payoffs of Inverse rank approach for case 3 (Average method) 
 
Figure 5.16 User preference partition of Inverse rank approach in different price 
cases (Average method) 
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Figure 5.17 System blocking rate of Inverse rank approach in different price cases 
(Average method) 
5.6.3 Results of Dusit Niyato’s Evolutionary game theoretic approach  
In [NH09], the population evolution algorithm with random selection is used to select the 
user to be moved.  The population evolution algorithm is evaluated for both minimum 
and average methods with same network parameters and settings used for Inverse rank 
approach. The homogeneous payoffs of Wi-Fi and WiMAX network along with their 
average payoff in different WiMAX re-configuration iterations (minimum method) for 
Dusit Niyato approach [NH09] in case 1, 2 and 3 are shown below in Figures 5.18, 5.19 
and 5.20 respectively. The impact of change in price being charged by network providers 
on partition (minimum method) for three different cases within service area ‗1‘ is shown 
below in Figure 5.21. The impact of change in partition on system blocking rate 
(minimum method) is shown below in Figure 5.22. 
The homogeneous payoffs of Wi-Fi and WiMAX network along with their average 
payoff in different WiMAX re-configuration iterations (average method) for Dusit Niyato 
approach [NH09] in case 1, 2 and 3 are shown below in Figures 5.23, 5.24 and 5.25 
respectively. The impact of change in price being charged by network providers on 
partition (average method) for three different cases within service area ‗1‘ is shown 
below in Figure 5.26. The impact of change in partition on system blocking rate 
(minimum method) is shown below in Figure 5.27. 
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Figure 5.18 Payoffs of Dusit Niyato approach for case 1(Minimum method) 
 
Figure 5.19 Payoffs of Dusit Niyato approach for case 2(Minimum method) 
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Figure 5.20 Payoffs of Dusit Niyato approach for case 3(Minimum method) 
 
Figure 5.21 User preference partition of Dusit Niyato approach in different 
price cases (Minimum method) 
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      Figure 5.22 System blocking rate of Dusit Niyato approach in different price 
cases (Minimum method) 
 
Figure 5.23 Payoffs of Dusit Niyato approach for case 1(Average method) 
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Figure 5.24 Payoffs of Dusit Niyato approach for case 2(Average method) 
 
 
Figure 5.25 Payoffs of Dusit Niyato approach of for case 3(Average method) 
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Figure 5.26 User preference partition of Dusit Niyato approach in different 
price cases (Average method) 
 
Figure 5.27 System blocking rate of Dusit Niyato approach in different price cases 
(Average method) 
5.6.4  Comparison between Inverse rank and Dusit Niyato approach 
In order to evaluate the proposed inverse rank approach, the results are compared with the 
Dusit Niyato approach [NH09]. The performance of blocking rates and number of users 
served by Wi-Fi (partition) for inverse rank and Dusit Niyato approach (WiMAX price is 
same as Wi-Fi price) is shown below in Figure 5.28. The number of users served by Wi-
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Fi for both approaches in average and minimum method is same till iteration ‗9‘ but after 
that the number of users served by Wi-Fi in inverse rank approach outperforms the Dusit 
Niyato approach. The Dusit Niyato approach better in terms of  blocking rate in average 
method till iteration ‗11‘ but after that inverse rank approach outperforms. The inverse 
rank approach outperforms the Dusit Niyato approach after iteration ‗6‘ in minimum 
method.    
 
 
Figure 5.28 Blocking rates and number of users served by Wi-Fi (Partition) of 
Inverse rank approach with Dusit Niyato approach for the case 1 
The performance of blocking rates and number of users served by Wi-Fi (partition) for 
inverse rank and Dusit Niyato approach (Wi-Fi price is less than WiMAX price) is shown 
below in Figure 5.29. The number of users served by Wi-Fi for both approaches in 
average method is same till iteration ‗14‘ but after that the number of users served by Wi-
Fi in inverse rank approach decreases very rapidly outperforming the Dusit Niyato 
approach. The number of users served by Wi-Fi for both approaches in minimum method 
is same till iteration ‗8‘ but after that the number of users served by Wi-Fi in inverse rank 
approach decreases very gradually but in the end both approaches achieve the same 
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performance. The same performance is achieved by both approaches in average and 
minimum method. 
 
Figure 5.29 Blocking rates and number of users served by Wi-Fi (Partition) of 
Inverse rank approach with Dusit Niyato approach for the case 3 
 
Figure 5.30 Blocking rates and number of users served by Wi-Fi (Partition) of 
Inverse rank approach with Dusit Niyato approach for the case 2 
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The performance of blocking rates and number of users served by Wi-Fi (partition) for 
inverse rank and Dusit Niyato approach (WiMAX price is less than Wi-Fi price) is shown 
in Figure 5.30. The inverse rank approach outperforms the Dusit Niyato approach in 
average and minimum method where WiMAX price is less than Wi-Fi price. It can be 
easily concluded that the inverse rank approach performs far better than Dusit Niyato 
approach for average method of all three cases whereas for the minimum method the 
inverse rank approach performs marginally better than the Dusit Niyato approach. 
5.6.4.1 Simulation Process 
The basic flowchart for the simulation process is shown below in Figure 5.31. The 
equilibrium partition step makes use of the population evolution algorithm mentioned in 
Section 5.4.4. 
 
Figure 5.31 Simulation Process 
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5.6.5 Dynamic Behaviour of Users 
We first analyze the dynamic behaviour of users by using the phase plane of replicator 
dynamics (for             ). This phase plane shows the evolution of proportions of 
users from different networks toward the evolutionary equilibrium (e.g., starting with 
  
           and   
           ). The evolutionary equilibrium is a point such as 
   
       
      where all the users receive an identical payoff. 
The evolutionary equilibrium is considered a solution to this game. The replicator 
equation for the proposed network selection model in area ‗1‘ with      is given as  
   
   
   
   
   
   
        
The evolutionary equilibrium is defined as the stable fixed point of the replicator 
dynamics. When a population of players evolves over time (i.e., based on the replicator 
dynamics), it may converge to the evolutionary equilibrium. At this evolutionary 
equilibrium, none of the players wants to change the strategy since its payoff is equal to 
the average payoff of the population it belongs to. This evolutionary equilibrium (or fixed 
points) can be obtained mathematically by solving 
    
   
       
The fixed point z is a point xj at which payoff of all users in area ‗1‘ are identical i.e. rate 
of strategy adaptation    
   
is equal to zero. The fixed points for replicator equation 
are          
   
      .  
Example 5.2: Consider an example of replicator dynamics for two different types in a 
population (n=2).  There are x number of users of type ‗1‘ and 1-x number of users of 
type 2 i.e.               .  For simplicity, the payoff function is assumed 
as               . Let the matrix    
      
      
   
           
           
  denote the payoffs 
for each type of users within a population. The replicator equation for this case will be as 
follows: 
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The fixed points are z=0, 1 or 
 
     
 provided ab > 0.  
The fixed point zj=0 is Nash equilibrium if  
   
      .  The fixed points can be stable, 
attractive or asymptotically stable. Trivially, every interior fixed point is Nash 
equilibrium. At a boundary fixed point z, the difference of   
   
       is an Eigenvalue 
for the Jacobian matrix of the replicator equation.  
Hence a fixed point z is Nash equilibrium if all its Eigen values are non-positive. This 
yields a proof for the existence of Nash equilibrium in terms of population dynamics 
[HS03]. 
 If z is a Nash equilibrium it is a fixed point 
 If z is a strict Nash equilibrium, then it is asymptotically stable 
 If the fixed point z is stable, then it is Nash equilibrium. 
5.6.6  Stability of Evolutionary equilibrium 
In [TD97] the authors explained the conditions of stability for evolutionary equilibrium 
by analyzing the following Jacobian matrix  
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The next step is to calculate the Eigen value of a matrix J. Let    
      
      
     
    
  the 
characteristic polynomial can be written as follows: 
    
       
    
  
     
          
                                        
  
         
 
  
           
 
 
                         
The two Eigen values of a matrix J is given as follows: 
  
         
 
 
                          
 
 
The Evolutionary Equilibrium is stable if these two Eigenvalues have negative real part.  
5.7 Summary 
In this chapter, modelling approach for network selection in heterogeneous networks 
environment have been presented and illustrated using a Wi-Fi hotspot within a WiMAX 
network. The proposed scheme considered multiple decision factors and multiple 
optimization objectives. Lack of information about performance obtained from different 
service providers or inadequate information about decision of other users, a user 
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gradually learns and changes his decision on choosing a particular wireless network. The 
results are analyzed in form of changes in partition, system blocking rates and payoffs for 
both networks in three different price settings. The mechanism of network 
reconfiguration in heterogeneous wireless networks appears to be a basis for a reasonable 
network choice for users (partition comes to equilibrium i.e. no user can change their 
payoff) even when the strict assumptions are not adhered to.  
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6 Game Theory Concepts 
In this chapter, background on relevant research fields is introduced. The application of 
the theory presented here is in Chapter 7. Topics covered include basics of game theory, 
non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory. In section 6.1, some essential 
principles of coalitional game theory are described and review their state of art in the 
literature given. Finally, section 6.2 summarizes this chapter. 
6.1  Coalitional Game Theory 
6.1.1  Basic Definitions 
A coalitional game consists of two elements: a set of players ‗N‘ and the coalition value 
‗v‘. The set N represents the players that interact in order to form coalitions to have 
mutual benefit. The coalition value v quantifies the utility of a coalition in a game. In 
general the coalition value can be in three different forms: 
 Characteristic form 
 Partition form 
 Graph form 
In any coalition game (independent of the form), the value of a coalition and payoff 
received by a player are two different terms. The value of a coalition represents the 
amount of utility that a coalition as a whole can obtain. The payoff of a player represents 
the amount of that utility that a player within the coalition will obtain. 
 Definition of Coalitional game: 
A coalitional game is a pair (N, v), where N is a finite set of players and v is a function 
mapping subsets of N to real valued numbers.  
Definition of Coalitions: Let N = {1, 2, ---, n} be a set of n players. Any subset S N is 
called a coalition of players, i.e., a coalition is one of the 2n-1 subsets of N. A coalition 
structure s is a partition of players into coalitions.  
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                where                and             
Intuitively, the coalition structure s contains one or more coalitions from S such that all 
the members of N are part of the coalition structure. The ‗k‘ is the number of coalitions 
included in coalition structure s from the set of coalitions S.   
Example 6.1: 
Let N= {1, 2, 3} 
Possible coalitions=                                       
Coalition structures=                                                             
 Definition of Grand Coalition:  
A grand coalition is a coalition that includes all of the players. 
Example: For a three player game such as          , the grand coalition is {1, 2, 3} 
while {{1, 2},{3}} is not a grand coalition.  
6.1.2 Types of coalition game 
The coalitional game can be either with transferable utility (TU) or with non-transferable 
utility (NTU). A TU game implies that the total coalitional value received by any 
coalition     can be distributed in any manner between the members of S. The non-
transferable utility was first introduced by Aumann and Peleg using non-cooperative 
strategic games as a basis [MYE91], [PM60]. In a NTU game, the payoff that each user 
in a coalition S receives is dependent on the joint actions that the players of coalition S 
select. Hence, in a NTU game, the value of a coalition S is no longer a function over the 
real line but a set of payoff vectors. For example, in an NTU game in characteristic form, 
the value of a coalition S would be given by the set v(S)   RS, where each element xi  of 
a vector x   v(S) represents a payoff that user i   S can obtain when acting within 
coalition S given a certain strategy.  
In this chapter whenever we mention coalitional game it is related to transferable utility 
(TU). Fuller definitions of non-transferable utility (NTU) coalitional games are given in 
[MYE91], [PM60] . 
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6.1.2.1 Characteristic Function  
The characteristic form is the most commonly used in game theory and introduced by 
Von Neuman and Morgenstern [NM44]. The coalition form of an n player game is given 
by the pair (N, v), where v is the characteristic function The characteristic function is a 
function denoted by ‗v‘ that associates with every subset S of N, a number denoted by 
v(S). The number v(S) is interpreted as the value created when the members of S come 
together and interact. The value of coalition S in characteristic form depends only on the 
members of that coalition. 
 A characteristic function is additive if for any two disjoint coalitions S and T  
                 
 A characteristic function is super-additive if for any two disjoint coalitions S and 
T the following relation holds: 
                 
For super-additive games, it is to the joint benefit of the players to always form the grand 
coalition N, i.e. the coalitions of all the users in N, since the payoff received from v (N) is 
at least as large as the amount received by the players in any disjoint set of coalitions they 
could form. As a result, whether a game is super-additive or not strongly impacts the 
approach used to solve the game.  
 A characteristic function is strictly super-additive if for any two disjoint coalitions 
S and T the following relation holds: 
                 
 A characteristic function is convex if for any two disjoint coalitions S and T the 
following relation holds: 
                        
6.1.2.2 Allocation 
For a coalitional game (N, v), an allocation is a collection of real valued payoffs   
               representing the payoff to each player ‗i‘ under coalition structure ‗S‘ 
from the division of v(S).  This is also called the payoff vector for S. 
i. Rational 
An allocation               for S is individually rational if                
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ii. Efficient 
Given the grand coalition N, an allocation              for S is efficient if 
   
 
         
6.1.2.3 Imputation 
An imputation ‗x‘ is a real valued payoff vector              satisfying the conditions 
for both rational and efficient allocation. An imputation ‗x‘ is said to be unstable through 
coalition S if               i.e. the players have incentive to form coalition S and 
reject the proposed ‗x‘.  Specifically, if the imputation is unstable, there is at least one 
player who is unsatisfied due to the coalition. 
6.1.3 Payoff distribution methods 
Cooperative game theory offers several solution concepts. There are different possible 
methods for dividing the coalition value to the members of a coalition and these can be 
classified as follows:  
6.1.3.1 Equal share 
The most simple division method [SHDH08] is to divide the extra payoff equally among 
the players in the coalition. In other words, the payoff of a player ‗i‘ among a coalition S 
is  
   
 
   
                         (‗i‘ is a member of S) 
6.1.3.2 Proportional share 
The extra payoff can be divided among the members of coalition in accordance with 
weights according to the player‘s willingness to cooperate in the coalition [SHDH08]. 
                  
   
         
Where          and within the coalition 
  
  
 
      
      
 
This allows values for each wj to be computed, e.g. as follows: 
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6.1.3.3 The Core  
The core is the set of all imputations x for which                  An allocation in 
the core of a game will always be an efficient allocation. The set of stable imputations is 
called the core. Consequently given the grand coalition N, the core of a coalitional game 
(N, v) in characteristic form with TU is defined as [FER] 
                    
      
             
Whenever one is able to find a payoff allocation that lies in the core, then the grand 
coalition is a stable and optimal solution for the coalitional game. However, the core of a 
coalitional game suffers from several drawbacks. On one hand, in many games, the core 
is empty, and thus, there does not exist an allocation that can stabilize the grand coalition. 
On the other hand, even when it exists, the core might be a huge set and selecting a fair 
allocation out of this set is a big challenge. 
6.1.3.4 Power index methods 
The solution of an N-person game can be obtained by several power index methods. A 
power index (or value) is commonly used to measure the influence of a player on the 
formation of coalitions and most importantly on the outcome of the game [AKJPS09]. 
There are several power index methods proposed in the literature (e.g., Shapley-Shubik 
value   (abbreviated as SSPI) [SCSM08], the Banzhaf value β (abbreviated as BPI) 
[BR07],  Holler–Packel index η (abbreviated as HPI) [HAR], Popularity Power Index ζ 
(abbreviated as PPI)[AKJPS09] ) and the numerical behaviour of all these power indices 
were examined by Josephina Antoniou and co-authors in [AKJPS09].  
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However, we choose Shapley-Shubik value for the distribution of coalitional value since 
the computational complexity of this method is small. Shapley defines a value for games 
to be a function that assigns to each game v a number  (v) for each player ‗i’.  The 
Shapley value                   can be computed as follows: 
        
 
  
     
       
                              
The summation ranges over all the subsets S of N.  A coalition that includes ‗i' is denoted 
as v(S) and a coalition without i is denoted as v(S/i). 
6.1.3.5 Marginal Contribution Principle  
Given a cooperative game (N, v), the quantity v (N) specifies the overall amount of value 
created. Given the set of players N and a particular player ‗i‘, let N\{i} denote the subset 
of N consisting of all the players except player ‗i‘. The marginal contribution of player ‗i‘ 
denoted by MCi [BRA07] can be computed as follow: 
                   
An (individually rational and efficient) allocation              satisfies the Marginal 
Contribution Principle if              The marginal contribution principle is explained 
with the help of buying and selling game for three players i.e. N= {1, 2, 3}. The player 
‗1‘ is the seller and player‗2‘ and ‗3‘ are two potential buyers. Player ‗1‘ has a single unit 
to sell at a cost of $4. Each buyer is interested in buying at most one unit. Player ‗2‘ has a 
willingness to pay $9 for player 1‘s product, while player ‗3‘ has a willingness to pay $11 
for player 1‘s product.  
This cooperative game of network selection can be solved in the following manner:  
                  
                                  
The              cannot create any value by coming together as each is looking for 
seller not any other buyer 
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The value of {1, 2, 3} = $ 7 instead of $5+$7=$12 as there is only one unit to sell by 
player ‗1‘ so it can interact with only one buyer so it prefer player ‗3‘. Considering the 
same example again the marginal contribution for each player can be calculated as 
follow: 
                                 
                                 
                                 
Considering the same example again the overall value created is $7. The marginal 
contribution values show that player ‗2‘ has $0 where as for player ‗3‘ it is $2. This 
implies that player ‗1‘ can get minimum $5 whereas the player ‗3‘ cannot get more than 
$2. The fair solution will be to divide the remaining $2 equally between player ‗1‘ and 
player ‗3‘. To conclude the player ‗1‘ will get $6 and player ‗3‘ will get $1. 
6.1.4  Modelling Resource Management as Standard Bankruptcy model 
The standard bankruptcy game model including the solution of a game, coalition form 
and characteristic function for N-person cooperative game is presented. The stability of a 
game is analyzed through the core of a game. Assume a company becomes bankrupt and 
it owns money to N creditors. This money need to be divided among these creditors. The 
sums of the claims by the creditors are larger than the money of the bankrupt company. 
The N-person game can be used to resolve this conflict by finding an equilibrium points 
to divide the money between the players. A detailed survey on the bankruptcy game 
model was presented in [NEI82]. 
The standard bankruptcy game can be expressed [PSL02] for a finite set of agents A,  a 
real positive number P which denotes the amount of bankrupt company money and a 
nonnegative vector     
  of  claimed money by agents, where the condition        
   To satisfy every network, the solution of the bankruptcy game must have the following 
two properties: 
• The payoff must be completely distributed 
• Each network has to obtain nonnegative money not exceeding their claimed money. 
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If xi denotes the solution (i.e., the amount of company money to be distributed to the 
agents i), the rule of this game can be expressed as follows: 
                
   
   
   
In case of the N-person bankruptcy game with transferable utility, the characteristic 
function can be defined [FER] for a coalition S (   ) as follows:  
                
    
  
Analyzing the above equation we can also see that the value of v(S) is higher if the value 
of                        where ‗j‘ represent the players involved in the coalition ‗S‘ 
whereas   represent the players not involved in the coalition ‗S‘. It is worthwhile to 
mention, higher value of v(S) means higher contribution in the coalition and will receive 
the higher claim from the coalition.   
In [NH06], the author has modelled the bandwidth allocation algorithm based on the 
standard bankruptcy model. The set of wireless networks is assumed as the agents and 
requested bandwidth is assumed as the company money to be distributed among the 
agents. This approach considers three wireless networks namely as WLAN, cellular 
network and the WMAN respectively. When a new connection request arrives the central 
controller decided the amount of bandwidth to be allocated by each network. The 
bandwidth allocated by each network is assumed as the agent‘s claims. The networks 
offer different bandwidths for different classes of mobile subscriptions considering their 
bandwidth requirements. Based on the offered bandwidth by the networks, the 
characteristic value of each network for the new connection request is calculated. The 
solution of the game can be found using the Shapley value or the core calculation. The 
solution found by both Shapley value calculation and the core is stable. This approach 
proposes a cooperative strategy for users requesting a service which cannot be admitted 
completely by a preferred network.  
Example 6.2: A man has three wives and he is committed to a contract that specifies that 
they should receive 100, 200 and 300 units after his death. If total amount of α units are 
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left after the man‘s death, the three wives can only claim 100,200 and 300 units 
respectively out of α units. If after man dies the amount of money left is not enough for 
this distribution [SHDHB09]. 
i. If α=100 then how much each wife will get 
ii. If α=200 then how much each wife will get 
iii. If α=300 then how much each wife will get 
The claims for each wife is represented as  
                         
The characteristic function for this situation in the form of bankruptcy game can be 
represented as: 
                
       
                        
Nucleolus solution: 
i. Each wife gets 100/3 when α=100 
ii. Wife 1 gets 50, wife 2 and 3 gets 75 each when α=200 
iii. Wife 1 gets 50, wife 2 gets 100 and wife 3 gets 150 when α=300 
6.1.5  Coalition formation process 
Coalition formation is a process of finding a coalitional structure that either maximizes 
the total utility in case of Transferable Utility (TU) game or finding a structure with 
Pareto optimal payoff distribution for the players in case of Non-Transferable Utility 
(NTU) game. The concept of Pareto optimality occurs in a number of areas of economics. 
The allocation of resources in an economy is Pareto optimal, often called Pareto efficient, 
if it is not possible to change the allocation of resources in such a way as to make some 
people better off without making others worse off. In game theory a Pareto optimal 
outcome is one in which no player could be better off without another becoming worse 
off. 
The coalition formation process considers of the following three phases [RAH07] as 
follow: 
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 Coalitional Value Calculation – to calculate the value of every possible coalition 
that can be formed. In this thesis, the linear programming is used to calculate the 
coalitional value by solving the linear equation with unknown number of variables 
under specific constraints.  
 Coalition Structure Generation – compute the set of disjoint coalitions that can 
have the maximum total utility. 
 Payoff Distribution – distribute the rewards that each agent in a coalition should 
obtain as a result of the actions taken by the coalition as a whole. 
A number of algorithms have been proposed for calculating the value of coalitions. The 
calculation of coalitional value is dependent on the problem under investigation and its 
complexity varies from linear [SK98] to exponential [SL97]. One of the main issues is 
the number of coalitional values need to be calculated. The efficient way is to distribute 
these coalition value calculations among the agents [RJ07]. In literature, an SK algorithm 
[SK95][SK96][SK98] which negotiates with agents to decide which coalitional value 
need to be calculated by whom. This algorithm does not consider the case where the 
coalitions of particular size are desirable. This algorithm is decentralized in nature, 
requires alot of messages for communication among the agents, redundant coalitional 
value calculation (same coalitional value calculated more than once), massive memory 
requirements and does not guarantee the fair distribution among the agents.  
Given the coalitional values, the next challenge is to partition the set of players into 
exhaustive and disjoint coalitions. This problem in the coalition formation process is 
named as Coalition Structure Generation (CSG). In characteristic form games, the value 
of a coalition only depends on the members within the coalition whereas in normal form 
game with positive and negative externalities the value of a coalition also depends on the 
non-members. The authors in [RRDGJ07] use the concept of complete set partitioning to 
optimally partition the space of all potential coalitions into sub-space which contain 
similar coalition structures depending on the same criterion (i.e. integer partition). The 
CSG problem can also be related to winner determination problem in combinatorial 
auction [SLAST99]. Such auctions involve a number of assets being simultaneously 
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offered for an auction to a number of bidders. The bidders are allowed to place bids on 
combinations of these assets. Once the auction is closed, the auctioneer needs to partition 
the set of assets, given the placed bid on every combination of these assets, such that the 
overall sum of bids (i.e. the auctioneer‘s revenue) is maximized [CSS07]. For a special 
case where the bids were allowed on every possible combination of assets, then this 
becomes very similar to the CSG problem. In CSG problem, the space of possible 
solutions grows very rapidly with the number of agents and finding an optimal solution is 
NP complete [SLAST99]. 
The existing algorithms in literature to solve the CSG problem can be classified into low 
complexity algorithms (return an optimal solution), fast algorithms (no guarantee of 
solutions) and anytime algorithms (returns a solution within bound from an optimal 
solution). Dynamic programming (DP) can be used to solve the optimal sub-structure and 
overlapping sub-problems [CLRS01]. It solves every sub-problem once and stores the 
calculated values in the table in order to avoid the re-calculation.  
A DP algorithm was developed by authors in [RPH95] for solving the winner 
determination problem in combinatorial auctions which can be easily applied to CSG 
problem. This algorithm starts from the coalitions of size ‗2‘ and calculate the values for 
each coalition of size ‗2‘. Based on the calculated values, it determines whether it is 
better to split the coalition or not. The coalitions are split if the sum of their calculated 
values on its own is better than the value of a coalition. This algorithm maintains two 
tables, one for the solution and the second one for its value. The solution can be either a 
coalition or two agents on its own. Similarly, the same procedure is repeated for coalition 
of size ‗3‘ to ‗n‘. The last step is to find an optimal coalition structure of ‗A‘ where it is 
the total number of agents.  The process considers the solution table to see whether it is 
better to split ‗A‘ into two sub-partitions A1 and A2 or not. This process is repeated until a 
coalition structure is found which cannot be split anymore. The complexity of this 
algorithm is O (3
n
).  This algorithm does not generate results at any time.  
The genetic algorithms [SD00] have also been applied in the CSG problem. This 
decentralized algorithm consists of number of iterative stages and maintains a list of 
permitted coalitions. At each stage, the coalition with highest value with all permitted 
coalitions is selected. The different rules exist for the disjoint and the overlapping 
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coalitions. In the case of disjoint coalitions, once a coalition is selected then all the 
coalitions containing the members of the selected coalition is removed from the list. In 
the case of overlapping coalitions, the only agents removed from the list are those who 
have exhausted their resources in previously formed coalitions. This algorithm provides 
the solution within a bound from the best possible combination of all permitted solutions. 
The process of selecting the best permitted coalition is carried out using the SK 
algorithm.   
The first anytime algorithm was proposed in [SLAST99]. The CSG problem is modelled 
as a search through the coalition structure graph where each level LVi contains the 
coalition structures having ‗i’ coalitions. Intuitively the coalition formation process can 
be thought as the search through all the possible coalition structures as shown below for 
N=3 and 4 in Figure 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. The arrows in downward direction indicate 
the merge of two coalitions whereas the arrows in upward direction indicate the split of 
two coalitions. Initially, the first two levels of coalition structure graph namely LV1and 
LV2 are searched to find an initial coalition solution. The breadth-first search algorithm is 
applied to search from bottom of the graph. This search continues until time permit or the 
entire graph is searched. The coalition structure with the highest reward is accepted as a 
solution. The limitation of this approach is to search through the entire graph and the 
bounds provided by the algorithm are impractical.  
{1},{2},{3}
{1,2},{3} {1,3},{2} {2,3},{1}
{1,2,3}
 
Figure 6.1 Search Space for N=3 
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{1},{2},{3},{4}
{1},{2},{3,4} {1,3},{2},{4} {2,3},{1},{4}
{2,3,4},{1}
{1,4},{2},{3} {2,4},{1},{3} {1,2},{3},{4}
{1,3,4},{2} {1,2,3},{4}{1,2},{3,4} {1,2,4},{3}{1,3},{2,4} {2,3},{1,4}
{1,2,3,4}
Figure 6.2 Search Space for N=4 
 The payoff distribution is the division of coalitional value among the agents within that 
coalition. The coalition is stable if no agent can deviate from the coalition it belongs to. 
Different stability concepts like core, the Shapley value and kernel are proposed to 
distribute the coalitional value among the agents of a coalition.  
Coalition formation process can be either centralized or distributed. In a centralized 
approach, all partitions of the players N need to be iterated to find an optimal partition. 
The total number of partitions for a set N can be found using Bell number [SLAST99] as 
shown below: 
     
   
 
           such that             
Example 6.3: For N=3 the total number of possible partitions for the set N is computed 
as follows: 
        
 
 
    
  
        
         
 
 
      
    
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
            
This implies that the number of partitions of set N grows exponentially with the number 
of players in N. For N=10, the total number of partitions need to be iterated by such a 
centralized approach will be 115975. Hence finding an optimal partition in centralized 
approach is computationally complex and impractical.  
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A more desirable approach would be distributed in nature in which all players 
autonomously decide whether to join a coalition or not. The approaches used for 
distributed coalition formation in literature range from heuristic approaches [SLAST99], 
Markov chain-based methods [RAY07] , Set theory based methods [AS09] and 
bargaining theory or  negotiation techniques approaches from economics [AS02]. 
The authors in [SLAST99] study the coalition formation in characteristic form games 
where the value of each coalition S (non-negative) is given by a characteristic function. A 
coalition structure CS is a partition of agents, A, into disjoint, exhaustive coalitions. In 
other words, in a coalition structure each agent belongs to exactly one coalition, and some 
agents may be alone in their coalitions. The set of all coalition structures are named as M. 
The value of a coalition structure is given as              . The goal is to find an 
optimal coalition structure which maximizes the social welfare of the agents     
               . The issue of finding an optimal coalition structure is 
computationally complex and is dependent on the number of agents (the number of 
coalition structures grows rapidly with an increase in the number of agents). Most work 
in the literature on coalition structure generation is carried out in super-additive and sub-
additive games. This work focuses on the coalitional games which are neither super-
additive nor sub-additive. The authors also explain the minimal search algorithm to 
establish a bound in fewer steps as compared to any other algorithm in the literature. The 
bound can be established by only searching the bottom two levels of the search space and 
can be further reduced using anytime algorithm. The results outperform in evaluation 
when compared to algorithms for characteristic form games in literature (Merging 
algorithm and Splitting algorithm).  The authors also define a mechanism for distributing 
the search space within the agents as the search done in parallel is more efficient.  
The coalition formation approaches can be fully reversible, partially reversible or 
irreversible [RAY07]. In irreversible coalition formation approach, the members within 
the formed coalitions are not allowed to leave. In a fully reversible approach, the players 
can join and leave coalitions with no restrictions. On one hand, a fully reversible 
approach is practical and flexible; however, deriving such an approach can be 
complicated. 
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 In [AS09] an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on transforming 
coalitions using simple merge and split rules has been proposed. The merge and split 
rules only take place if it is better for a player to leave (or join) any other partition for 
potential gains with respect to comparison relation on partitions satisfying few natural 
properties namely as irreflexivity, transitivity and monotonicity. The paper identifies 
conditions under which every iteration of merge and split rules yield unique partition 
which lead to a natural notion of a stable partition. The results are parameterized by a 
preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to 
coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games. It provides generic 
framework to derive coalition formation algorithms in different scenarios and can be 
tailored to develop distributed algorithm. 
6.1.6  Stable partitions 
Let               be a set of players called the grand coalition and let (v, N) be a 
coalitional TU-game.  The coalition consists of non-empty set of elements of N. The ‗v‘ 
is a characteristic function which determines a value to the members of a coalition.  
A collection is any family                of mutually disjoint coalitions of N (such 
as                     and   is called its size. A collection does not need to include 
all players. A partition                is the set of mutually disjoint coalitions of N 
i.e.   
 
     .  
The collection C of size l in the frame of P of size k denoted by C [P] can be defined for 
collection C and partition P as follows: 
             
 
   
              
 
   
       
A collection can be of different forms, varying from singleton (single element), C   P or 
C as partition of N (   
 
    .  
i. If C={A} then   
                          
ii. If C is a partition of N then C[P]=P 
iii. If C   P                                     P         P      
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Example 6.4: 
          
      
                  
               
  
 
Possible Coalitions: 
                         
                
                  
 
Partition  
                  
           
           
           
        
Characteristic function values: 
v (S1) = v (S2) = v (S3) =0 
v (S4) = v (S5) = v (S6) =2    
v (S7) =3  
v (P1)= v(P2)= v(P3)= v(P4)= v(P5)=3 
Given a partition                ,  
i. A coalition S of N is P-compatible if and only if 
                                        
ii. A coalition S of N is P-incompatible if and only if 
                                      
iii. A partition                 is P-homogeneous  
a. If for each              some              exists  such that either 
      Or        
The stability of partition is conceptually related with the defection function. Intuitively, 
given a partition P such as             , the defection function D (P) consists of all the 
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collections                whose players can leave the partition P by forming a new, 
separate, group of players    
 
      divided according to the collection C.  
Let D be a defection function, A partition P is said to be D-stable if 
                                                   (6.1)   
If C is a partition of N, then Equation (6.1) can be rewritten as follows:  
                  
A partition P is D-stable if no group of players are interested in leaving P when the 
players who wish to leave can only form collections allowed by the defection function 
D(P). There are three notions of the defection functions which are classified as follows: 
 Dc stability 
The defection function Dc allows any group of players to leave P and create an arbitrary 
collection in N. Dc (P) is the family of all collections in N. A partition P is Dc stable if it 
satisfies the following two conditions: 
i.            
                                                                       
                     
ii. For each P-incompatible coalition     
             
 
   
 
 Dp stability 
The defection function Dp(P) for each partition P is the family of all partitions of N. It 
allows a group of players to leave P only as the group of players to form an arbitrary 
partition of N. The partition P is Dp stable if and only if  
        
 
          
 Dhp stability 
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The defection function Dhp(P) for each partition P is the family of all P-homogeneous 
partitions in N. The Dhp allows the players to leave the partition P by only means of split 
or merge.  
        
 
                                        
                             
The partition P is Dhp stable if and only if  
i. For each                                                   of the 
coalition Pi 
            
 
   
 
ii. For each              
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7 Investigating the concept of Coalitions of 
Base stations  
In Chapter 5, only one network could adjust its RF coverage to improve user coverage 
and in effect all the decision making was done by the wider coverage (here the WiMAX) 
network. In this chapter adjacent BS or networks can both make adjustments and the use 
of coalitions of networks and of users. A coalition is simply a subset of the set of players 
which forms in order to coordinate strategies and to agree on how the total payoff is to be 
divided among the members. The cooperation between the providers can be classified as 
either intra-provider or inter-provider. In intra-provider cooperation, base stations 
belonging to the same provider cooperate by borrowing channels. In inter-provider 
cooperation, networks belonging to different providers using the same RAT share the 
spectrum. More detail regarding inter-provider cooperation is explained in Section 7.3.  
As part of the optimisation of radio resource distributed hybrid frequency allocation 
algorithm utilizing channel borrowing considering the co-channel interference is a 
commonly considered tool. In this thesis, the intention is to build on and utilize state of 
art hybrid frequency allocation algorithms rather than develop a new hybrid frequency 
allocation algorithm.  Rather in this thesis, intra-provider cooperation is proposed and 
will be implemented. A linear programming approach analogous to [ASSK09] is 
modelled. Coalitions of base stations (or sectors) are considered and a linear programme 
under specific resource constraints is solved for every coalition to calculate their value. 
The objective of each member in the coalition becomes the optimization of the coalition 
objective subject to operating constraints. 
The search space can be partitioned into subspaces using the Anytime Integer Partition 
Algorithm (AIPA) and this search through all the subspaces heuristically using a branch 
and bound approach and using the lower and upper bounds to constraint the search space. 
The algorithm has the capability to provide the solution at anytime and hence can be 
classified as an anytime algorithm. This algorithm also finds a solution within 95% of the 
optimal solution. The AIPA algorithm is classified into three stages (shown in Figure 7.3) 
namely as 1) input processing 2) calculating the bounds and pruning the subspace and 3) 
searching within a subspace to find a near optimal partition.  
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The optimal coalition structure found by AIPA needs to be checked for stable partition 
condition     as mentioned in Section 6.2.6. If the optimal coalition structure is not 
stable, then the next optimal coalition structure is examined. The search objective is to 
find a stable partition as compared to the optimal partition. 
7.1 Related Work 
In [ZY89], different channel assignment strategies like simple borrowing (SB), hybrid 
assignment (HA), borrowing with channel ordering (BCO), locally optimized dynamic 
assignment (LODA) and borrowing with directional channel locking (BDCL) were 
examined. Their simulations were carried out in a 49-cell network for both uniform and 
non-uniform traffic using blocking probability as a parameter to measure the efficiency of 
these strategies. All cells are assigned with ten nominal channels. The channel reuse 
distance in the system is assumed to be three cell units. The call distribution is 
exponentially distributed with a duration mean call of 3 min.  The traffic load is increased 
by 10% to 150% above the base load and the blocking probability is measured for the 
channel assignment strategies. The SB and HA strategies have always higher blocking 
rates as compared to all other channel assignment strategies. The BDCL strategy has the 
lowest blocking probability for both uniform and non-uniform traffic. The LODA 
strategy has blocking probability comparable to BCO in non-uniform traffic condition 
while BCO has far lower blocking probability under uniform traffic conditions. This 
comparative study did not consider sectors within the cells. In this thesis, six sectors 
within a cell are considered.  
7.2 Optimal Frequency Allocation as a coalitional game 
 In this section, the base station cooperation and frequency allocation is modelled as a 
coalitional game. The coalitional game is used to model the benefits of cooperation 
between the base stations (intra-provider) or networks (inter-providers).  The important 
aspect is the formation of coalitions in the game. The coalitional game is explained 
below. 
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7.2.1  Problem Formulation 
Consider a multi-cell wireless network with k base stations (BS‘s). Let Mik denote the set 
of mobile users associated with the sector i of the base station ‗k‘. The instantaneous bit 
rates mobile users receive on different channels depend on the quality of the channel and 
the current position of the mobile users. We assume that whenever mobile user j is served 
by channel l, the mobile user receives a bit rate Rlj, which is a function of the state of the 
channel l and position of mobile user j. For simplicity we assume that the cost of using a 
channel l is negligible i.e. cli=0. A channel       (the channels in sector i) can serve 
mobile user j only when both are associated with the same sector or the sectors associated 
with them are in coalition (i.e. channel is borrowed from the neighbouring sector). Let the 
random variable           be the fraction of time channel   serves mobile user    . Let 
             denote the set of sectors seeking to provide resources to the congested 
sector within the multi-cell network owned by the same provider. Any subset     is 
called a coalition and those subsets that only contain one sector, i.e.,        are called 
singleton coalitions. The partition comprising all the members on the set N is called the 
coalition structure. For mathematical tractability of the investigated problem, it is also 
assumed that each user will be allocated a single channel. The cost of borrowing a 
channel from the neighbouring or adjacent sectors is ignored because all the cells are 
owned by the same provider. Each sector forms a coalition with neighbouring or adjacent 
sectors (i.e. from which it can borrow a channel). On joining a coalition, the sector ‘ik’ 
will contribute towards the coalitional utility and in return will receive a pay-off denoted 
by pik. In order to avoid singleton coalitions, the coalitional value is set to            
   and to prevent singleton coalitions from joining other singleton coalitions, the 
coalitional value is set to                   .  
Each formed coalition should represent the mutual benefit (coalition value) to the sectors. 
The main objective is to calculate coalitional value v(S) for any coalition S   N (set of 
sectors from whom the channel can be borrowed) if feasible, else v(S) = −∞. This 
problem can be formulated as an optimization problem which returns coalition value for 
any coalition S   N (set of sectors from whom the channel can be borrowed) as shown 
below: 
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O (S):- Maximize:         
    
     
7.2.1.1  Constraints 
The service specific constraints under which the problem needs to be optimized are 
shown as below:      
Constraint 1: 
Suppose we want an allocation of resource that maximises the bit rate allocated to all the 
users that satisfies the minimum bit rate of each user denoted by   . This condition is 
justified with the help of the following constraint: 
    
    
                     
    
    
                      
Constraint 2: 
A channel can serve at most the whole fraction of time given by the following constraint 
    
    
            
Constraint 3: 
Also the user cannot receive a message for more than the time period from each channel   
given by following constraint. 
    
     
           
Constraint 4: 
        l, j. 
This is a linear programming problem and so a solution can be found unless there is no 
feasible solution.   
7.2.1.2 Example 
 
In the context of cooperation between the sectors within the base stations, the benefits of 
the cooperation are evaluated for a 7-cell environment. Initially, the sector S1 has 
channels              . There are   users within the sector S1. The sector S1 has un-
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served user for whom it can borrow channels from the sector S3 or S5 of the same base 
station or neighbouring base stations. If the sector S1 cooperates (or borrows) from the 
sector S3 or S5, there are two possible channels available to S1 to serve its mobile user 
labelled ‗a‘ and ‗b‘ respectively. The bit rate received by all the mobile users 
                  would be dependent on the state of the channels (              and 
channel ‗a‘ or channel ‗b‘ and their relative positions. In general terms, the bit rate 
received by mobile users    in the non-cooperative case (does not borrow) in sector S1 
would be as follows: 
                                                        (7.1) 
The bit rate received by mobile users   in sector S1 while forming coalition   (i.e. borrow 
from sector S3 and S5) is given below: 
                                                                   (7.2) 
The bit rate received by mobile users   in sector S1 while forming coalition   (i.e. borrow 
from sector S3 or S5) is given in (7.3) and (7.4) respectively: 
                                                            (7.3) 
                                                                  (7.4) 
 
Sector 3
CH a
CH 2
Same BS
User1
Sector 1 Sector 5
CH b
Neighbour BS
Users attached 
to sector 1  
Figure 7.1 Cooperation between adjacent or neighbouring sectors 
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The case where the sector S1 borrows channels from both S3 and S5 as an optimization 
problem subject to the following constraints are shown in (7.5): 
O (S):- Maximize:                                         (7.5) 
The cases where the sector S1 borrows channels from either S3 or S5 as an optimization 
problem subject to the following constraints are shown in (7.6) and (7.7) respectively: 
O (S3):- Maximize:                                    (7.6) 
O (S5):- Maximize:                                    (7.7) 
Example 7.1: In Figure 7.1, there are three players involved (i.e. sectors S1, S3 and S5). 
The possible coalitions are                                                  . The (7.1) 
can be solved for sector S1 using allocated      channels to serve       users using linear 
programming techniques (i.e. v ({S1}). Similarly Equation (7.1) can be solved for sector 
S3 and S5 to get the coalition value v ({S3} and v ({S5} respectively. For the 
coalition        , the Equation (7.6) can be solved to get the coalition value v (       ). 
For the coalition        , the Equation (7.7) can be solved to get the coalition value v 
(       ). For the coalition           , the Equation (7.5) can be solved to get the 
coalition value v (      ). The coalition formation is considered in regards to S1 so the 
coalition values of         is              . 
7.2.2 Searching through Coalition Structures 
The next activity in the coalitional game is the Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) 
which heuristically searches through all the possible coalition structures to find an 
optimal solution. The search space increases exponentially with the number of agents 
involved in the coalition. The searching mechanism needs to search the space by applying 
heuristics to find a near to optimal solution in a reasonable time.  
The search space P can be partitioned into sub-spaces which contain coalition structures 
which are similar according to some criterion. The considered criterion is based on the 
integer partitions of the number of agents (or players). An integer partition of n is a multi-
set of positive integers that add up to exactly n.  
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Example 7.2: For n=4 the different ways of portioning the search space into sub-spaces 
based on integer partitions are shown as follows: 
                  
      
 
 
 
 
 
                 
                 
                 
                 
  
       
                 
                 
                 
  
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
  
                                
For instance, the coalitions structures                   can be mapped to the integer 
partition [3, 1] since they each contain one coalition of size 1 and the second coalition of 
size 3.  The sub-space noted as PG contains all the coalition structures that correspond to 
the same integer partition G. The number of possible integer partitions grows 
exponentially with n. The sub-spaces are categorized into levels based on the number of 
parts within the integer partitions. Specifically, level Pi contains all the sub-spaces that 
correspond to integer partition with i parts as shown below: 
              
Considering the four agent example again, the level ‗1‘ would have all the sub-spaces 
with only one part i.e. [4]. Similarly, the level 2,3 and 4 would have all the subspaces 
with two ([2,2] &[3,1]) , three ([2,1,1]) and four parts ([1,1,1,1]) respectively. 
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The Anytime Integer Partition based Algorithm (AIPA) [RRJG09] could be used to 
search through the entire graph using upper and lower bounds on every sub-space. The 
lower bound would be used to prune the search space. This algorithm also uses the 
conventional branch and bound principle. 
Now, let                    be the set of agents, where n is the number of agents. 
In order to allow for any limitations on the coalitional sizes, we assume there is a set S of 
the permitted coalitional sizes. Also, let    be an ordered list of possible coalitions of 
size    , and Ns be the number of coalitions in Ls (i.e. Ns = |Ls|). 
Finally, let           
      
        
   denote the coalition located at index i in the list Ls, 
where each element     
 
 is an integer representing agent  
    
 (For example, Ci,s = {1, 3, 4} 
corresponds to the coalition of agents a1, a3, a4). Now for any    , we define the order 
in the list Ls as follows: 
 The first coalition in the list is:              
 The last coalition in the list is:            
 
L1 L2 L3 L4 
4 3,4 2,3,4 1,2,3,4 
3 2,4 1,3,4  
2 2,3 1,2,4  
1 1,4 1,2,3  
 1,3   
 1,2   
    
The coalitions would be ordered into lists Ls of size s according to the ordering technique 
used by Talal Rahwan and Jennings in Distribution of Coalitional Value to Coalitions 
(DCVC) [RJ07]. The coalitions in Ls are ordered lexicographically. The representation 
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for input can only use a list containing only the values of these ordered coalitions. The 
scanning of sub-spaces PG can be classified into the following steps: 
Step 1: 
First of all the value of coalition structure of size ‗n‘ (P|n|) is scanned which is the only 
sub-space in level P1. Secondly the value of coalition structure of size ‗1‘ (P|1, 1, 1, 1|) is 
scanned which is the only sub-space in level Pn. The two sub-spaces have been scanned 
and we can select the maximum value of coalition structure as a current best coalition 
structure    . 
 Scan all sub-spaces in PG where G is an integer partition which consists of two parts (in 
example 7.2 for four agents, G= [2, 2] & [3, 1]) and for six agents, 
G=[1,5],[2,4],[3,3],[4,2],[5,1]). The ordering technique imply that any two 
complimentary coalitions C and    in a coalition structure           are always 
diametrically positioned in the coalition lists               even if         . Considering 
example 7.2 again, the coalitions                     are diametrically positioned in the 
lists L1 and L3 respectively, and the coalitions                  can be found at the 
bottom and top of the list L2 (diametrically positioned in the same list).  
As mentioned before G is an integer partition which consists of two parts as           
where g1=s and g2=n-s. Considering example 7.2 again, the level P2 would have all the 
subspaces i.e.               . The sub-space        contains all the coalition structures of 
size ‗2‘ and in our ordering technique these lie in list L2. Similarly       contains the 
coalition structures of size ‗3‘ and ‗1‘ so these lie within the list L3 and L1 respectively. In 
order to compute the values of all the coalition structures in the level PG by summing the 
values of the coalitions as a process of scanning the lists                    starting at 
different points for each of the list. Once both lists                   are scanned, it is 
possible to get maximum values of coalition for each of the lists and these two values 
constitute the best coalition structure     found so far. It is also possible to found the 
indices of these maximum values in their respective lists. As the input ordered list only 
consists of the values of the coalition structure (i.e.                  ), an algorithm 
developed by Rahwan and Jennings [RJ07] can be used to return a coalition C given its 
position in the ordered list L|C|. In the end, the new generated coalition structure     is 
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compared against the previous best coalition structure and updated if it is better than the 
previous one. 
Step 2: 
After scanning the lists                 , it is possible to compute an upper and lower 
bounds. Let maxs, mins and avgs as well as maxn-s, minn-s and avgn-s be the computed 
maximum, minimum and average value of the coalitions in                respectively. 
Given an integer partition G, let SG be the Cartesian product of the lists Ls:     . 
           
     , where G(s) is the multiplicity of s in G 
For example, given G= [2, 1, 1], we have       
      
 . We can now calculate the 
upper bound UBG by summing the maximum value of each coalition list involved in a set 
SG as shown below: 
         
   
      
In a similar way it is possible to define a lower bound as follow: 
              
   
 
However a better lower bound would be the average of the values of these coalition 
structures. Let AVGG be the average value of all the coalition structures in PG. It is 
possible to obtain the average value of a sub-space without going through any coalition 
structure. The average would be a better lower bound because having a greater lower 
bound allows more pruning of the search space. Let the avgs be defined as the sum of the 
values of all coalition of size ‗s‘ and divided by the total number of coalitions of size ‗s‘ 
and can be computed as a part of the input scanning process. 
               
   
 
     
 
       
     
       
   
  
Considering G= [2, 1, 1], then UBG= max2+2*max1, LBG=min2+2*min1 & 
AVGG=avg2+2*avg1. From now onwards the AVGG would be used as a lower bound. 
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Step 3: 
The upper and lower bound for each sub-space PG is calculated in step 2. After that the 
optimal lower bound     would be assigned as follow: 
                     
   
 In the above equation the     
  is the highest lower bound out of all the sub-spaces and 
       is the value of the best coalition structure obtained after scanning the input in step 
1. Similarly, the optimal upper bound     would be assigned as follow: 
                    
   
In the above equation     
  is the highest upper bound out of all the sub-spaces. Hence 
all the sub-spaces where       
  would be pruned. This scanning procedure allows 
us to compute a worse case bound β on the value of     as follow: 
      
 
 
 
   
      
  
It is also possible to specify a bound      and if the best solution found so far fits 
within the specific bound such that      and then there is no need for further search. 
 Step 4: 
In order to verify     is an optimal solution, we need to search sub-spaces where the 
upper bound is greater than       . This can be done by selecting the next sub-space to 
be searched using the following rule: 
               
   
      
As a result of this, all the sub-spaces with an upper bound lower than        will not be 
searched. Another reason for using this selection rule is that it only terminates when there 
are no sub-spaces left to be searched or the maximum upper bound has been reached. 
This approach is used to find an optimal solution. 
 Step 5: 
Given                   , we define the following set of agents:              : 
where A1 contains n players and            contains      
   
    players. 
Moreover, list    
  is the list of possible combinations of size s taken from the 
set          . The list    
  would contain the following 
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combinations                                    . It is also worth mentioning         
implies the 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 element of the corresponding A and is represented by C.  
Let the memory                 required to store one coalition structure at a time. 
In more detail,   is assigned to one of the combinations in     
    . After that    is used 
to cycle through      
     until a combination that does not overlap with   is found. After 
that    is used to cycle through      
     until a combination that does not overlap with 
        is found. This is repeated until each      is assigned to a combination in 
list     
    . The Mk is only updated once all the possible instances of                  
whose corresponding                does not overlap with               are 
examined. For example, the M1= {1, 2} implies that C1= {1
st
 element of A1, 2
nd
 element 
of A2}. The M2 is only updated once all the possible instances of M3 whose 
corresponding C3 that do not overlap with         are examined.  
In this case M would be a valid coalition structure belonging to a sub-space. The value of 
this coalition structure is then calculated and compared with the maximum value found so 
far. The cycling technique is explained with the help of the following example: 
Example 7.3:                                                            
and                           . 
    
        
      
        
      
        
  
5,6   
4,6 4  
4,5   
3,6   
3,5 3  
3,4   
2,6  1,2,3 
2,5 2  
2,4   
2,3   
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1,6   
1,5   
1,4 1  
1,3   
1,2   
 
The A1 consist of ‗n‘ i.e.                  and having          from the list    
  
means that C1 contains the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 elements of A1 i.e.        . By knowing C1 we 
can easily compute the A2 which will include all the players excluding the C1      ) 
and             . The M2 will cycle through all the possible coalitions of the size ‗1‘ 
out of A2 (   
  ) and would never overlap with C1. The M2 can be either 1
st 
element of A2 
{3}, 2
nd
 element of A2 {4}, 3
rd
 element of A2 {5} or 4
th
 element of A2 {6} because it does 
not overlap with C1= {1, 2}. If M2= {2} then C2 will be {4} and similarly, A3 will include 
all the players which do not belong to C1 or C2 i.e.           . The M3 will cycle 
through all the possible coalitions of the size ‗3‘ out of A3 (   
  ) and select the one 
coalition which does not overlap with C1or C2. However, whenever the Ak is updated, the 
same combination in     
   
  would correspond to a different coalition. 
Using the above technique, the same coalition structure can be generated twice and in 
order to remove this redundancy the following rules are defined as follows: 
i. Mk cycles through the combinations in     
     that start with ‗j‘ 
a. Mk+1 only cycles through the combinations in       
       that start with 
values equal to or greater than ‗j‘ 
ii. Mk can only cycle through the combinations in     
     that start with ‗j‘ such that 
                    
Step 6: 
As mentioned in step 5, we only update Mk once all the possible instances of 
                    are examined which do not overlap with              . If 
none of the coalition structures in                     have a value greater than the 
maximum value found so far we could update Mk without going through any of the 
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possible instances of                    . In order to update Mk straight away we 
need to calculate the upper bound on the remaining coalition structures 
from                   . 
As we had already computed maxs for every possible coalitions of size              
in step 1, we can easily compute the upper bound denoted by UB as follows: 
  
           
 
       
   
     
 
If we define                 as the sum of the values of coalitions             so 
t                      
 
   . Now let CB be the value of the current best solution 
found so far. There exist no solution starting with coalition structures starting with 
              and end with coalition structures              better than the current 
found solution ‗CB‘ if the following condition is satisfied: 
                                
 
On the other hand, if                                  
 implies that there could 
be a coalition that starts with               and end with coalition structures 
             better than the current found solution ‗CB‘. However still we do not need 
to examine all the coalition structures from            . In the next list there might be 
some coalition structures which are not better than the current best will be pruned. This 
branch and bound principle is explained below in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2 Applying Branch and Bound while searching through the sub-space 
[RRJG09] 
7.2.3 Distribution of coalitional value among the members 
The last activity in the coalitional game is the distribution of coalitional value among the 
base stations involved in the selected stable partition. The concept of payoff distribution 
methods are mentioned in Section 6.2.3. In this thesis, the core and Shapley value would 
be used for the payoff distribution.  
Example 7.4: To distribute the payoff between the members of the coalition the 
calculation of core                                of this game subject to the 
following constraints is shown below:  
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Figure 7.3 Anytime Integer Partitioning Flowchart 
 
                                         
 
                                            
 Search the coalition structures of size 1,2 or n 
 
 
 For every subspace   calculate upper bounds       and 
lower bounds     . 
 Calculate the optimal upper bounds       and lower 
bounds       
 Prune the unpromising subspaces such that 
      
 
 & subspace is unstable according to stability 
concept of coalitional game 
 Establish a worst case gaurantee   as follows: 
            
 
 
 
   
      
  
                            
 
 
 Search a subspace and update             
  Prune any subspace    such that       
 
and check 
the stability of a subspace using the stability concept of 
coalitional game theory 
                         
                  
INPUT: n,                  
Calculating bounds & Pruning the subspaces 
Searching the subspaces 
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Using linear programming technique the solution of this game (core) can be computed 
as follows: 
             
Using C4 
          
       
Using C2 
         
     
Using C3 
         
     
In fact the core of this game                             
7.2.4 Proposed Experiment 
To evaluate the benefits of modelling resource allocation as a coalition game, intended to 
do comparisons with other approaches need to be made. To make comparisons, the 
simulations will be carried out to measure the performance metrics for different traffic 
distributions. A suitable simulator is a LTE system level simulator capable of simulating 
LTE Single Input Single Output (SISO) and Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) 
networks using Open Loop Spatial Multiplexing (OLSM) and Transmission Diversity 
(TxD) transmission modes that has been developed by the Institute of Communications 
and Radio Frequency Engineering, Vienna University of Technology, Austria.  
A simulation would consist of three main components: the network initialization, the 
optimization and LTE system level simulator. The simulation would calculate 
performance metrics for the traffic configuration, as illustrated in Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4 Simulation Setup 
At first, the simulation network needs to be initialised with a network topology (the 
locations of BSs) and antenna model. According to the traffic scenario setting, such as 
hotspot locations, number of hotspots, population in hotspot area, etc, a set of traffic 
scenarios will be built. After the network initialization, the dynamic frequency allocation 
algorithm and tilting mechanisms are applied. The tilting mechanism or dynamic 
frequency allocation can be applied in different order depending on the network 
configuration. The Matlab based open source LTE system simulator will be run for each 
traffic scenario, the network simulation evaluates the QoS performance metrics of the 
simulation network. Lastly, the coalition between base stations is modelled as an 
optimisation problem and the optimisation module consisting of Matlab based LP solver 
capable of solving linear programming under specific constraints is applied. Experiments 
can then be performed for the network under the same traffic conditions for the state of 
art approaches to compare the results with our proposed approach. 
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The benefits of cooperation in context of the base station and user coalitional game will 
be evaluated. Initially, the optimal frequency allocation scheme (including hybrid 
frequency allocation and the convex optimisation problem) would be verified for 
symmetric settings as mentioned in [AS09]. In symmetry setting, all base stations and 
users receive equal pay off so the payoff profile turns out to be in core [AS09]. The 
allocation that maximizes the aggregate payoffs of all participants (base station and users) 
is referred to as socially optimal. Users‘ payoffs should decrease with increase in number 
of users ‗j‘ for any given number of base station ‗n‘ as each user needs to contend with 
more users for sharing the same amount of resource. The trend should be opposite for 
base stations‘ payoffs as demand increases with increase in ‗j‘. The aggregate base 
stations‘ payoffs increase with increase in n, j [AS09].  
The coalitional game based on the optimal frequency allocation scheme would be 
evaluated in terms of user throughput, cell throughput and the bit rates achieved by users 
with Non-Cooperative Resource Allocation (NCRA) scheme [PNB08] and the base 
association approach mentioned in [JPW08] . In [JPW08], the authors describe the 
association between base stations and selfish users in multi-network environment. The 
resource allocated by BS using a simple scheduling policy is explained for two different 
cases. Each BS performs intra-cell optimization and the total utility of the users are 
maximized at Nash Equilibrium. In our proposed experiment, the core is considered as 
the optimal distribution of payoff between base stations or sectors within the coalitions. 
The throughput of the user within each cell and the total utility of all users in our 
proposed experiment would be compared with results in [JPW08] and [PNB08].   
7.3  Inter-Provider cooperation (Dynamic Spectrum Access 
case) 
The inter-provider cooperation studies the spectrum sharing (or cooperation) between 
networks belonging to different providers using the same Radio Access Technology 
(RAT). The inter-provider cooperation requires a mechanism by the networks to sense 
their spectrum and pool the channels available to be utilized by other networks at a 
particular instant of time.  
170 
 
There are two major types of spectrum sharing namely as Dynamic Spectrum Allocation 
(DSA) and Dynamic Spectrum Selection (DSS) [HWBSYH09]. The DSA is used when 
sharing is controlled by collaborating network providers whereas in Dynamic Spectrum 
Selection (DSS) the sharing is implemented by the User Equipment (UE) negotiating 
access with a number of networks. In DSA, the providers are able to support their user 
requests on another network. The providers are able to temporarily allocate their 
resources to a user associated with a different network. 
The spectrum sharing can be classified as either pool or non-pool based. In pool based 
spectrum sharing [SQTT08], the resource is available to be shared jointly in a pool 
manner without prioritized access between the two providers. Hence, there is no notion of 
primary and secondary providers in pool based spectrum sharing. In non-pool based 
spectrum sharing [HWBSYH09], a provider has spare capacity that can be temporarily 
assigned to a capacity limited secondary system. It is assumed that both providers cover 
the same geographical area. The providers are assumed as primary and secondary 
providers. The primary provider (PO) is defined as the provider which has instantaneous 
spare capacity to support the secondary provider (SO) during a capacity crisis. The 
secondary provider suffers capacity problems and requires additional resources from 
another network for a given period of time. It is important to note that the process is 
dynamic in time (i.e op A and op B may interchangeably be PO or SO) based on traffic 
demand.  
To facilitate spectrum sharing between providers, collaboration is implemented at a 
network level. The sharing of Radio Network Controller (RNC) minimizes delays and 
signalling between the providers. It also implies that spectrum sharing can happen on a 
very fast time scale (order of milliseconds) [SQTT08].  
This section focuses on a centralized mechanism for pool based spectrum sharing 
between two providers using the same technology as shown in Figure 7.5. The traffic 
demand of Network Provider ‗1‘ is given by                  at time 
interval               and similarly for Network Provider ‗2‘; the traffic demand is 
given by                  at time interval              . In particular, different 
providers may form a coalition and pool their resources such as spectrum. For the 
centralized model, a meta-provider owns and manages a common pool of spectral 
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resources in a specific region. The authors in [SAGDB08] refer to the common spectrum 
pool notation as (Coordinated Access Band or CAB). 
 
Figure 7.5 Centralized Intra-provider model [KCG09] 
7.3.1  Example of Cooperation between different providers 
Consider a network with a set of providers N and a set of mobile users within the network 
coverage area. The mobile users associated to a particular network ‗N‘ is represented by 
MN. Each provider uses its base stations to serve mobile users through a set of channels it 
has access to. Each mobile user negotiates the minimum bit rate (mj) and maximum bit 
rate (Mj) with its provider beforehand. We assume each base station k can have access to 
a set of channels Ck. The base station k is allowed to use any subset of channels in Ck. We 
also assume that no base stations in vicinity can have access to the same channel i.e. 
          for       if k1 and k2 are in the vicinity in order to avoid interference 
between the communications of different base stations for different mobile users.  One of 
the networks is assumed to be a primary network and the secondary network can utilize 
the spectrum of the primary network during the inactivity of primary users. 
The instantaneous bit rate mobile users receive on different channels depends on the 
quality of the channel and the current position of the mobile users. We assume that 
whenever mobile user ‗j‘ is served by channel ‗l‘, the mobile user receives a bit rate Rlj, 
which is a function of the state of the channel ‗l‘ and position of mobile user ‗j‘. For 
simplicity we assume that the cost of using a channel ‗l‘ by the provider ‗i‘ i.e. cli=0. A 
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channel       can serve mobile user ‗j‘ only when both are associated with the same 
provider or the providers associated with them are in coalition. Let random variable 
          be the fraction of time channel   serves mobile user    .  
 
Figure 7.6 Cooperation between two different providers 
In this section we assume the channels available to each provider are not identical in 
nature. If both providers (as in Figure 7.6) are not cooperating, there are two channels 
available to each provider to serve its mobile users. The bit rate received by mobile user 
                                  would be dependent on the state of the channels 
(channel ‗1‘ and channel ‗2‘) and their relative position. The bit rate received by mobile 
users ‗1‘ and ‗2‘ is shown below in (7.8) and (7.9) respectively.  
                                             (7.8) 
                                                    (7.9) 
Similarly the bit rate received by mobile users ‗                                     is 
shown below in (7.10) and (7.11) respectively. 
                                              (7.10) 
                                              (7.11) 
In general terms, the bit rate received by mobile user    in non-cooperative case would be 
as follows: 
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                                           (7.12) 
When the provider associated with mobile user   is in coalition  , the rate received by   is 
given below in (7.13): 
                                                 (7.13) 
Example 7.5: Consider the network in Figure 7.6 with         and C1= {ch1} C2= 
{ch3}. Let R12=R31=R32= P and R11=R33=Q, where Q< P and Rlj=0 otherwise. Let 
   
 
 
              . The payoff is equal to the sum of the service rates. 
Solution: 
i. Non-cooperative 
a. Provider 1 
                                     
b. Provider 2 
                                     
 
 
ii. Cooperative 
                                
 
 
 
                                                    
                     
                      
 
 
    
 
 
    
                    
 
 
  
 
 
  
    
 
 
Example 7.6: Consider the network           with C1= {ch1} C2= {ch2} and C3= 
{ch3} as shown in Figure 7.7. The number of mobile users belonging to a network ‗N‘ is 
represented by MN. Let                    &                       
                        Let              . The payoff is equal to the sum 
of the service rates. 
Solution: 
         
                       Since the channel 2 is utilized by user ‗1‘ only so 
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                       Since the channel 3 is utilized by user ‗2‘ only so 
      
                                 Since P > Q the channel 1 is utilized by 
user ‗1‘. 
Base station 1
CH 1
CH 2
Provider 1
Provider 2
21
Base station 2 Base station 3
Provider 3
CH 3
 
Figure 7.7 Cooperation between three different providers 
                                 Since P > Q the channel 1 is utilized by 
user ‗2‘. 
                             
                               
Let                          
                            
                                    
                              
Thus                         which proves this game is not a convex one. 
7.4 Summary  
The coalition formation process includes three main activities: coalitional value 
calculation, coalition structure generation, and payoff distribution. In this chapter, the 
linear programming approach under resource specific constraints to calculate the 
coalitional values for a wireless network is discussed. This chapter also highlights the 
limitations of the state of the art algorithm for coalition structure generation. The 
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advantages and disadvantages of each of these classes have also been discussed, and 
examples from existing literature have been provided. 
To conclude, this approach can be used to calculate the payoff value of all the possible 
coalition structures for a given number of players. This is a linear programming problem 
and so a solution can be found unless there is no feasible solution. This coalitional game 
approach is explained with the help of few examples and the linear programming 
technique is used to compute the solution (or core) of the game. 
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8  Conclusion and Discussion 
8.1 Conclusion 
This thesis describes examples of cooperative games theory supported by AHP to 
wireless resource management. Evolutionary games and the selection of optimal 
coalitions of users are the focus of the work.  Users and networks decisions were 
modelled using AHP. The examples covered the choice of network where two 
technologies overlap and to modelling optimal frequency allocation between different 
networks in heterogeneous environment and between the base stations belonging to the 
same provider. AHP is systematically used to address the challenges in network selection 
and optimisation in heterogeneous environments. An AHP based network selection model 
considering four QoS related attribute as presented in Chapter 5 is applied to approximate 
the respective traffic load within the networks. This generally approximated traffic load 
can be used as a historical data in the next two phases. 
Cooperative control mechanisms supported by evolutionary game theory are described in 
Chapter 5 and are used to balance the traffic load across the different networks. The 
mechanism was based an evolutionary game between the wireless networks and was 
illustrated in the context of shifting users from one network to another depending on the 
payoff within a particular service area. This gave a procedure to decide upon adjustments 
to the transmitted power in a non-congested network to offer better services (i.e. better 
SINR or bit rate) to a mobile user. This allowed the appropriate traffic to be diverted from 
the congested network to the uncongested network. The process involved hypothetical 
reasoning steps considering both networks with the actual selection is performed at the 
end. The network configuration mechanism was implemented for omni-directional 
antennas and with the ability to adjust transmit power at BSs. The evolutionary 
equilibrium is a fixed point at which payoff of each user in a population is equal to the 
average payoff. Notionally, an evolutionary equilibrium is a point at which no user is 
willing to shift from one network to another network.  If the evolutionary equilibrium is 
able to divert the congestion between the networks efficiently, then this is considered as 
an appropriate solution. This mechanism could be extended for six sectors case in the 
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WiMAX network where the power configuration within a particular sector is enhanced 
depending on their respective traffic load. 
Adjustment to the load in a network may require invocation of the cooperative control 
mechanism between the base stations belonging to the same provider. When a BS is 
heavily loaded, it has less potential to serve new mobile users and so call blocking 
increases. Overloaded BSs therefore need to seek help from neighbouring BSs. The 
cooperative control techniques like dynamic frequency allocation techniques and 
cooperative tilting can be applied. My research colleagues Haibo Mei and Peng Jiang are 
investigating cross layer optimisation to increase spectral efficiency using cooperative 
tilting and dynamic frequency allocation. They are investigating the benefits of one over 
the other, and the value of applying both techniques one after the other. Physically 
altering the coverage, such as by tilting is the only real resource when there is a physical 
BS or RS failure.  
The change in network configuration (originally R) results in different power patterns 
(R
*
) i.e. the network can cover more areas. The cooperation between the neighbouring 
base stations and the congested base station is modelled as a coalitional game. The 
players in the game include the neighbouring base stations are able to help the congested 
base station. The channel allocation between base stations is modelled as an optimisation 
problem and is solved using linear programming techniques. The set of coalitions are 
represented as a search space and is heuristically searched to provide Pareto-optimal 
solution using the stability concepts of coalitional game. Validation of the computational 
approach has not been possible, but a detailed description of the steps in the process of 
finding the optimal coalitions has been given 
8.2 Future Directions 
Firstly, the evolutionary game theory model mentioned in Chapter 5 can be extended for 
the Cognitive Radio networks. The cognitive radio system consists of M primary users, 
where primary user ‗i‘ owns the frequency spectrum denoted by Fi with bandwidth of size 
Bi (Figure 8.1). A primary user can sell portions of the available spectrum (e.g., time slots 
in a time division multiple access (TDMA)-based wireless access system) to secondary 
users who are willing to buy the spectrum opportunities. The primary user broadcasts the 
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availability of spectrum along with the price to secondary users over a dedicated control 
channel to access the spectrum. If a secondary user wants to buy the spectrum from this 
primary user, it will send a request message to the primary user through the control 
channel. After receiving the request message, the primary user allocates time slot(s) to the 
secondary user. 
 
Figure 8.1 Evolutionary model for cognitive radio network 
There are ‗N‘ groups of secondary users, and      denotes the number of secondary users 
in group ‗a‘. The number of users associated with secondary group ‗a‘ served by primary 
user ‗i‘ is denoted by   
   
  The secondary groups may correspond to the sets of users in 
different geographical areas. The secondary users will make decisions on buying 
spectrum independently. The primary user ‗i‘ sells spectrum opportunities of size bi from 
the total available bandwidth of size Bi and charges price pi (per user per unit time) to the 
secondary users. This available spectrum can be shared by secondary users from the same 
or from different groups. The secondary users dynamically choose and buy the spectrum 
from the primary user which maximizes its payoff in terms of performance and price. As 
a result, the secondary users will evolve to buy spectrum with lower price and/or better 
performance. A secondary user will stop evolving when the payoff becomes identical to 
the average payoff of the group in which that secondary user belongs to. 
180 
 
The game consists of a set of players i.e. group of secondary users. In an evolutionary 
game, the players are grouped into a population. The secondary users in group ‗1‘ 
constitute one population whereas the secondary users in group ‗N‘ constitute another 
population. The set of strategies associated with each player in a population is to select 
the primary user from whom to buy the spectrum. The net utility of secondary user ‗a‘ 
buying spectrum from the primary user ‗i‘ is denoted by   
   
. 
The deterministic model like replicator dynamics can be applied separately to each 
population (i.e. group of secondary users). The   
   
denotes the number of secondary 
users in group ‗a‘ buying spectrum from primary user ‗i‘, the total number of secondary 
users in group ‗a‘ is shown below: 
        
   
 
   
 
The proportion of secondary users buying spectrum from primary user ‗i‘ is   
   
 
  
   
    
 and this is referred to as the population share. The population state can be denoted by 
the vector         
   
      
   
      
   
 . The replicator dynamics is defined as 
follows:  
   
   
   
   
   
   
       
        
   
 
   
  
   
 
According to this replicator dynamics of secondary users in group ‗a‘, the number of 
secondary users buying spectrum from primary user i increases if their payoff is above 
the average payoff.  The evolutionary equilibrium is considered as a solution to the game. 
The evolutionary equilibrium is defined as the stable fixed point of the replicator 
dynamics. When a population of players evolves over time (i.e., based on the replicator 
dynamics), it will converge to the evolutionary equilibrium. At this evolutionary 
equilibrium, none of the players wants to change the strategy since its payoff is equal to 
the average payoff of the population it belongs to. This evolutionary equilibrium can be 
obtained by solving: 
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The more detail about the evolutionary equilibrium and their stability can be found in 
sections 5.6.3 and 5.6.4 respectively. 
Secondly, network black holes are major concern, as increasing capacity in certain 
locations may adversely affect the coverage in other areas. When an antenna 
configuration is changed, it may not be able to cover a region or the received power 
cannot support link set up. They are particularly awkward network as the network 
provider cannot detect mobile users within a coverage black hole. Only when a mobile 
user cannot find service can the user determine that it is in an uncovered area. A reliable 
coverage prediction model to achieve collaboration between the cells and accommodate 
the complex propagation effects for optimization performance is required. When an 
antenna configuration is changed, the radio coverage is changed and some boundary MSs 
might be involved in handover processes. In case of a base station failure or RS failure a 
coverage black hole might be created.  
Mobile users within the coverage black hole try to connect to the users connected to the 
base station. The connected users act as a relay for the users in the black hole. This 
interaction between the users in black hole and users connected to the base stations are 
modelled using a coalitional game theory. All the connected mobile users could detect 
those mobile users that are within their Bluetooth or Wi-Fi range. Because of this, all the 
connected mobile users would have a list of un-served MSs in the coverage hole. The 
connected mobile users would act as a Relay station (RS) for un-served users in the 
coverage hole. The RS have the option whether to connect to another RS or un-served 
MS. This is conceptually possible, but would require special software on the mobile 
handsets and also would incur battery usage on behalf of others- a persistent problem 
with ad-hoc and Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN). These practical implementations 
should be carefully considered in the coalitional game model. 
The network formation game with the RSs as the players can be modelled. In this model, 
the players are the RSs who interact for forming a directed uplink tree structure (directed 
towards the BS). Every RS ‗i‘ in the tree, acts as a source node, and transmits the packets 
that it receives from external mobile stations (MSs) to the BS, using multi-hop relaying. 
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Hence, when RS ‗i‘ is transmitting its data to the BS, all the RSs that are parents of ‗i‘ in 
the tree relay the data of ‗i‘ using DTN. The RSs negotiate with other RS (or un-served 
MS) and choose whether to accept or reject a proposal to form a link between them. The 
BS accepts any connection from any RS. Through multi-hop relaying, the probability of 
error is reduced, and consequently the packet success rate (PSR) achieved by a RS can be 
improved. Essentially, the value function in this game is Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) 
as each RS optimizes its own utility. The utility of a RS ‗i' is an increasing function of the 
effective number of packets received by the BS (effective throughput) while taking into 
account the PSR, as well as the number of packets received from other RS (the more a RS 
receives packet, the more it is rewarded by the network). The utility also reflects the cost 
of maintaining a link, hence, each RS ‗i‘ has a maximum number of links that it can 
support. As the number of links on a RS ‗i‘ increases, the rewards needed for accepting a 
link also increase, hence making it difficult for other RSs to form a link with ‗i‘. The 
possible actions or strategies available to each RS is to select the link that it wants to form 
with available RSs or un-served MS (denoted by set Bi)  and which already accepted 
links (Ai) should be maintained. The RS ’i’ can only connect to all RSs that are not 
connected to ‗i’. If a RS wants to connect to another RS it needs to either have an 
available connection or drop the previously accepted link. The strategy of RS can be 
denoted by         where                  . The best response for the RSs is to select 
the link that maximizes its utility. 
The RS are prioritized from the lowest to the highest Signal to Noise (SNR) ratio. The 
purpose is to allow the RS with low SNR more options to connect to other RSs or un-
served MS. The dynamic algorithm for network formation game can be proposed with RS 
being myopic i.e. strategies are selected to maximize their payoff. Several models for 
myopic dynamics have been considered in the literature [SD00][RAY07] that proposes a 
myopic dynamics algorithm inspired from [JW02] and [AJM08] consisting of several 
rounds where each round mainly consists of two phases: a fair prioritization phase and a 
dynamics phase. The RSs could select their strategies sequentially. For any strategy 
        that RS i intends to choose, node bi (another RS or un-served MS) approves to 
form link between RS i and node bi ( ibi ) only if it is able to improve its utility by either 
adding link ‗ibi’  or replacing one or more of its already accepted links in    by ‗ibi ’. 
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Replacing implies that node bi will break one or more of its already accepted links and 
replace them with ibi if this will improve its utility. This process continues until that no 
node ‗i’ can improve its utility by a unilateral change in the strategy. The resulting graph 
   should be a local Nash tree and the stability of the tree can be checked according to 
conditions mentioned in [AJM08].  
Finally, the AHP based network selection model can be used to select the best possible 
cognitive radio network for the secondary users depending on their preferences. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A. Using lpsolve from MATLAB 
Lpsolve is callable from MATLAB via an external interface or MEX-function. As such, it 
looks like lpsolve is fully integrated with MATLAB. Matrices can directly be transferred 
between MATLAB and lpsolve in both directions. The complete interface is written in C 
so it has maximum performance. The whole lpsolve API is implemented with some 
extra's specific for MATLAB (especially for matrix support). So you have full control to 
the complete lpsolve functionality via the mxlpsolve MATLAB driver. If you find that 
this involves too much work to solve an lp model then you can also work via higher-level 
M-files that can make things a lot easier.  
MATLAB is ideally suited to handle linear programming problems. These are problems 
in which you have a quantity, depending linearly on several variables that you want to 
maximize or minimize subject to several constraints that are expressed as linear 
inequalities in the same variables. If the number of variables and the number of 
constraints are small, then there are numerous mathematical techniques for solving a 
linear programming problem. Indeed these techniques are often taught in high school or 
university level courses in finite mathematics. But sometimes these numbers are high, or 
even if low, the constants in the linear inequalities or the object expression for the 
quantity to be optimized may be numerically complicated in which case a software 
package like MATLAB is required to effect a solution. 
A.1 Installation 
To make this possible, a driver program is needed: mxlpsolve (mxlpsolve.dll under 
Windows). This driver must be put in a directory known to MATLAB (specified via File, 
Set Path or via the MATLAB path command) and MATLAB can call the mxlpsolve 
solver. This driver calls lpsolve via the lpsolve shared library (lpsolve51.dll under 
Windows and liblpsolve51.so under Unix/Linux). This has the advantage that the 
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mxlpsolve driver doesn't have to be recompiled when an update of lpsolve is provided. 
The shared library must be somewhere in the Windows path. 
So note the difference between the MATLAB lpsolve driver that is called mxlpsolve and 
the lpsolve library that implements the API that is called lpsolve51. There are also some 
MATLAB script files (.m) as a quick start. To test if everything is installed correctly, 
enter mxlpsolve in the MATLAB command window. If it gives the following, then 
everything is ok: 
mxlpsolve MATLAB Interface version 5.1.0.1 
using lpsolve version 5.1.1.3 
 
Usage: [ret1, ret2, ...] = mxlpsolve('functionname', arg1, arg2, ...) 
However, if you get the following: 
mxlpsolve driver not found!!! 
Check if mxlpsolve.dll is on your system and in a directory known to 
MATLAB. 
Press enter to see the paths where MATLAB looks for the driver. 
Then MATLAB can find the mxlpsolve.m file, but not the mxlpsolve.dll file. This dll 
should be in the same directory as the .m file. 
 If you get the following: 
??? Undefined function or variable 'mxlpsolve'. 
Then MATLAB cannot find the mxlpsolve.* files. Enter path in the command line to see 
the MATLAB search path for its files. You can modify this path via File, Set Path. 
Specify the path where the mxlpsolve.* files are located on your system. 
If you get the following (Windows): 
??? Failed to initialise lpsolve library. Error 
 
in == > ...\mxlpsolve.dll 
Or (Unix/Linux): 
liblpsolve51.so: cannot open shared object file: No such file or 
directory. 
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Then MATLAB can find the mxlpsolve driver program, but the driver program cannot 
find the lpsolve library that contains the lpsolve implementation. This library is called 
lpsolve51.dll under Windows and liblpsolve51. So under Unix/Linux. 
Under Windows, the lpsolve51.dll file must be in a directory that in the PATH 
environment variable. This path can be shown via the following command in MATLAB: 
!PATH. 
It is common to place this in the WINDOWS\system32 folder. 
Under Unix/Linux, the liblpsolve51.so shared library must be either in the directories /lib 
or /usr/lib or in a directory specified by the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable.  
Note that it may also be necessary to restart MATLAB after having put the files in the 
specified directory. It was noted that MATLAB sometimes doesn't see the newly added 
files in folders until it is restarted. All this is developed and tested with MATLAB version 
6.0.0.88 Release 12. 
A.2 Solve an lp model from MATLAB via mxlpsolve 
In the following text, >> before the MATLAB commands is the MATLAB prompt. Only 
the text after >> must be entered.  
To call an lpsolve function, the following syntax must be used: 
>> [ret1, ret2, ...] = mxlpsolve('functionname', arg1, arg2, ...) 
The return values are optional and depend on the function called. Function name must 
always be enclosed between single quotes to make it alphanumerical and it is case 
sensitive. The number and type of arguments depend on the function called. Some 
functions even have a variable number of arguments and a different behaviour occurs 
depending on the type of the argument. Function name can be (almost) any of the lpsolve 
API routines (see lp_solve API reference) plus some extra MATLAB specific functions. 
Most of the lpsolve API routines use or return an lprec structure. To make things more 
robust in MATLAB, this structure is replaced by a handle. This is an incrementing 
number starting from 0 and the lprec structures are maintained internally by the 
mxlpsolve driver. However you will see not much (if any) difference in the use of it. 
Almost all callable functions can be found in the lp_solve API reference. 
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APPENDIX B. Analytic Hierarchy Process related 
Material  
B.1 Attribute scores of different application types per 
payment plan  
Table B.1 Attribute scores per payment plan for video-interactive application 
 Score Pay as you go Pay Monthly Business 
1 Bit rate Bit rate Bit rate 
3 Reputation Reputation Cost 
5 Cost Mobility support Reputation 
7 Mobility support Cost Mobility support 
Table B.2 Attribute scores per payment plan for video-streaming application 
 Score Pay as you go Pay Monthly Business 
1 Bit rate Bit rate Bit rate 
3 Cost Reputation Cost 
5 Reputation Mobility support Mobility support 
7 Mobility support Cost Reputation 
 
Table B.3 Attribute scores per payment plan for data application 
Score Pay as you go Pay Monthly Business 
1 Bit rate Bit rate Bit rate 
3 Cost Mobility support Cost 
5 Reputation Reputation Mobility support 
7 Mobility support Cost Reputation 
B.2 Weight calculation of different application types per 
payment plan  
B.2.1 Voice 
i.  pay monthly 
Maximum Eigen Value =4.34826 
C.I =0.116088 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
0.0400948 
0.691545 
0.192264 
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0.0760971 
Pair-wise Comparison Matrix 
1 0.111111 0.166667 0.333333 
9 1 7 8 
6 0.142857 1 4 
3 0.125 0.25 1 
 
ii. business 
Maximum Eigen Value =4.34826 
C.I = 0.116088 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
0.192264 
0.0760971 
0.691545 
0.0400948 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
1 4 0.142857 6 
0.25 1 0.125 3 
7 8 1 9 
0.166667 0.333333 0.111111 1 
 
B.2.2 Video Streaming 
i. pay monthly 
Maximum Eigen Value =4.34826 
C.I=0.116088 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
0.0400948 
0.192264 
0.691545 
0.0760971 
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Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
1 0.166667 0.111111 0.333333 
6 1 0.142857 4 
9 7 1 8 
3 0.25 0.125 1 
 
ii. pay as you go 
Maximum Eigen Value =4.34826 
C.I =0.116088 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
0.192264 
0.0760971 
0.691545 
0.0400948 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
1 4 0.142857 6 
0.25 1 0.125 3 
7 8 1 9 
0.166667 0.333333 0.111111 1 
 
iii. business 
Maximum Eigen Value =4.34826 
C.I =0.116088 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
0.192264 
0.0400948 
0.691545 
0.0760971 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
1 6 0.142857 4 
0.166667 1 0.111111 0.333333 
7 9 1 8 
0.25 3 0.125 1 
 
 
 200 
 
B.2.3 Video Interactive 
i. pay as you go 
Maximum Eigen Value =4.59739 
C.I =0.199129 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
0.0849364 
0.537845 
0.334111 
0.0431081 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
1 0.25 0.125 3 
4 1 4 6 
8 0.25 1 9 
0.333333 0.166667 0.111111 1 
 
ii. pay monthly 
Maximum Eigen Value =5.39012 
C.I =0.463375 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
0.0465368 
0.517157 
0.31334 
0.122967 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
1 0.166667 0.333333 0.111111 
6 1 4 6 
3 0.25 1 9 
9 0.166667 0.111111 1 
 
iii. business 
Maximum Eigen Value =4.34826 
C.I =0.116088 
 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
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0.192264 
0.0760971 
0.691545 
0.0400948 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
1 4 0.142857 6 
0.25 1 0.125 3 
7 8 1 9 
0.166667 0.333333 0.111111 1 
 
B.2.4  Data 
i. pay as you go 
Maximum Eigen Value =4.34826 
C.I =0.116088 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
0.192264 
0.0760971 
0.691545 
0.0400948 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
1 4 0.142857 6 
0.25 1 0.125 3 
7 8 1 9 
0.166667 0.333333 0.111111 1 
 
ii. pay monthly 
 
Maximum Eigen Value =4.34826 
C.I =0.116088 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
0.192264 
0.0760971 
0.691545 
0.0400948 
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Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
1 4 0.142857 6 
0.25 1 0.125 3 
7 8 1 9 
0.166667 0.333333 0.111111 1 
 
iii. business 
 
Maximum Eigen Value =4.34826 
C.I =0.116088 
 
Weights (Eigen Vector) 
0.0400948 
0.0760971 
0.691545 
0.192264 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
1 0.333333 0.111111 0.166667 
3 1 0.125 0.25 
9 8 1 7 
6 4 0.142857 1 
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APPENDIX C. cnlab Speed Test Collected data sample 
 This section shows a sample of download data rate, upload data rate and response time of 
Wi-Fi for different locations of scenario ‗1‘ taken on 3rd August 2011 between 12.25 pm 
and 13.22 pm.  
 
Figure C.0.1 Response time in milliseconds of Wi-Fi for scenario ‘1’ measured on 3rd 
August 2011 between 12:25 pm to 13:22 pm 
 
 
Figure C.2 Download and Upload data rates of Wi-Fi for scenario ‘1’ measured on 
3rd August 2011 between 12:25 pm to 13:22 pm 
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APPENDIX D. Basics of Game Theory 
In this section, background on relevant research fields is introduced. Topics covered 
include basics of game theory and non-cooperative game theory. Section D.1 gives an 
introduction to the basic principles of game theory. 
D.1 Basics of Game theory 
Game theory is a branch of mathematics that provides a suite of analytical tools to 
analyze the interactions of parties with conflicting interests. Each player has independent 
decision rights only over its own possible actions, which are confined to its strategy 
space. In general, game theory provides a formal modelling approach to situations in 
which decision makers interact with other players. It analyzes and represents such 
situations as games, where players choose different actions in an attempt to maximize 
their returns. In other words, game theory studies choice of optimal behaviour when costs 
and benefits of each option depend upon the choices of other individuals.   
Game theory is divided into two branches, called the non-cooperative and cooperative 
branches. A game is considered to be a collection of players who play different moves 
aiming at maximizing their individual payoff obtain when the game is ended. The players 
have the option of different game strategies and following one strategy or more strategies 
dictates which move to make at each given turn in the game. In the wireless networking 
context, the players can be the users controlling their devices or the network providers. 
As we assume that the devices are bound to their users, we will refer to devices as players 
and the two terms are used interchangeably here. In compliance with the practice of game 
theory, we assume that the players are rational, which means that they try to maximize 
their payoff or alternatively to minimize their costs. In a static game, players make their 
moves simultaneously whereas in a dynamic game players make their moves in turn (the 
player can decide its action depending on other player‘s actions). 
D.1.1 Static games 
A static game is one in which all players make decisions (or select a strategy) 
simultaneously, without knowledge of the strategies that are being chosen by other 
players. Even though the decisions may actually be made at different points in time, the 
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game is simultaneous because each player has no information about the decisions of 
others; thus, it is as if the decisions are made simultaneously.  
In a game G, a pure strategy for player Ei denoted by si provides a complete plan of 
action for whatever situation might arise; this fully determines the player's behaviour. 
The strategy of a player can be a single move or a set of moves during the game. 
Generally strategy is the set of possible actions. The strategy concept is sometimes 
confused with that of a move. A move is an action taken by a player at some point during 
the play of a game (e.g., in chess, moving white's Bishop a2  to b3 ). A strategy on the 
other hand is a complete algorithm for playing the game, telling a player what to do for 
every possible situation throughout the game.  
A strategy profile is a vector of strategies (s1, s2, -----, sn) one for each player Ei of a 
game. The s-i describes the strategies chosen by all other players except for a given player 
Ei. Any given strategy profile in a game may then be represented by the pair (si , s-i). The 
set of strategy profiles denoted by S is the Cartesian product of the strategy spaces over 
all players: S = S1×S2×-------×Sn. In a game G, a payoff function ui is defined for each 
player Ei. The domain of ui is the set of strategy profiles S and the range of the function is 
the set of real numbers, so that for each strategy profile (si , s-i) є S, ui (si , s-i) represents 
the player Ei‘s payoff when Ei plays strategy si and the other players follow strategies s-i.  
A simultaneous game in strategic form is defined by the tuple: G = {E, S, U} where 
                                                      
                                                       
                                                      
 
Note D.1: A game with complete information is a game in which each player has full 
knowledge of all aspects of the game. In this context, complete information is used to 
describe a game in which all players know the type of all the other players, i.e. they 
know the payoffs and strategy spaces of the other players. 
Example D.1: Consider a forwarder‘s dilemma  represented as a two player static game. 
The player p1and p2 wants to send a packet to his or her destination denoted by B and A 
respectively, in each time step using the other player as a forwarder. We assume that the 
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communication between a player and the respective receiver is possible only if the other 
player forwards the packet. The Forwarder‘s Dilemma is illustrated in Figure D.1.  
 
P1 P2 BA
 
Figure D.1 Forwarder’s Dilemma game 
If player p1 forwards the packet of p2, it costs player p1 a fixed cost 0 < C << 1, which 
represents the energy and computation spent for the forwarding action. This enables the 
communication between p2 and A, which gives p2 a benefit of 1. The payoff is the 
difference of the benefit and the cost. If player p2 forwards the packet of p1, it costs player 
p2 a fixed cost 0 < C << 1, which represents the energy and computation spent for the 
forwarding action. This enables the communication between p1 and B, which gives p1 a 
benefit of 1.  
The player p1 and p2 can decide to forward (F) the packet to the other player or to drop it 
(D); this decision represents the strategy of the player. In this game p1 is the row player 
and p2 is the column player. Each cell of the matrix corresponds to a possible 
combination of the strategies of the players and contains a pair of values representing the 
payoffs of player p1 and p2, respectively. The ‗c‘ is the cost of forwarding a packet by a 
player. 
Table D.1. Forwarder’s Dilemma game in strategic form 
p1\p2 Forward Drop 
Forward (1-c,1-c) (-c,1) 
Drop (1,-c) (0,0) 
In the rewards represented in the table, the first element is the reward to p1 and the 
second the reward to p2. This is a symmetric non zero sum game, because the players can 
mutually increase their payoffs by cooperating (i.e. from zero to 1-c). By helping each 
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other to forward, they can achieve an outcome that is better for both players than mutual 
dropping. 
D.1.2  Iterated Dominance 
A game expressed in normal (or strategic form) can be solved in many ways. The 
simplest way to solve a game is by using the concept of iterative strict dominance. 
Note D.2: Strategy   
  of player ‘i’ is said to be strictly dominated by his or her strategy 
   if, 
     
                             
The      
      is the utility or payoff of player ‗i‘ given the strategy   
 , when the 
remaining players select strategy       In example D.1 from the point of view of player 1, 
the Forward (F) strategy is strictly dominated by the Drop (D) strategy. This means we 
can eliminate the first row of the matrix since the rational player p1will never choose this 
strategy. From the point of view of player 2, the same argument leads to the elimination 
of the first column of the matrix. Thus the solution of the game is (D, D) and the payoff is 
(0, 0). You can observe that strategy pair (F, F) would lead to better payoff for both the 
players (not selected because of lack of trust between the players). It is worth to mention 
that iterated strict dominance cannot be used to solve every game. 
Example D.2: Consider a Joint Packet Forwarding Game, in which a source src wants to 
send a packet to its destination dst in each time step. To this end, it needs both devices p1 
and p2 to forward. Similar to the previous example D.1, there is a forwarding cost 0 < C 
<< 1 if a player forwards the packet of the sender. If both players forward the packet, 
then they each receive a benefit of 1 (e.g, from the sender or the receiver. This packet 
forwarding scenario is shown in Figure D.2. 
 
Figure D.2 Joint Packet Forwarding game 
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The two players have to decide whether to forward the packet simultaneously, before the 
source actually sends it. 
Table D.2. Joint Packet forwarding game in strategic form 
p1\p2 Forward Drop 
Forward (1-c,1-c) (-c,0) 
Drop (0,0) (0,0) 
 
In the Joint Packet Forwarding Game, none of the strategies of a player strictly dominates 
the other. If player p1 drops the packet, then p1 is indifferent to the move of player p2 and 
thus we cannot eliminate his strategy D based on strict dominance. 
D.1.3 Nash Equilibrium 
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile s
* 
= (si
*
, s-i
*
) in which no player has an incentive 
to unilaterally modify his or her strategy. Given the other players‘ strategies s-i
*
, player Ei 
cannot increase his or her payoff by choosing a strategy different from si
*
. The current set 
of strategies s
*
 and the corresponding payoff values constitute a Nash equilibrium. Nash 
equilibrium is said to represent a solution for a given game. 
Note D.3: Given a game G= {E, S, U}, a strategy profile s
*
 є S represents Nash 
equilibrium if and only if for every player Ei, i є {1, 2, ----, n}: 
     
     
            
             
According to the Nash equilibrium concept, the solution of the game mentioned in 
Example D.1 is (D, D) which is same as conceived by iterative dominance. The Nash 
equilibrium for Example D.2 would be (F, F) or (D, D).  
D.1.4 Pareto Optimality 
One method for identifying the desired Nash equilibrium point in a game is to compare 
strategy profiles using the concept of Pareto-optimality. Let‘s define the key concepts of 
Pareto-optimality as follows: 
Note D.4: The strategy profile s is Pareto-superior to strategy profile s
ʹ 
if for any player 
i ϵ N: 
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The strategy profile s is Pareto-superior to strategy profile s
ʹ
, if the payoff of the player 
‗i‘ is increased by switching from strategy profile s to s
ʹ 
without decreasing the payoff of 
other players. The strategy profile s
ʹ 
is Pareto-inferior to strategy profile s. 
Note D.5: The strategy profile s
po
 is Pareto-optimal (or efficient) if there exists no other 
strategy profile that is Pareto-superior to s
po
. 
In Pareto-optimal strategy profile, one cannot increase the payoff of player ‗i‘ without 
decreasing the payoff of at least one other player. 
In Example D.1, the Nash equilibrium (D, D) is not Pareto-optimal. The strategy profiles 
like (F, F), (F, D) and (D, F) are Pareto-optimal but are not Nash equilibrium. In Example 
D.2, the strategy profiles (F, F) and (D, D) are Nash equilibrium but only (F, F) is Pareto-
optimal. 
D.1.5  Repeated Games 
In repeated games, the players interact several times. Each interaction is called a stage. 
We assume that the players make their moves simultaneously in each stage. The set of 
players is defined similarly to the static game. Repeated games can be expressed in both 
strategic and extensive forms. The two player prisoner‘s dilemma game is represented as 
below:  
Table D.3. Two player Prisoner’s dilemma 
 C D 
C 2,2 -1,3 
D 3,-1 0,0 
 
In this game there are two players—a row player and a column player—each of whom 
has two possible actions: to ―cooperate‖ (C) or to ―defect‖ (D). Notice that if the game is 
played just once, then regardless of what the other player does, it is optimal (i.e., a 
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dominant strategy) for each player to play D: by doing so he gets 3 rather than 2 if the 
other player plays C, and 0 rather than −1 if the other player plays D. Thus, the predicted 
outcome of the one-shot game for each player is to play D (and thereby get a zero 
payoff), even though both would be better off if they played C (they would then each get 
2). 
In extensive form the game is represented as a tree. The root of the tree is the start of the 
game and represented with an empty circle. Each of the levels of the tree below the root 
node is called stage. In a two player game, a stage represents the sequence relation of the 
moves of the players. The sequence of moves defines a path on the tree and is referred to 
as the history h of the game. The leaf (or terminal node) of the tree defines the potential 
end of the game called outcome and it is assigned the corresponding payoff. The game 
can be either finite-horizon (finite number of stages) or infinite-horizon (infinite number 
of stages). 
The Repeated prisoner‘s dilemma game which is a repetition of the Prisoner‘s dilemma 
stage game (expressed in an extensive form) is described as follows: 
 
Figure D.3 Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
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The set of the past moves at stage t is referred to as the history h (t) of the game. If the 
move of the player i in stage t is denoted by mi (t). Then the history h (t) can be formally 
written for number of players ‗N‘ as follows: 
                                                 
For example, the history of twice repeated prisoner‘s dilemma, if both players have 
defected so far is as follows: 
                    
The strategy si defines a move for player i in the next stage t+1 for a given history h (t) of 
the game. Initially history h (0) is an empty set and   the strategy si of the players i must 
define a move mi(0) which is referred as initial move.  
For example: In the Two stage repeated prisoner‘s dilemma, the one example strategy of 
each player is DDDDD where the entries define the defecting behaviour if the following 
conditions hold as follows: 
i. Initial move h (0) =D   
ii. If the history h (1) = { (D, D)} or h (1) = { (D, F)} 
It is infeasible to make an exhaustive search in repeated games for the best strategy and 
hence for Nash equilibrium. The objectives of the players in the repeated games can be 
either to 
i. Maximize their payoffs only for the next stage and is referred as myopic games as 
the players are short-sighted optimizers. 
ii. Maximize their total payoffs during the game is called as long-sighted optimizers 
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APPENDIX E. Multi-Network System Level Simulator 
The comprehensive WiMAX network simulator developed by the research colleague 
Peng Jiang is extended to cater multi-networks namely as WiMAX and WLAN.  
In network setting module, the WLAN access point is located within the coverage area of 
WiMAX BS. The operating modes of WLAN are initialized in the simulation network 
initialization module. 
In the traffic initialization module, the users in traffic snapshots are classified into 
different payment plans. Each payment plan has different preferences for the considered 
attributes. The scores of attributes for each application type per payment plan, scores of 
application preferences and the network preference scores are computed and assigned to 
each traffic unit in traffic initialization module.  
In MCDM module, two MCDM methods Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Simple 
Additive Weighting (SAW) are implemented. In AHP, the pair-wise comparison matrix 
and geometric mean method are implemented to compute the weight of the considered 
attributes. This module takes user preferences for the considered attributes as an input 
and outputs the weight of each attribute. In SAW, the network values offered by available 
networks for the considered attributes are compared with each other and assigned a score. 
This module also computes the utility value of each traffic unit for the WiMAX and 
WLAN networks. The traffic unit is connected to the network with the highest utility 
value. 
In Game theory module, the evolutionary game theory concepts are implemented. This 
module also consists of random and inverse rank sub-modules to select a traffic unit to be 
moved. This module also stores the current subscription of each traffic unit. 
In network simulation module, the transmission power of WiMAX BS is dynamically re-
configured to extend the coverage area. At each re-configuration step, the SAW sub-
module recalculates the utility values of each traffic unit. The game theory sub-modules 
are initiated to check whether any traffic unit needs to be moved. This re-configuration 
step is repeated until the maximum transmission power of WiMAX BS is reached.   
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Figure E.1 Multi-network System Level Simulator 
